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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the essential struggle between a state’s
interest in facilitating shale oil and gas production by creating a uniform
statewide regulatory process and local governments’ interest in protect-
ing residents’ safety, wishes, and environment by exerting control or influ-
ence over drilling activities within their jurisdictions. Local jurisdictions1
across the country are paying attention to the shale oil and gas boom.2
Some jurisdictions want to encourage it, hoping it will bring jobs, custom-
ers, and tax revenues.3 Others want to control it, fearing the environmen-
tal damage it may cause.4 Many would like to require it to operate, if at
1 “Local jurisdiction” or “locality” in this Article, includes chartered municipalities and
non-chartered municipalities that are entitled home rule authority under the Ohio
Constitution, article 18, section 3, as interpreted in N. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n
v. Parma, 402 N.E.2d 519, 523–25 (1980).
2 See, e.g., Laura Arenschield, Athens Votes to Ban Fracking, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Nov. 6, 2014, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/11/05/athens-votes-to
-ban-fracking.html [https://perma.cc/84FB-PVPT]; Laura Arenschield, Ohio Counties Can’t
Vote to Ban Fracking, Husted Rules, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 14, 2015, http://www
.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/08/13/Fracking-ballots-nixed-by-Husted.html
[https://perma.cc/C27L-ZCQX]; Youngstown Voters Turn Down Anti-fracking Proposal—
Again, THE YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, Nov. 7, 2014, http://www.vindy.com/news/2014
/nov/07/youngstown-voters-turn-down-anti-frackin/ [https://perma.cc/9EHK-YX6J] (dis-
cussing the four-time failure of local drilling ban legislation in the industry-oriented city
of Youngstown). See also Michael Shellenberger & Tod Nordhaus, Campaign to Stop
Fracking Sacrifices Nature for Ideology: Column, USA TODAY, July 16, 2015, http://www
.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/07/16/natural-gas-renewable-fuels-fracking-column
/27089397/ [https://perma.cc/KP2W-ZTFK]; Dan Elliott, Colorado’s High Court to Decide
if Cities Can Ban Hydraulic Fracturing, CBS DENVER (Sept. 21, 2015), http://denver.cbs
local.com/2015/09/21/colorados-high-court-to-decide-if-cities-can-ban-fracking-2/ [https://
perma.cc/RA6L-3EAX]; Susan Phillips, Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Hear More Argu-
ments on Act 13, STATEIMPACT: PENNSYLVANIA (Oct. 30, 2015, 3:12 PM), https://stateimpact
.npr.org/pennsylvania/2015/10/30/pennsylvania-supreme-court-to-hear-more-arguments
-on-act-13/ [https://perma.cc/T9F7-LMK4].
3 See, e.g., Youngstown Voters Turn Down Anti-fracking Proposal—Again, supra note 2;
Youngstown, Ohio is a City Changed by Fracking, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 21, 2015, http://www
.buffalonews.com/city-region/youngstown-ohio-is-a-city-changed-by-fracking-20140518
[https://perma.cc/PCH3-ACBY]; Ohio Oil & Gas Ass’n (OOGA), proponent testimony
supporting Ohio H. Bill 278 before the Ohio H. R. 125th Gen. Assembly Energy and Env’t
Comm., Oct. 8, 2013, http://208.68.184.222/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/HB278TESTesti
mony-1.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Aaron Marshall, New Quinnipiac Poll: Ohioans Want Hydro-fracking Stopped
Until More Study is Done, THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.cleveland.com
/open/index.ssf/2012/01/new_quinnipiac_poll_ohioans_st.html [https://perma.cc/8URY
-33L9] (summarizing recent Quinnipiac polls, finding a margin of seventy-two percent
to twenty-three percent of Ohio voters wanted to suspend hydraulic fracturing until there
are further studies on its impact, however, the same polls show eighty-five percent to
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all, on their own terms—local terms. Local jurisdictions seeking to con-
trol or influence the work of the shale oil and gas industry argue it is
within their right of self-government to enact ordinances to protect the
health and welfare of their citizens and communities.5 They believe some
ordinances that are protective of health and welfare may also sometimes
effect drilling.6 State legislation in many states,7 including Ohio, suggests
the contrary.8 For example, in Ohio, the legislature long ago enacted the
eleven percent of Ohioans believe the industry can create jobs). While public opinion
seems fractured, environmental and lobbyist groups loudly oppose the promise of the
natural gas economy in Ohio. See Anti-fracking Charter Amendment to be on Nov. 4 Ballot
in Youngstown, THE YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, Sept. 2, 2014, http://www.vindy.com/news
/2014/sep/02/anti-fracking-charter-amendment-be-nov-4-ballot-yo/ [https://perma.cc/9HXY
-BW6B] (showing the tension in attitudes between industry and environmentalist groups
on the impacts of drilling for the city).
5 See, e.g., Sara Dorn, Anti-fracking Bill of Rights Will Be on Gates Mills November Ballot
After Village Officials Change Stance, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 8, 2014, http://www.cleve
land.com/hillcrest/index.ssf/2014/09/anti-fracking_bill_of_rights_w.html [https://perma
.cc/DF6U-5L47] (discussing a small-town petition to adopt a charter amendment pre-
venting “fracking in the village”).
6 See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 139 (Ohio 2015) (sup-
porting the proposition that “municipalities have statutory authority to regulate land
uses within zoning districts to promote the public health, safety, convenience, comfort,
prosperity, and general welfare.”).
7 In 2012 alone, fourteen states enacted or refined comprehensive oil and gas legislation,
which in each state restricted local control to at least some degree. Enacting states
included Idaho, Kansas, and Utah. See Jacquelyn Pless, States Take the Lead on
Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing: Overview of 2012 State Legislation, NAT. CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES 1 (March, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/NaturalGasDev
Leg313.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW7A-E8BC]. In 2015, Colorado and Oklahoma were
considering legislation that would explicitly preempt local oil and gas regulation. Id.
Some of the proposed measures would allow for certain ordinances (such as those related
to road use, traffic, noise, or odor) but would prevent outright bans. According to the
National Conference of State Legislatures, numerous states have attempted, or are
currently attempting, to preserve local control of fracking in a number of ways including:
legislators in ten states have proposed restrictions about where wells can be located and
how close they can be to each other, legislators in at least seven states are considering
bills requiring additional disclosure rules for chemicals, and legislators in at least nine
states are considering measure to regulate the transport, treatment, and disposal of
wastewater produced from fracking. Id. In addition, several states (Colorado and North
Dakota among them) have joined Wyoming in a lawsuit questioning the Bureau of Land
Management’s authority to impose a regulatory framework on what has traditionally
been under the jurisdiction of state officials. See Kristy Hartman, Economies of Shale, ST.
LEGISLATURES MAG. (June 1, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natu
ral-resources/economies-of-shale.aspx [https://perma.cc/75WV-7XX9].
8 See, e.g., 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3303–3304 (2016), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis
/LI/consCheck.cfm?txtType=HTM&ttl=58 [https://perma.cc/3JM2-Y6BF]; N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. § 23-0303 (1981), http://codes.findlaw.com/ny/environmental-conservation-law/env
-sect-23-0303.html [https://perma.cc/29ES-4LHM]; H.B. 40, 84th Leg. (Tex. 2015), http://www
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original Ohio Revised Code section 1509.02.9 In its current form it bestows
on the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas
Resources Management “sole and exclusive authority to regulate” in the
field of oil and gas.10 In recent years, the Ohio legislature has lengthened
and strengthened this statute primarily with respect to its assertion that
it preempts local control in a broad area of oil and gas regulation.
Still, some local jurisdictions have enacted outright drilling bans,11
others have enacted local permit requirements, fees, or inspections for oil
and gas activities,12 and still others hope to control oil and gas operations
by controlling traffic, noise, or aesthetics.13 Some local jurisdictions passed
resolutions opposing what they see as the Ohio legislature’s special treat-
ment of the oil and gas industry14—by attempting to exempt the industry
from all local control. They argue that despite apparent preemption by
state legislation local control ordinances should be permissible under the
home rule authority they claim through Ohio’s constitution.15 This author-
ity purports to grant local jurisdictions “authority to exercise all powers
of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/billtext/pdf/HB00040F.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/3L
MX-S3Q4]; S.B. 809, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us
/cf_pdf/2015-16%20ENR/SB/SB809%20ENR.PDF [https://perma.cc/BD2T-UBM4].
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013).
10 Id.
11 Several Ohio cities and towns sought to ban fracking through the November 2014 bal-
lot, including the cities of Athens, Youngstown, and Kent. See, e.g., David DeWitt, Anti-frack-
ing Group Looks Beyond Ballot Initiative Toward Continuing Efforts, THE ATHENS NEWS,
Oct. 29, 2014, http://www.athensnews.com/ohio/article-43560-anti-fracking-group-looks
-beyond-ballot-initiative-toward-continuing-efforts.html [https://perma.cc/4H85-B3YT];
David Lange, Restore Rights to Real People, CHAGRIN VALLEY TIMES, Oct. 2, 2014, http://www
.chagrinvalleytoday.com/viewpoint/our_viewpoint/article_cb5fba80-4992-11e4-b97a-0017a
43b2370.html [https://perma.cc/MB75-L5BW]; Matthew Merchant, Rallying for Local Frack-
ing Regulations, KENT WIRED, Oct. 12, 2014, http://www.kentwired.com/latest_updates
/article_44516b06-527f-11e4-a15c-0017a43b2370.html [https://perma.cc/L6K6-FW32].
12 The cities of Munroe Falls and Broadview Heights are among Ohio localities that have
tried to exert control over drilling activity using zoning regulations and other ordinances,
rather than outright bans. See Sara Dorn, The Fracking Debate: How Communities are
Trying to Control Drilling, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 14, 2014, http://www.cleveland.com
/hillcrest/index.ssf/2014/07/the_fracking_debate_how_commun.html [https://perma.cc /S93S
-KJVY].
13 See Bob Downing, Communities Seek Ways to Override State Control of Oil and Gas




15 See Brief of Appellant at 2–3, State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d
85 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 2013) (No. 2013-0465), 2013 WL 5229893, at 2.
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local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict
with general laws.”16
This Article explores the nationally common problem of tension
and conflict among state oil and gas statutes, constitutional home rule, and
local control by considering intersections and tensions among the Ohio
Constitution’s home rule authority, the Ohio oil and gas law’s preemption
provision, and the many regulatory efforts of Ohio’s local governments.
It explores the scope of the Ohio Constitution’s home rule authority, in
part, by evaluating courts’ statements on the validity of several types of
local ordinances, as they confront home rule and a legislative attempt at
preemption. Types of local ordinances evaluated include those that pro-
hibit or ban drilling, those that impose additional permitting fees, hear-
ings or other requirements upon drillers, and those that pertain to more
traditional exercises of zoning authority. The Article also considers some
similar local control efforts in the region—in particular, in New York and
Pennsylvania—which have constitutional home rule provisions similar
to Ohio’s, and where, like Ohio, the shale oil and gas industry is active. By
considering the constitutions, legislation, and local control efforts of nearby
states that are, like Ohio, within the Utica, Marcellus, and Barnett shale
plays, this Article gauges the legal circumstances under which localities
might regulate the actions of the shale oil and gas industry within their
borders, and under what circumstances these efforts might succeed. Be-
cause this problem presents itself throughout the country, this Article looks
briefly at similar circumstances in other regions, in particular, Colorado
and Texas. These states have active shale oil and gas industries, legisla-
tures vigorously working to preempt local control, and some engaged local
communities hoping to exert some influence over oil and gas activities in
their jurisdictions.
Although it comes in many variations, the main question is this:
does constitutional home rule, when coupled with statutory preemption
of local control, allow any room for local regulation of the shale oil and
gas industry?
I. THE MANY MASTERS OF SHALE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION:
LEGISLATION, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COURTS
A. Ohio’s Oil and Gas Law
Theoretically, localities can use their police power to regulate
activities within their borders for the health, safety, and welfare of their
16 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
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citizens.17 Ohio’s constitution even includes a home rule provision to help
protect this authority.18 Localities can enact and enforce substantial con-
trols over the activities within their borders.19 They can enact noise ordi-
nances, zoning plans, and traffic controls. They can decide where houses
can be built, and in which areas commercial and industrial activities may
take place. These are traditional exercises of land use and zoning powers.20
That said, state legislatures sometimes enact laws that claim
specific, and sometimes broad, regulatory authority, thereby preempting
the regulatory power of the local jurisdiction. That is what the Ohio
legislature did in Ohio Revised Code section 1509.02, Ohio’s oil and gas
law. This section will address the evolution of that statute to understand
how, through serial amendments, section 1509.02 evolved to become the
restrictive, putatively preemptive statute it is today.21
17 See, e.g., State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 164 N.E.2d 574, 575–76 (Ohio 1960) (noting the
inherent power of municipalities to perform certain functions without state approval);
Fondessy Enter. v. City of Oregon, 492 N.E.2d 797, 799–800 (1986) (explaining that
“Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution grants municipalities ‘. . . the power to
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.’ ” This “power of home rule” is
constitutionally conferred upon municipalities and may not be withdrawn by the General
Assembly); Akron v. Scalera, 19 N.E.2d 279, 279–80 (1939). See also George L. Blum,
Annotation, Validity of Zoning Regulations Prohibiting or Regulating Removal or Exploi-
tation of Oil and Gas, Including Hydrofracking, 84 A.L.R. 6th 133 (2013).
18 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
19 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Shaker Heights, 507 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ohio 1987) (holding that
it was within a city’s home rule police power to regulate traffic, despite a state statute
that all cities keep their streets “open”); Cincinnati v. Welty, 413 N.E.2d 1177, 1178 (Ohio
1980) (holding that the City of Cincinnati had traditional home rule purview over what
type of vehicle could drive on its streets when that had a “real and substantial relation”
to its police powers).
20 See Wendy H. Gridley, Municipal Home Rule, 128 MEMBERS ONLY 8 (Jan. 26, 2010),
http://www.lsc.ohio.gov/membersonly/128municipalhomerule.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QRL
-32U7] (explaining that a municipality has the power to enact zoning regulations to ad-
dress concerns such as “traffic control, traffic volume, property values, enhancement of
municipal revenue, costs of municipal improvement, land use, nuisance abatement, and
the general welfare and development of the community as a whole.”). See also Morrison,
37 N.E.3d at 128 (O’Donnell, J., concurring) (explaining that, in addition to the Ohio
Constitution, municipalities’ zoning powers are derived from O.R.C. § 713.07 which
provides that municipalities may regulate or restrict the use of a premises if the restric-
tion is “in the interest of the promotion of health, safety, convenience, comfort, prosperity,
or general welfare”).
21 This section draws heavily on the author’s previously published column in Crain’s
Cleveland Business regarding the development of Ohio’s oil and gas law, granting in-
creasing control to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and decreasing involve-
ment of local authorities. See Heidi G. Robertson, The Road to State Control Over Drilling
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The Ohio legislature worked hard to establish tight state regula-
tory control over shale oil and gas operations. It created a uniform state-
wide regulatory system by constraining the ability of local jurisdictions to
enact their own controls, and by consolidating decision-making authority
in a state agency. When Ohio Revised Code section 1509.02 was first en-
acted in 1964,22 it merely “created in the department of natural resources
the division of oil and gas . . . .”23 The Ohio legislature has amended it
many times since then. Most of the amendments are not relevant to the
local control question—instead dealing with funding issues.24
In 2000, an amendment combined the Division of Mines and Rec-
lamation and the Division of Oil and Gas—both within the Ohio Depart-
ment of Natural Resources (“DNR”), and created the Division of Mineral
Resources Management.25 This change, although it affected the Division
of Oil and Gas, did not yet start the legislation’s march towards eliminat-
ing local control of shale oil and gas regulation.
The legislature’s push to consolidate decision-making authority
in the state agency began, in earnest, in 2004 with House Bill 278.26 The
legislature made some important and lasting changes. This is where it
first gave the Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management “sole and
exclusive authority to regulate the permitting, location, and spacing of
oil and gas wells within the state.”27 It declared the “regulation of oil and
gas activities [to be] a matter of general statewide interest that requires
uniform statewide regulation” and it declared the “rules adopted under
[the new law to be] a comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of
is Paved With Legislation, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS., Aug. 22, 2014, http://www.crains
cleveland.com/article/20140822/BLOGS05/140829925 [https://perma.cc/N9VX-HYBZ].
22 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 1964).
23 Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 1977), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1509.02 (Supp. 1984) (adding the following language: “All fines imposed under 1509.99
of the Revised Code shall be paid to the treasurer of state and credited by him to the oil
and gas well plugging fund created by section 1509.071 of the Revised Code.”).
24 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (1984), amended
by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (Supp. 1995) (providing for the creation of an “oil and
gas permit fee” special account which would be appropriated to the division of oil and gas
biennially); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (1995), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1509.02 (1999) (removing the biennial appropriation provision and instead provided
that “the fund shall be used only for the expenses of the division associated with the
administration of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978”).
25 1999 Ohio Laws 45.
26 H.B. 278, 125th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2004) (enacted), updated by 2004 Ohio Laws 98;
see also Robertson, supra note 21.
27 2004 Ohio Laws 98 (codified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2004)).
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the locating, drilling, and operating of oil and gas wells within this state,
including site restoration and disposal of wastes from those wells.”28
As if these changes were not sufficiently damaging to local con-
trol, the Ohio Legislative Services’ bill analysis notes that the new law
also “repeal[ed] all statutory authority of local governments to regulate
oil and gas exploration and operation.”29 Whereas the earlier version of the
law allowed concurrent authority—that is, authority of the state as well as
local jurisdictions—the 2004 amendment stripped that away. According
to the bill analysis, under the former law, the Division of Mineral Resources
Management “had a certain amount of concurrent jurisdiction with mu-
nicipal corporations, counties, and townships to regulate the exploration
and operation of oil and gas wells. An applicant for a state permit to drill
a new oil and gas well was required to include in the application to the
Division a sworn statement that the applicant would comply with all local
requirements related to the drilling or operation of an oil or gas well.”30
Although the aforementioned concurrent jurisdiction was found in a sep-
arate section—1509.06(i),31 it was an important legislative nod to the
authority of local jurisdictions.
In fact, the prior version of the law could not be construed to prevent
any municipal corporation “from enacting and enforcing health and safety
standards for the drilling and exploration for oil and gas, provided . . .”
these standards were not less restrictive than state law.32 Still, counties
and townships were precluded from requiring any permits or license re-
garding drilling, or imposing their own minimum acreage or set-back
requirements.33 So, even when the statute protected local control, it lim-
ited local control.
In the 2004 amendment, section 1509.02 included language specifi-
cally reserving limited authority for localities. It stated that “[n]othing
in this section affects the authority granted to the director of transporta-
tion and local authorities in section . . . 4513.34 of the Revised Code.”34
Section 4513.34 provides the director of transportation and local authorities
the power to issue heavy load permits for roads within the jurisdiction.35
28 Id.
29 OHIO LEG. SERV. COMM’N, OHIO FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, 2004 H.B. 278 (2004).
30 Id.
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.06(I) (West 2015).
32 Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 141–42.
33 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.39 (West 2016).
34 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2004).
35 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.34 (West 2013).
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Certainly because shale oil and gas development requires substantial use
of trucks, jurisdictions could use that authority to effect shale oil and gas
development—yet the legislature retained it.
Later, in 2011, the Ohio legislature broadened section 1509.02’s
reach and tightened its grip. It added the words “and production opera-
tions” as follows: “[t]he division has sole and exclusive authority to regulate
the permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas wells and production op-
erations within the state.”36 This addition of production operations broad-
ened the section’s ever more inclusive list of oil and gas-related activities
explicitly reserved for exclusive government control by the Ohio DNR,
and thereby tightened the state agency’s control over the activities of the
shale oil and gas industry within Ohio.
This 2011 version also added qualifying language to the portion
of the law that had preserved the limited authority granted to local
government by some other sections of the Ohio Revised Code. In particu-
lar, it added language to modify Ohio Revised Code section 723.01 (to
control the use of roads within the jurisdiction), curtailing that section’s
preservation of local authority.37 Whereas the earlier version of section
1509.02 ended the relevant paragraph by preserving section 723.01’s
limited local authority, this newer version qualified it. It added “provided
they do not obstruct oil and gas activities and operations.”38
In the version of section 1509.02 that was effective from Septem-
ber 29, 2011, to September 9, 2012, the legislature added further restric-
tive language, presumably to expand evidence of state control over shale
and gas activities. The new language further indicated state control by
“excepting only those activities regulated under federal laws for which
oversight has been delegated to the environmental protection agency and
activities regulated under section 6111.02 to 6111.029 of the Revised
Code.”39 By excepting EPA-controlled activities, the legislature impliedly
reserves for the Ohio DNR all issues that do not pertain to “off pad” issues,
such as EPA’s traditional areas of control in air, water, and waste. The
Ohio Revised Code sections the legislature excepted from Ohio DNR con-
trol pertain to isolated wetland designation, isolated wetland permits, re-
view of proposed filling of wetlands, wetland mitigation banks and impact,
36 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
37 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (West 2016) (giving municipalities “special power to
regulate the use of the streets.”).
38 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
39 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2012).
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and discharge of material into isolated wetlands, all areas within EPA’s
traditional areas of expertise and control.40
This iteration of section 1509.02 once again expanded the explicitly
listed oil and gas related activities, for which regulatory authority would
be reserved for the Ohio DNR, to include: “all aspects of the locating,
drilling, well stimulation, completing, and operating of oil and gas wells
within this state, including site construction and restoration, permitting
related to those activities, and the disposal of wastes from those wells
(new language in italics).”41 The entire list of activities now reserved for
the Ohio DNR’s Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management is huge.
This ultimate list results from repeated efforts, over a decade of amend-
ments by the Ohio legislature, to ensure that the statute would deliver as
much specific authority to the Ohio DNR Division of Oil and Gas Resources
Management as possible by precisely enumerating the activities within
the Division’s authority. The continued expansions of coverage were also
likely intended to encourage the sections’ interpretations—by the courts
and by localities—as a general law, thus preempting local control. Re-
served activities now include “all aspects of the locating, drilling, well
stimulation, completing, and operating of oil and gas wells within this
state, including site construction and restoration, permitting related to
those activities, and the disposal of wastes from those wells.”42
Another notable addition in the latest change to the statute was
not made to the ever-growing list of Division-controlled activities. Instead,
it was three sentences added to follow that lengthy list. The new lan-
guage further emphasizes the Division’s “sole and exclusive authority”
and strives to assist it in exercising this control.43 It says:
In order to assist the Division in the furtherance of its sole
and exclusive authority as established in this section, the
chief may enter into agreements with other state agencies
for advice and consultation, including visitations at the
surface location of a well on behalf of the division. Such
cooperative agreements do not confer on the other state
40 The statute specifically exempts both “activities regulated under federal laws for which
oversight has been delegated to the environmental protection agency” and “sections
6111.02 to 6111.028 of the Revised Code” which are regulated by the state EPA. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013).
41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2012).
42 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (2013) (current version, codified Sept. 29, 2013).
43 Id.
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agency any authority to administer or enforce this chapter
and rules adopted under it. In addition, such cooperative
agreements shall not be construed to dilute or diminish
the division’s sole and exclusive authority as established
under this section.44
So, the Ohio legislature has worked hard to make sure that almost
everything a local jurisdiction might like to regulate regarding drilling
is prohibited by virtue of the Ohio DNR’s now broad and explicit statutory
authority. The statute has evolved from merely creating a Division of
Mineral Resources Management within the Ohio DNR to giving a Division
of Oil and Gas Resources Management authority over a lengthy, enumer-
ated list of activities. Finally, cross-referencing section 1509.02 with other
areas of the Ohio Revised Code and the Ohio Administrative Code ex-
presses how completely the Legislature has aimed to control the shale oil
and gas development process as a whole.45 It is no surprise that localities,
like Munroe Falls, Ohio,46 and others have attempted to find space, some-
where or somehow, to exercise a modicum of influence over what happens
within their borders.47
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-01 to -08 (2012) (listing administrative rules for
activities associated with natural gas drilling); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.03 (West
2012) (allocating State power to general topics list related to drilling, including safety and
waste containment); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.021 (West 2011) (controlling locations
of new wells built).
46 In 2011, the City of Munroe Falls sued to stop Beck Energy from initiating a drilling
project in the city. Beck Energy had obtained a state permit form the Ohio Department
of Natural Resources, but Munroe Falls claimed that the driller must also comport with
its municipal ordinances. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2011-04
-1897 (Summit Cnty. Ct. C.P. May 3, 2011), rev’d, 989 N.E.2d 85 (2013).
47 Ohio localities that have established regulations on the oil and gas drilling industry
include: Broadview Heights (struck down by Bass Energy, Inc., v. Broadview Heights, No.
CV-14-828074 (Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. C.P. Mar. 10, 2015) (Norton Rose Fullbright), Niles,
Mansfield, Yellow Springs, and Oberlin, banning drilling using rights-based city ordinances;
the Village of Hartville, Hinckley Township, Medina Township, York Township, Bowling
Green, Brunswick, the Village of Burton, Plain Township, Sharon Township, Canal Fulton,
the City of Girard, Madison Township, the City of Athens, and Munroe Falls (ruled unconsti-
tutional in Beck Energy Corp.¸ 37 N.E.3d at 128) regulating drilling through city ordinances
based on municipal police powers; Heath, placing local regulations on drilling not amounting
to a ban; and Canton, North Canton, the Village of South Russell, Stow, Randolph Township,
Cincinnati, Chester Township, the Village of Meyers Lake, passing resolutions disapproving
of the Governor or Ohio General Assembly’s development of state control of drilling projects.
Copies of the original ordinances are no longer available online, but are available with the
author; for a list of local regulations in Ohio and other states, see Local Resolutions Against
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Ohio State Representative Debbie Phillips has attempted to reverse
the Ohio legislature’s persistent march toward eliminating local control.
In May 2016, she introduced House Bill 522. HB522, the short title of
which is “Oil and gas wells—local approval/ conversion-injection wells,”
seeks to amend portions of the Ohio oil and gas law to, among other things,
require municipal or township approval prior to the issuance of an oil or
gas well permit.48 It would remove the language in section 1509.02 declar-
ing oil and gas regulation a matter of statewide general interest requiring
uniform statewide control.49 It would remove the entire sentence indicat-
ing the many oil and gas related activities over which the Ohio DNR has
sole and exclusive regulatory authority.50 Though these changes would
remove the statutory preemption problem for local jurisdictions seeking
to regulate oil and gas activities, and add an explicit approval for local
governments, they are highly unlikely (in the author’s opinion) to be re-
ported out of the Ohio House Energy and Natural Resources Committee.51
B. The Ohio Constitution’s Home Rule Provision
In amending section 1509.02, the Ohio legislature expanded that
statute’s regulatory authority over oil and gas related decisions to the
apparent exclusion of all local regulation. But to what extent does that
expansion, however large, leave room for localities to regulate—if it leaves
any room at all? Ohio was once known for its strong Constitutional support
of its abundant local governments.52 Article XVIII, Section 3, of the Ohio
Constitution gives municipalities “authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws.”53 So, when an Ohio municipality wants to control land use
Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org
/insight/local-resolutions-against-fracking [https://perma.cc/KU42-NYDS].
48 H.B. 522, 131 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016) (referring to Energy and Natural
Resources Committee May 26, 2016).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Dan Langshaw, HB 522: Letter to the Editor, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 6, 2016, http://
www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/02/ohio_cities_home_rule_rights_f.html.
52 See generally Mayo Fesler, The Progress of Municipal Home Rule in Ohio, 5 NAT’L.
MUN. REV. 242 (2006) (discussing the history of the home rule amendment to the Ohio
Constitution); but cf. Harvey Walker, Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1 (1948) (analyzing the traditions of municipal control in Ohio before the home
rule amendment was passed).
53 Ohio’s home rule amendment was ratified in 1912, see OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. See
also Jonathon Angarola, Ohio’s Home-Rule Amendment: Why Ohio’s General Assembly
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decisions within its borders by setting spacing or set-back requirements
for shale oil and gas wells, it sounds at first blush, like that action might
be permissible under the Ohio Constitution’s home rule provision.
Home rule advocates champion local control as an example of
democracy at its best, where local citizens have a real say in what their
government does on their behalf.54 Those in favor of local control in many
areas of law characterize Ohio’s history of home rule as part of Ohio’s
identity.55 Through the 1990s, there was an apparent tradition of home
rule in Ohio, across numerous areas of law.56 Some areas have been, and
remain, squarely in the purview of municipalities—for instance, the
structure and organization of local governments, and the procedures
controlling local police powers.57 But around the turn of the 21st century,
the Ohio legislature began, in earnest, to erode this tradition—not just
in the area of oil and gas development—but in multiple areas of economic
interest to the state. In his twenty-year review of municipal home rule
in Ohio, George Vaubel calls this trend an inevitable product of a na-
tional movement towards centralization.58 Since the 1980s, Ohio’s courts
have moved from a restrictive to a sweeping construction of the notion of
“general laws.”59 The result has been to construe the police power scope
Creating Regional Governments Would Combat the Regional Race to the Bottom under
Current Home-Rule Principles, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 865 (2015) (discussing the history
and policy behind Ohio’s home rule provision and its role in encouraging unhealthy compe-
tition among local jurisdictions).
54 See generally Stephen Cianca, Home Rule in Ohio Counties: Legal and Constitutional
Perspectives, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 533, 534 (1994).
55 See, e.g., Ohio Cities’ Home Rule Rights Face Another Threat, This Time Over Traffic
Cameras, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 18, 2014, http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014
/02/ohio_cities_home_rule_rights_f.html [https://perma.cc/D3V3-AEW7]; Robert Higgs, In Vic-
tory for Home Rule, Supreme Court Says Cleveland, Other Cities, Can Regulate Tow Trucks,
THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 21, 2014, http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/01/in_vic
tory_for_home_rule_supre.html [https://perma.cc/Z4M3-FJCY]; Oberlin Should Assert Its
Home-Rule Rights and Not Surrender Public Safety to Armed Bullies, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 12, 2013, http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/09/outgunned_by_the_ero
sion_of_ho.html [https://perma.cc/H8JG-UYUH]; Kevin O’Brien, Ohio Supreme Court Under-
mines Home Rule and Cleveland’s Future, THE PLAIN DEALER, June 11, 2009, http://www
.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2009/06/ohio_supreme_court_undermines.html/ [https://
perma.cc/JE2R-M6NR].
56 George D. Vaubel, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio (1976–1995), 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
143 (1995); see also Lavea Brachman, Legislating Sustainable Design: The Challenge of
Local Control and Political Will, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10740 (Aug. 2010).
57 See, e.g., Wagner, 164 N.E.2d at 578 (noting the “inherent” power of municipalities to
perform certain functions without state approval).
58 Id.
59 Vaubel, supra note 56, at 144–45.
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of local control ever more strictly.60 In the 1990s, the Ohio Supreme
Court began to make more frequent its use of the doctrine that a local
regulation may not conflict with the general laws of the state.61 This has
produced a marked shift towards state control of once-locally regulated
concerns, including labor, welfare, waste disposal, utilities, and more.62
More recently, Ohio’s regulatory balance has tipped even more
towards statewide control of areas from behavioral control to commerce.
This has occurred through legislative restructuring of regulatory regimes63
and through courts’ increasingly stringent construction of the “general
law” preemption doctrine.64 Some specific areas that have experienced
reductions in local control back include municipal residency require-
ments for public officials,65 municipal lending and housing regulations,66
60 Id. at 177–78.
61 See Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. Parma, 564 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1990).
62 Dorn, supra note 12.
63 Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ohio 2002) (articulating a new, four-part test for
determining what is a general law for the purposes of home rule analysis); see, e.g., Lima
v. State, 909 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio 2009) (upholding a state regulatory scheme controlling
wages and employment conditions after a home rule challenge). For a thorough summary of
regulatory and court-made limitations on home rule powers, see Gridley, supra note 20.
64 Compare Vill. of W. Jefferson v. Robinson, 205 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 1965) (applying the
relaxed general law test characteristic of early home rule jurisprudence) with Canton,
766 N.E.2d at 965 (announcing a new, 4-part general law analysis, amounting to heightened
scrutiny). See, e.g., Lima, 909 N.E.2d at 616 (upholding a statute which prohibited politi-
cal subdivisions from imposing residency requirements on employees as a condition of
their employment and holding that the home rule provision of Ohio’s Constitution could
not impair the legislature’s power to enact legislation pursuant to the general welfare
clause). See also Rocky River v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103, 104 (Ohio
1989) (approving a state mandate for binding arbitration between a city and safety forces
if negotiations between the parties broke down).
65 See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006) (holding that
Ohio’s predatory lending statutes are general laws within the meaning of Ohio’s home
rule amendment because, in enacting these laws, the General Assembly was acting on
a matter of statewide concern). Accordingly, city ordinances that sought to forbid certain
types of loans, which were expressly authorized under the statute, conflicted with the
state statute and therefore, the city ordinances were deemed unconstitutional. See also
Joe Mulligan, Not in Your Backyard: Ohio’s Prohibition on Residency Requirements for
Police Officers, Firefighters, and Other Municipal Employees, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 351,
366 (2012); Lima, 909 N.E.2d at 616.
66 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1332.22(J) (West 2007) (“The continued development
of Ohio’s video service market and promotion of infrastructure investment are matters
of statewide concern and are properly subject to exercises of this state’s police power.”).
See also Brett Altier, Municipal Predatory Lending Regulation in Ohio: The Dispropor-
tionate Impact of Preemption on Ohio’s Cities, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125, 139 (2011); Am. Fin.
Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 776.
2016] WHEN STATES’ LEGISLATION & CONSTITUTIONS COLLIDE 71
and cable television and video regulation.67 Still, even though the home
rule provision seems to be eroding, some have noted its powerful political
hold on Ohioans.68
The oil and gas industry argues that Ohio’s oil and gas statute
amounts to an occupation of the field of oil and gas regulation, and that
it is a general law, against which local rules would conflict and therefore
be preempted and void.69 This means they believe local oil and gas regu-
lation falls outside the protection of the Ohio Constitution’s home rule
provision. But does it? The Ohio Supreme Court has written, on many oc-
casions, about its process for carrying out a home rule analysis to deter-
mine whether a local action is preempted by state statute or protected by
home rule.70 The Ohio courts current rule on home rule protection is that
“a state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when (1) the
ordinance is in conflict with the statute; (2) the ordinance is an exercise
of the police power, rather than of local self-government; and (3) the
statute is a general law.”71
The first question is whether the local ordinance effecting oil and
gas operations is an exercise of local self-government or an exercise of local
police power.72 This matters because an exercise of local self-government
will stand on its own and an exercise of police power requires further re-
view to determine whether it is in conflict with a general law.73 For the
ordinance to fall into the local self-government category, and thereby stand
without question under the Ohio Constitution’s home rule provision, it
must pertain “solely to the government and administration of the inter-
nal affairs of the municipality.”74 If so, the ordinance will survive because
the Ohio Constitution says that it should.75 The Ohio court has provided
67 Gregory M. Saul, Constitutional Issues Under Ohio’s New Regulatory Framework for
Video Service Providers, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 819, 837 (2009); see also OHIO REV. CODE
§§ 1332.21–1332.34 (West 2009).
68 Melanie Shwab, Crossing the Home-Rule Boundaries Should be Mandatory: Advocating
for a Watershed Approach to Zoning and Land Use in Ohio, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463
(2010) (arguing in favor of state-level land use control, but identifying the localist
tradition of home rule as “deeply engrained in the politics of Ohio’s local governments.”).
69 Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, at 7–8.
70 See, e.g., Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 963; see also Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde,
896 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio 2008).
71 Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 966.
72 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 92 (citing Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 24).
73 Id.
74 Id. (citing Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 30 (quoting Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 880
N.E.2d 906, ¶ 11 (Ohio 2008), quoting Beachwood v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 148
N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 1958)).
75 The Ohio Constitution vests with a municipality the power “to adopt and enforce within
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a test for this, too. The task is to divine whether the results or impact of
the ordinance’s implementation effect only the municipality, or whether
it has “extraterritorial” effect.76 If there is extraterritorial impact of the
ordinance, then the ordinance does not pertain “solely to the government
and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality,” and the
court would send the question of the ordinance’s status to the General
Assembly for a determination.77
If the ordinance is not one of local self-government, the next piece
of analysis is to determine whether the ordinance is an exercise of the
municipality’s police power—that is, its power to protect public health,
safety, morals, or the general welfare—as opposed to its power of local
self-government.78 If the ordinance is one of solely local governmental con-
cern, it will stand.79 If the ordinance is an exercise of the municipality’s
police power, it will stand only if it is not in conflict with a general law.80
This means that a critical part of the analysis is to determine whether
the potentially conflicting statute counts as a general law. If the statute
is a general law, and if the police power–supported ordinance conflicts with
it, the general law will trump the ordinance.81 If the statute is a general
law, and if the police power–supported ordinance does not conflict with
it, the ordinance may survive.82 If, however, the statute is not a general
law, the ordinance could stand on its own under the jurisdiction’s police
power authority.83
Next, then, is to determine when a statute counts as a general law,
such that conflict with it would void a police power–authorized ordinance.
General laws are laws “which prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens
generally, and which operate with general uniform application through-
out the state under the same circumstances and conditions.”84 The Ohio
court set forth its widely used test on this issue in Canton v. State:
their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict
with general laws.” OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; see also Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d at 799.
76 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 92 (citing Kettering v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 496 N.E.2d
983, 993 (Ohio 1986) (quoting Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 239 N.E.2d
75 (Ohio 1968), quoting Beachwood, 148 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 1958)).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 92–93 (quoting Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 25).
79 Id. at 92 (quoting Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 24).
80 Id. at 93 (quoting Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 25).
81 Id. (quoting Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 25).
82 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 93) (citing Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d 797).
83 Id. (citing Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d 797).
84 Id. at 92 (citing Smith Family Trust v. Hudson Bd. of Zoning & Bldg. Appeals, 9th Dist.
No. 24471, 2009-Ohio-2557, 2009 WL 1539065, at ¶ 10 (quoting Garcia v. Siffrin Residential
Ass’n, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1370 (Ohio 1980))).
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To constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule
analysis, a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and
comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts
of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the
state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations,
rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power
of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or
similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon
citizens generally.85
So, to be a general law, the statute must meet all four prongs of the
Canton analysis. In local regulation of oil and gas law, the fourth Canton
element is central: did the Ohio legislature prescribe a general rule of
conduct on all citizens of the state?
C. Local Control Under Ohio’s Oil and Gas Statute
This section will discuss the Ohio courts’ views on the question
whether the state legislature created a general rule of conduct applicable
to all citizens. It will do this by exploring courts’ reactions to the regula-
tory efforts of local jurisdictions. The purpose is to determine whether
the local efforts should be protected by the Ohio Constitution’s home rule
provision. To do this, this section will discuss local efforts to impose re-
quirements on drillers beyond the requirements of the state permitting
authority. It will also consider local efforts to enact total bans on oil and
gas development, as opposed to imposing additional regulatory require-
ments. It will consider local legislative actions as well as charter-amending
voter initiatives that have purported to ban drilling. The purpose of this
section is to illustrate the Ohio courts’ conclusion that Ohio’s oil and gas
statute is, in fact, a general law under the aforementioned Canton test,
thus preempting conflicting local regulation of oil and gas activities, leav-
ing them unprotected by constitutional home rule.
1. Local Control Through Local Legislative Action
One way local jurisdictions attempt to control oil and gas activities
is by imposing local requirements beyond those of the state permitting
85 Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968; see also Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 93 (citing Smith Family Trust,
2009 WL 1539065, at ¶ 10); see also Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 776 (discussing
generally home rule in the Ohio Constitution and referencing Vaubel, supra note 56).
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authority. Local requirements could come in the form of additional permits,
bonds, hearings, applications, or by exercise of traditional zoning powers.
In addition to attempting to control or influence drilling by enforcing local
restrictions or requirements, some local jurisdictions have attempted to
impose outright drilling bans, usually by voter adopted amendments to
local charters.86
The first portion of this section will evaluate efforts at imposing
additional local requirements on drilling activities by considering the
efforts of Warren, Ohio, and Munroe Falls, Ohio, to enforce longstanding
local ordinances that applied to the oil and gas industry. The latter por-
tion of this section will address local efforts to enact outright drilling bans.
The purpose of both portions is to explore these efforts through the lens
of the legal system in which they operate, specifically, under the state-
wide legislative preemption of local control and the state constitution’s
home rule provision.
To review, the Ohio Constitution’s home rule provision gives munici-
palities “authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations,” but with the caveat that those regulations “are not
in conflict with general laws.”87 The state oil and gas statute, expanded
over several years by the Ohio legislature, now vests in the Ohio DNR’s
Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management control of “all aspects of
the locating, drilling, well stimulation, completing, and operating of oil
and gas wells within this state, including site construction and restora-
tion, permitting related to those activities, and the disposal of wastes from
those wells.”88 This potential conflict among local attempts to regulate oil
and gas activities, a putatively preemptive oil and gas statute, and a
Constitutional home rule provision presents a recurring and perplexing
theme.89 The question it raises is whether the Ohio oil and gas law is a
86 See, e.g., Arenschield, Athens Votes to Ban Fracking, supra note 2; Arenschield, Ohio
Counties Can’t Vote to Ban Fracking, supra note 2; Youngstown Voters Turn Down Anti-
fracking Proposal—Again, supra note 2.
87 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
88 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013).
89 Forty-eight states have home rule provisions in either their constitutions or legislation.
Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at Home Rule, 34
ENERGY L.J. 261 at 268 (2013) (including a policy analysis of how courts in various states
interpret home rule provisions) (citing RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 268 (6th ed. 2004)); Kevin J. Duffy, Regulating Hydraulic
Fracturing Through Land Use: State Preemption Prevails, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 817 (2014)
(explaining that the state has the power to preempt local land use rules); see David J.
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general law such that local regulations such as these would be void if in
conflict with it?
It may seem clear that the Ohio legislature intended the oil and
gas law to be a general law—they amended it time and again, making it
increasingly inclusive with respect to the powers exclusively bestowed on
the state agency and ever more restrictive of local authority. But does the
legislature’s intent that a statute be a general law make it one? This is
one way to interpret the issue which the City of Munroe Falls brought to
the Supreme Court of Ohio, in an ultimately unsuccessful defense of its
ordinances.90
a. Local Ordinances: Warren, Ohio
Years before the Ohio Supreme Court took up the question of the
validity of Munroe Falls’ local ordinances—whether they were preempted
by the state law or protected by home rule—Warren, Ohio, attempted to
control oil and gas operations by enforcing existing local ordinances. In
2004, Everflow East, Inc. initiated a drilling project that triggered a
private landowner nuisance suit based, in part, on Warren’s zoning
ordinances.91 One Warren ordinance provided that storage tanks used in
connection with any producing well may not be located within 200 feet
of a house, unless the permitee obtains a waiver of the 200 foot setback
requirement.92 Another provision provided that it was impermissible to
“drill, operate, or maintain any oil or gas well within the limits of the City
in such a manner as to be injurious . . . to the welfare, comfort or property
of individuals.”93 The landowner complained that the well, fewer than
200 feet from his house, was a nuisance that violated the ordinance.94
Klein, Home Sweet Home: Clarifying and Reinforcing a Municipality’s Authority to Regulate
Natural Gas Activities in its Corporate Limits, 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L. J. 339 (2013);
Gregory R. Nearpass & Robert J. Brenner, High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing and Home
Rule: The Struggle for Control, 76 ALB. L. REV. 167 (2013) (discussing home rule decisions
in New York state and arguing that they should not apply to the mining and oil and gas
industries); Bryan M. Weynand, Placing the Seal on a Fractured Debate: How North
Carolina Clarified its Law of Hydraulic Fracturing and Can Strike the Right Balance
with Preemption of Local Regulation, 93 N.C.L. REV. 596 (2015) (discussing North
Carolina’s lack of constitutional home rule provision and use of legislation to strike a
balance with local ordinances).
90 Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 139.
91 Natale v. Everflow E., Inc., 959 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
92 Id. (citing CITY OF WARREN OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 731.05 (1990)).
93 Id. at 609 (citing CITY OF WARREN OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES §§ 731.04–.06).
94 Id. at 605.
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Everflow East, the oil and gas company permitee in Warren, ac-
quired the required local permits and waivers from Warren, so compliance
with local ordinances was not at issue.95 Instead, the legal concern was
the validity of the ordinances.96 The Natale v. Everflow East court wrestled
with the problem of possible preemption of the Warren local ordinances by
Ohio’s oil and gas law.97 The trial court held that the Warren ordinance
restricting the location of oil wells was preempted by Ohio Revised Code
section 1509.02.98 The Ohio Court of Appeals (11th District) agreed.99
Here, the Ohio Administrative Code, through which the Ohio DNR
implements the oil and gas law, includes setback requirements clearly in
conflict with the Warren ordinance.100 The administrative code provides that
spacing of oil and gas wells be a “minimum of one hundred (100) feet from
existing inhabited structures.”101 The Warren ordinance, however, required
a 200 foot distance—a more stringent requirement than that required by
state law.102 The court found that the Warren ordinances concerned the
“location and operation of the oil and gas well,” which are precisely within
the list of activities, the regulation of which the state statute reserves for
the Ohio DNR with “clear, unequivocal language.”103 Therefore, the War-
ren ordinance was preempted by state law.104 The 11th District Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court in an August 26, 2011, decision.105 The
Warren case was not taken up by the Supreme Court of Ohio, but it laid
the groundwork for future analysis by that Court of the ability of local
jurisdictions to regulate oil and gas activities in the context of a constitu-
tional home rule provision and a potential general law of the state.
b. Another Attempt at Local Control: Munroe Falls, Ohio
Beck Energy Corporation, an oil and gas developer, obtained per-
mits as required from the Ohio DNR’s Division of Oil and Gas Resources
95 Id.
96 Id. at 610–11.
97 Natale, 959 N.E.2d at 610–11.
98 Id. at 610.
99 Id. at 611.
100 Id.
101 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-9-05(A)2 (2010).
102 Compare OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-9-05(A)2 (2010) with CITY OF WARREN OHIO,
CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 731.04(i) (1992).
103 Natale, 959 N.E.2d at 611 (emphasis added).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 612; see OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.02. The Natale Court also held that the landowner
could not prevail against the drilling company in his alternative nuisance claims. See
Natale, 959 N.E.2d at 612.
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Management for an oil and gas project in Munroe Falls.106 Unlike the driller
in Warren, however, it did not meet several additional local requirements
under Munroe Falls’ city ordinances.107 In particular, Munroe Falls’ ordi-
nances required Beck Energy to:
(1) obtain a drilling permit, a “conditional” zoning certifi-
cate, and a zoning certificate; (2) appear before the city’s
planning commission in a public hearing and obtain its
approval; (3) pay the necessary fees and post the requisite
performance bond; and (4) obtain a rights-of-way construc-
tion permit and pay the required fees.108
When Beck Energy attempted to begin drilling, under authority
of its Ohio DNR permit, Munroe Falls filed a complaint in the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas seeking a preliminary and permanent
injunction seeking to stop Beck Energy from drilling without complying
with local law.109 Munroe Falls prevailed in the trial court, obtaining an
injunction preventing Beck Energy from continuing drilling operations
within Munroe Falls until Beck Energy complied with the city ordi-
nances.110 In granting the injunction, the trial court found that Ohio’s oil
and gas law did not preempt Munroe Falls’ ordinances because the
statute “did not authorize drilling companies, permit-in-hand, to ignore
any and all local regulation.”111
1) Munroe Falls in the Ohio Court of Appeals (Ninth District)
The Ohio Court of Appeals (Ninth District) reversed the trial
court, holding that Beck Energy’s drilling permit from the Ohio DNR did
106 Note that Beck Energy’s intended well in Munroe Falls was to be a shallow well and
not a well affected by horizontal drilling. See Ohio Div. Res. Mgmt. Well Permit #2-3126
(issued to Beck Energy on February 16, 2011).
107 Munroe Falls cited eleven city ordinances the drilling company violated in its complaint
and request for injunction. See CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE §§ 1329.03–.06 (1980),
§ 1163.02 (1995), § 919.02 (2008),§§ 919.04–.08 (2008).
108 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 89.
109 Complaint at 5, Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2011-04-1897 (Ct. Com. Pl. Summit
Cty., Ohio, Apr. 6, 2011).
110 Order Granting Injunction at 4, Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2011-04-1897 (Ct.
Com. Pl. Summit Cnty., Ohio, May 3, 2011).
111 Id. at 4 (stating that “[l]ocal subdivisions retain a limited interest in regulating gas
and oil production in their communities.”).
78 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:55
not give the drilling company license to ignore applicable local rules.112
The court of appeals acknowledged the Ohio legislature’s effort to create
“a uniform system for the permitting of oil and gas wells throughout the
state,”113 but noted that despite the state law, localities “retain a limited
interest in regulating gas and oil production in their communities.”114 To
reach this conclusion, the court of appeals applied the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s general law analysis to the eleven ordinances the City of Munroe
Falls had applied to shale oil and gas drilling within its boundaries.115 The
court’s purpose was to determine whether Munroe Falls was protected by
the Ohio Constitution’s home rule authority or whether instead, the local
ordinances were void due to conflict with a general law.116 Munroe Falls
alleged that Beck Energy should have complied with some of these ordi-
nances, despite the fact that Beck Energy had secured a drilling permit
from the Ohio DNR as required by the Ohio oil and gas law.117
The Munroe Falls ordinances at issue dealt with drilling,118
zoning,119 and rights-of-way.120 Of particular concern were the ordinances
deriving from Munroe Falls’ codified ordinances, Chapter 1329, pertain-
ing to oil and gas drilling.121 Also at issue was an ordinance requiring
drillers to obtain a zoning certificate.122 Munroe Falls codified ordinance
Chapter 1163 requires, that before any building or other structure is
erected or constructed, the builder must obtain a zoning certificate indi-
cating that the project complies with the city’s zoning scheme.123 Before
112 Morrison, 989 N.E. 2d at 85, 99.
113 Id. at 96.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 96–97.
116 Id. at 88–89.
117 Id. at 85, 89.
118 CITY OF MUNROE FALLS, OHIO CODE §§ 1329.03–.06.
119 Id. § 1163.02.
120 Id. §§ 919.02, 919.04–.08.
121 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 95 (citing CITY OF MUNROE FALLS, OHIO CODE §§ 1329.03–.06.
These ordinances are: “Ordinance 1329.03 . . . no one shall commence to drill a well for
oil, gas, . . . within the corporate limits unless such persons has ‘wholly complied with all
provisions of this chapter and a conditional zoning certificate has been granted by
Council . . . .’ Ordinance 1329.04 requires any person ‘desiring to drill a well for oil and
or/gas within the corporate limits’ to apply for a ‘conditional zoning certificate’ to the
city’s Planning Commission. The ordinance also requires an application fee of $800 to be
paid when an application is filed. Ordinance 1329.05 requires a mandatory public hearing
be held at least three weeks before the commencement of drilling . . . [t]his public hearing
is required before the ‘conditional zoning certificate’ can be granted for drilling. Ordinance
1329.06 requires a $2,000 performance bond . . .”).
122 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 85, 96; see also CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE § 1163.02.
123 CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE § 1163.02.
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the city will issue a zoning certificate the applicant must first attend a
hearing.124 In the case of drilling, the applicant would need a conditional
zoning certificate because drilling is included as a conditional use in
Munroe Falls.125 These requirements apply to all types of construction
and are not directed towards oil and gas operations in any apparent way.
Munroe Falls argued that six additional Munroe Falls ordinances
applied to the Beck Energy conflict.126 These pertained to rights-of-way
construction permits and excavation permits.127 In particular, “[Munroe
Falls] Ordinance 919.04 requires a rights-of-way construction permit and
a street opening permit for any activities impacting the city’s roads in
any manner.”128 Other ordinances prohibit the obstruction of rights-of-
way without the city’s prior consent,129 govern the application and issu-
ance of rights-of-way construction permits,130 govern the fees for these
permits131 and require anyone seeking to “make any tunnel, opening, or
excavation of any kind in or under the surface of any street” to secure an
excavation permit from the city.132
Munroe Falls argued that Beck Energy, and any other person or
entity hoping to begin drilling within the city limits, must comply with
the long preexisting ordinances133 applicable to their activities.134 Here,
that meant that Beck Energy needed to:
(1) appear at a public hearing three weeks before the drill-
ing starts, (2) obtain a drilling permit (which is granted
only after [the applicant has] a “conditional zoning cer-
tificate. . . .” approved by the city council), (3) receive a
“zoning certificate” (which also requires the prior issuance
124 Morrison, 989 N.E. 2d at 98, see also CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE § 1329.05.
(providing that “[a]fter the first reading, but before the third reading of the legislation
granting a conditional zoning certificate, Council shall require the applicant to schedule
a public hearing . . .”).
125 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 95.
126 Id. at 96.
127 Id.; see generally CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE §§ 1163.02, 1329.03–.06.
128 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 95; CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE § 919.04.
129 CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE § 919.05.
130 Id. §§ 919.06–.07.
131 Id. § 919.08.
132 CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE § 905.02 (1959).
133 The ordinances were all enacted in the 1980s and 1990s; the ordinances specific to oil
and gas drilling were all enacted in the year 1980, see Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 94.
134 Id.
80 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:55
of a “conditional zoning certificate”), (4) apply for a rights-
of-way construction permit and street excavation permit,
and (5) pay all permit fees and [a] performance bond.”135
Beck Energy argued that because it had obtained a drilling permit
from Ohio DNR,136 it did not need to comply with these Munroe Falls re-
quirements, which, it argued, were void due to conflict with the Ohio oil
and gas law which grants to the Ohio DNR “sole and exclusive authority”
to regulate oil and gas operations in Ohio.137
The primary issue before the court of appeals was whether Munroe
Falls’ ordinances were protected by the Ohio Constitution’s home rule
provision against preemption by the Ohio oil and gas law.138 To answer
this question, and thus to determine whether to uphold or reverse the
trial court’s drilling injunction, the court of appeals evaluated the ordi-
nances under a Ohio Supreme Court’s home rule analysis.139
To accomplish this task, the court of appeals applied a home rule
analysis as prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.140 In crafting Ohio’s
oil and gas statute, the Ohio legislature wrote that the regulation of oil
and gas development “is a matter of general statewide interest that re-
quires uniform statewide regulation, and [Chapter 1509] constitutes a
comprehensive plan” for such activities.141 The court also noted that “‘[a]
statement by the General Assembly of its intent to preempt a field of legis-
lation is a statement of legislative intent’ that may be considered in a
home rule analysis but does not dispose of the issue.”142 However, just be-
cause the legislature says a statute is of statewide interest does not make
it a general law for home rule purposes.143 The courts must evaluate the
statute’s operation, not only its words.144
135 Id. at 95.
136 Beck Energy obtained a well permit (#2-3126) from Ohio DNR on February 16, 2011.
It commenced excavation of the Munroe Falls site, for which it had obtained gas rights,
but Munroe Falls issued a Stop Work Order for failure to comply with the applicable
ordinance. Id. at 90.
137 Id. at 90.
138 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 88, 92.
139 Id. at 92.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 96 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.02).
142 Id. (citing Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 29 (citing Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 776,
¶ 31)).
143 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 96.
144 Id.
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The court of appeals evaluated whether the Munroe Falls ordi-
nances at issue constituted exercises of local self-government—the first
piece of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s home rule analysis.145 If an ordinance
survives this analysis, it survives. This is because the Ohio constitution
specifically authorizes municipalities to exercise powers of self-govern-
ment.146 But if the ordinance is not self-government, and is an exercise
of police power, it is not protected in the same way by the Ohio constitu-
tion.147 Because this case called into question the validity of several types
of ordinances, the court of appeals addressed them in groups according
to their function.
With respect to the ordinances that required a conditional zoning
certificate prior to drilling,148 the court of appeals found these to be ex-
ercises of police power, not self-government.149 In fact, all parties agreed
that the rights-of-way ordinances were exercises of Munroe Falls’ police
power—designed to protect the public safety and general welfare, not
self-government.150 When an ordinance is an exercise of police power, as
opposed to one of self-government, it does not fall within the home rule
safe harbor and the court must decide whether the statute with which it
might be in conflict is a “general law.”151 If so, the statute trumps the local
ordinance, only if the local ordinance conflicts with the state statute.152
The court of appeals cited a previous case indicating the Ohio oil
and gas statute “regulates the conservation of natural resources and is
unquestionably a general law.”153 It did not, therefore, pursue the general
law question further, instead moving on to the question of the ordinances’
potential conflicts with the oil and gas statute.154
145 Id. at 92; see also Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 963.
146 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 92 (citing Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 24).
147 Id. at 92–93 (citing Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 30).
148 CITY OF MUNROE FALLS OHIO, CODE §§ 1163.02, 1329.03–.06 (these five ordinances are
the “drilling” and “zoning” ordinances, while the other six ordinances at issue dealt with
rights-of-way and did not require a conditional zoning certificate).
149 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 96 (citing Rispo Realty & Dev. Co., 564 N.E.2d at 425 (citing
Garcia, 407 N.E.2d at ¶ 2)) (stating that “Ohio law has long recognized that the enact-
ment of zoning laws by a municipality is an exercise of its police power as described
under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution”).
150 Id. at 96.
151 Id. at 93 (citing Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 25).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 96 (citing Smith Family Tr., 2009 WL 1539056 ¶ 11).
154 The appellate court disposed of the “general law” inquiry stating that “[t]his court has
already determined, in Smith Family, that ‘R.C. 1509 et seq., regulates the conservation
of natural resources and is unquestionably a general law.” Morrison, 989 N.E. 2d at
96–97; see also Smith Family Tr., 2009 WL 1539056 at ¶ 10. Furthermore, the City of
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To explain its method for deciding whether an ordinance is in con-
flict with a statute, that is, “whether the ordinance prohibits that which the
statute permits, or vice versa,”155 the court of appeals turned to Supreme
Court of Ohio’s analysis as illustrated in a case pertaining to local efforts
to regulate hazardous waste in potential conflict with a state statute:
In Fondessy, the court considered whether there was a
conflict between the state statute that granted the state
the power to license and regulate hazardous waste facili-
ties (R.C. Chapter 3734), and a municipal ordinance that
imposed a permit fee on all hazardous waste landfills lo-
cated within the city, and also required that waste facility
operators keep complete and accurate records. The court,
applying the conflict test, concluded that the municipal
ordinance did not conflict with the statute regulating the
state’s hazardous waste landfills, because the ordinance did
not permit anything prohibited by the state statute, or pro-
hibit anything permitted by the statute. The court held that
the reporting requirement [imposed by the ordinance] did
not “alter, impair, or limit” the operation of the hazardous
waste facility licensed, as prohibited by the statute.156
Ultimately, the Fondessy court held that the ordinance at issue
there and the potentially conflicting state statute could co-exist because,
although both concerned the monitoring of hazardous waste landfill
facilities, they did not directly conflict with one another.157 The court
found it possible for the two government entities to exercise their respec-
tive police powers concurrently.158 The Fondessy court said, “the author-
ity of the Environmental Protection Agency to license, supervise, inspect
and regulate hazardous waste facilities does not preclude municipalities
from enacting police power ordinances which do not conflict with that
Munroe Falls conceded that R.C. 1509.02 is a general law. Id. Thus, the court found it
unnecessary to engage in a new “general law” analysis and instead moved on to the third
step of the home rule analysis—the Conflicts analysis. See id.
155 Morrison, 989 N.E. 2d at 93 (citing Clyde, 896 N.E.2d at ¶ 53 (citing Vill. of Struthers
v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 ¶ 2 (1923))); see also Marich, 880 N.E.2d at ¶ 30.
156 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 94 (citing Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d at 800).
157 Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d at 800, 802.
158 Cf. City of Cleveland v. GSX Chem. Servs. of Ohio, Inc., 1992 WL 95735 at 6–7 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992) (applying Fondessy, and holding the City of Cleveland could impose pol-
lution reporting requirements on a chemical services company because the municipal
regulations were neither “proscribed by State law,” nor “in conflict” with it).
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authority.”159 The city had required waste facility operators to maintain
daily records and to submit a report to the municipality. These require-
ments were different from those imposed by the state, such as fence size,
number of guards, and number of monitoring wells.160 So, despite the
reality that the ordinance and the state statute both imposed require-
ments on municipal waste facilities, and appeared initially to be in conflict
with one another, the court ruled that they were not actually in conflict
and could operate concurrently.161
With respect to the Munroe Falls’ drilling ordinances, however, the
court of appeals held that the state statute did not allow for additional
local regulations.162 Munroe Falls originally argued, and the trial court
agreed, that the statute only limited local efforts to control permitting,
location, and spacing of oil and gas wells.163 Had Munroe Falls been faced
with an earlier version of the statute, this argument might have prevailed
in the appellate court. But, as discussed above, the legislature worked
hard to expand the reach of the oil and gas statute beyond mere permit-
ting, location, and spacing. The court of appeals, therefore, disagreed with
Munroe Falls and with the trial court, instead focusing on the statute’s
inclusive nature.164 The court of appeals was swayed by the language:
“comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling,
well stimulation, completing, and operating of oil and gas wells within this
state, including site construction and restoration, permitting related to
those activities, and the disposal of wastes from those wells.”165
For the same reason, the court of appeals found Munroe Falls’ per-
mit application fee and performance bond also to conflict with the state
law.166 Because Munroe Falls’ public hearing requirement was tied to its
permit requirement, the hearing requirement, too, was void for conflict
with state law.167 Munroe Falls’ right of way and excavations ordinances,
unlike those more closely related to drilling, did not conflict with the state
law.168 The reason was the statute’s language leaving the regulation of
159 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 93 (citing Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d at 800).
160 Id.
161 Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d at 800, 802.
162 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–98.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 90–91, 97–98 (noting that the Ohio General Assembly has regularly expanded
Ohio DNR’s regulatory authority since 2004 and that the current form of O.R.C. 1509.02
“is more encompassing than Munroe Falls claims.”).
165 Id. at 97 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.02).
166 Id. at 98.
167 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 98–99.
168 Id. at 99.
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streets to local authorities.169 The court of appeals did not dive deeply
into Munroe Falls’ zoning ordinances, holding only that, to the extent it
interferes with the state drilling permit, it is in conflict with the state
law. In particular, the court of appeals stated:
[Munroe Falls] Ordinance 1163.02 . . . governs zoning in
general, requiring a zoning certificate for the construction
of any building or structure, which, in turn, can only be
issued if a “conditional zoning certificate” has been ap-
proved. Because drilling necessarily involves the construc-
tion of a well, this ordinance, to the extent it requires a
zoning certificate and “conditional zoning certificate” for
drilling, conflicts with [the state oil and gas statute] and
cannot be enforced against a person seeking to drill.170
Although, as in Fondessy, Munroe Falls argued that its ordi-
nances should stand on home rule grounds, Ohio’s Ninth District court
of appeals overturned the trial court’s drilling injunction, holding that
some, but not all, of the local ordinances were void because they conflicted
with section 1509.02, which the court found was, unlike the statute at
issue in Fondessy, indeed, a general law.171
2) Munroe Falls in the Supreme Court of Ohio
If the Ohio Court of Appeals was the end of the line, many of
Munroe Falls’ ordinances would have been dead in the water long ago,
along with local efforts in other Ohio jurisdictions to enact similar ordi-
nances affecting shale oil and gas wells.172 But their ultimate demise took
some time.
169 Id. at 97 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.02) (providing that “[n]othing in this section
affects the authority granted to local authorities in section 723.01 of the Revised Code,
provided that the authority granted under those sections shall not be exercised in a
manner that discriminates against, unfairly impedes, or obstructs oil and gas activities
and operations regulated under this chapter.”). OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 723.01 (West
1997) provides that “[m]unicipal corporations shall have special power to regulate the use
of the streets. . . the legislative authority of a municipal corporation shall have the care,
supervision, and control of the public highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, public
grounds, bridges, aqueducts, and viaducts within the municipal corporation.”).
170 Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 99.
171 Id. at 96–97; see also Fondessy, 492 N.E.2d at 797.
172 Among Ohio cities that enacted drilling bans between 2010 and 2014 are Athens, Ohio
and Mansfield, Ohio—these cities and others wait to see if their laws will remain effective. 
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Munroe Falls appealed the appellate court’s decision to the Su-
preme Court of Ohio on March 22, 2013.173 Almost a year later, on Febru-
ary 26, 2014, the Court heard oral argument on two specific issues.174 The
Court first considered whether the state oil and gas law deprives munici-
palities such as Munroe Falls of their Ohio constitutional home rule
authority.175 The second issue the Court heard was whether Munroe
Falls’ ordinances, some of which required oil and gas drillers to submit
information to Munroe Falls via a permit requirement (ostensibly to
protect local residents’ interests), conflict with the state’s oil and gas
statute when the driller has already secured a drilling permit from Ohio
DNR.176 After holding the case for close to a year, the Ohio Supreme
Court released its decision on February 17, 2015.177
Regarding the first issue, Munroe Falls hoped that, while the
Ohio statute gave Ohio DNR the power to regulate drilling operations,
the Ohio constitution’s home rule provision would allow the city some
control over drilling that would occur within its jurisdiction. According
to Munroe Falls, the home rule provision preserves its power to issue
zoning ordinances regarding the location of shale oil and gas wells within
its borders, because localities are best-suited to decide the locations that
would not create excessive noise, traffic and other factors that impact
property owners. Munroe Falls’ position was that this is the purpose of
Ohio’s home rule provision.178 Ohio and the affected driller, Beck Energy,
argued that if the court allowed localities to create their own rules, even
zoning rules, the practice would undermine the state’s ability to carry out
the legislature’s statutory directives. They argued that “local ordinances
[that] restrict oil and gas drilling . . . would conflict with the state law.”179
Munroe Falls, however, argued that local land-use regulation could
See, e.g., Laura Arenschield, Athens Votes to Ban Fracking, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Nov. 6, 2014, 3:03 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/11/05/athens
-votes-to-ban-fracking.html [https://perma.cc/S56E-2Y8G]; Aaron Marshall, Mansfield
Leads Legal Fight Against Injection Wells Holding Fracking Waste, THE PLAIN DEALER
(Sept. 10, 2012, 12:04 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/09/mansfield
_leads_legal_fight_ag.html [https://perma.cc/JL5N-V93V].
173 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, at 1.
174 See generally Oral Arguments of Appellant–State of Ohio and Appellee–Beck Energy,
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 143 N.E.2d 271 (2015) (No. 2013-0465),
http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileId=142427 [https://perma.cc
/HKV4-FXV4].
175 Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 131.
176 Id. at 136.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 134.
179 Oral Argument, supra note 174, at 29:15.
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operate in harmony with the state’s control of drilling operations and
would not, therefore, be preempted by the state law.180
Munroe Falls maintained that Beck Energy violated local rules
and failed to meet local requirements prior to drilling, despite having
already obtained a drilling permit from the Ohio DNR.181 Munroe Falls
required that Beck Energy obtain, in addition to the Ohio DNR permis-
sions, a local zoning certificate and a right-of-way construction permit,
pay an application fee, and post a performance bond.182 Beck Energy
claimed that because it had secured the required permit from the Ohio
DNR, it did not need to comply with the additional local rules. The no-
table aspect of the challenged Munroe Falls ordinances is that they are
directly related to the development of oil and gas wells, as opposed to
focusing on more traditional aspects of local zoning authority, such as
creating and defining residential, commercial, or industrial zones within
the city.
3) Oral Argument183
The Ohio Supreme Court justices forecasted the sharply split deci-
sion by expressing their concerns at the oral argument. For example, some
of the justices expressed serious doubts that Ohio DNR really has “sole
and exclusive authority” to preclude all local oversight with no adminis-
trative appeal.184 Justice William O’Neill, in particular, seemed bothered
that the oil and gas statute does not expressly state a preclusion for mu-
nicipal zoning authority, whereas the legislature has shown that it knows
how to include preclusions in other statutes.185 Although some other state
laws specifically exclude local zoning ability, Ohio’s oil and gas law does
not.186 The two sides argued over whether a specific preclusion was re-
quired or whether preclusion by implication was satisfactory.187
180 Id. at 01:43.
181 Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, at 1–2.
182 Id. at 1.
183 This section draws upon a column the author wrote on this issue for Crain’s Cleveland
Business’ Energy Report. See Heidi G. Robertson, Awaiting the Court’s Word on Validity
of Local Zoning Control of Well Locations, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://
www.crainscleveland.com/article/20140404/BLOGS05/140409906 [https://perma.cc/67J3
-LDVV].
184 Oral Argument, supra note 174, at 19:21 (inferring that Justices O’Neill and Lanzinger
are particularly doubtful about Munroe Falls’ position).
185 Id. at 13:50.
186 Id. at 17:21.
187 Id. at 14:26.
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At the oral argument, Justice Paul Pfeifer pressed Munroe Falls’
attorney on the question of where, within its borders, it would have
allowed the drilling.188 The Justice appeared to be interested in whether
a local jurisdiction might use its zoning powers to effectively prohibit
drilling when that drilling would otherwise be allowed by the State.
Munroe Falls contended that drilling within the city might be allowed as
a conditional use in one of the city’s three industrial zones, but was not
specific as to where that might occur.189 This matters because the Ohio
legislature, in enacting the state legislation in the first place, must have
wanted to create a regulatory system that was predictable statewide—
and likely to facilitate an industry that promised economic reward. To
allow a local jurisdiction to enforce an ordinance thwarting the statewide
system would seem to undermine the legislature’s purpose. In fact, it
could effectively prohibit an activity that Ohio allows.
Justice Pfeifer later focused on the fact that under Ohio’s oil and
gas statute, a driller can appeal a denied drilling permit request to the
state agency, but a landowner has no opportunity to appeal the state’s
decision to grant a driller’s permit request.190 This dichotomy did not seem
to sit well with him. Justice Pfeifer said, “For those [landowners] who
object [to the drilling], there is nowhere to go . . . the Director of Natural
Resources is God in this case.”191 This comment indicated Justice Pfeifer’s
concern with the statutory truth that local citizens have virtually no
recourse to appeal a state drilling decision by Ohio DNR that would allow
drilling in a residential area, or anyplace else. Ohio DNR seems to be
granting drilling permits without any regard to whether the driller has
complied with local zoning.
Justice William O’Neill also expressed some disbelief. He focused
on the densely populated suburb of Shaker Heights, Ohio, with relatively
small residential lots and said: “You’re saying that this statute would per-
mit a driller to go into Shaker Heights and (if the driller has convinced
ODNR that there is money in it for everyone) then it’s full steam ahead?”192
These concerns were reflected in the split decision the Justices
ultimately issued. Three Justices signed a “majority” opinion authored
by Justice Judith French, with Chief Justice O’Connor and Justice
Kennedy concurring. Justice O’Donnell concurred in the judgment only,
188 Id. at 15:38.
189 Oral Argument, supra note 174, at 16:12.
190 Id. at 21:22.
191 Id. at 22:04.
192 Id. at 38:09.
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issuing his own separate opinion, but creating the majority through his
concurrence. The remaining three Justices, Pfeifer, O’Neill, and Lanziger
each dissented and issued separate opinions.
4) The Decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
Although the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision confirmed that the
Ohio Constitution’s home rule provision is quite limited indeed—it does
not give as much authority to local jurisdictions as its name suggests—the
Court did not seem entirely to close out all possibility of local influence.193
The Justices were divided almost evenly, with three voting to void the
ordinances and three voting to uphold them. Justice O’Donnell made the
difference by concurring with the majority in the result.
Without Justice O’Donnell, the decision would have been a tie. Jus-
tice French wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice O’Connor,
and Justice Kennedy with Justice O’Donnell concurring in judgment
only; Justices Pfeiffer, O’Neill, and Lanzinger formed the minority, each
filing a separate dissenting opinion. Three of the Justices who joined the
majority struck down Munroe Falls’ ordinances as conflicting with the
state oil and gas law, but the other three Justices would not, holding that
the local ordinances could co-exist with the state law. Justice O’Donnell
was torn by this case, as evidenced by his authoring a separate concurring
opinion.194 In it, he agreed with the result, that the Munroe Falls ordi-
nances had to be struck down, but he had more to say beyond the ratio-
nale Justice Judith French and the majority provided in their opinion.
Justice O’Donnell wrote that the Munroe Falls ordinance requir-
ing a local permit to drill an oil and gas well went too far.195 The Justice
found that as written, the ordinances conflicted with a general law.196
Even though it was not a new ordinance and was not enacted either in
193 See Heidi G. Robertson, Ohio Supreme Court Leaves Room for Traditional Zoning as It
Rejects Munroe Falls’ Ordinances, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www
.crainscleveland.com/article/20150306/BLOGS05/150309881 [https://perma.cc/PSC5-F3QP].
194 See generally Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 138, 143 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in judgment
only).
195 Id. at 137–39.
196 Id. at 138 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in judgment only) (explaining that imposing a
municipal permitting process to Munroe Falls’ Codified Ordinance 1329.03 conflicted
with OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.02—a general law—and was therefore preempted by Ohio
Revised Code Chapter 1509); CITY OF MUNROE FALLS, OHIO CODE § 1329.03 (prohibiting
any person from drilling a well for oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons “until such time as such
persons have wholly complied with all provisions of this chapter and a conditional zoning
certificate has been granted by Council to such person for a period of one year.”).
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response to Beck Energy’s drilling aspirations, or in preparation for it,
O’Donnell wrote that because it amounted to a permit scheme for oil and
gas drilling, it directly conflicted with the state law which gave ‘sole and
exclusive authority’ for those decisions to Ohio DNR.197 But Justice
O’Donnell would have evaluated each ordinance, examining how it would
work, and showing on a fact-bound basis why the state law would preempt
it.198 He wanted to “emphasize the limited scope” of the Court’s holding.199
Moreover, O’Donnell wrote that the other four ordinances, from
Munroe Falls’ zoning code, were too intertwined with the aforementioned
local oil and gas permitting scheme to be upheld on their own as pure ex-
ercises of zoning authority.200 Munroe Falls’ zoning ordinances indicated
that oil and gas wells were a conditional use in an industrial zone, re-
quiring a conditional use certificate.201 For oil and gas wells, though, the
required conditional use certificate amounted to the very same local drilling
permit that conflicted with state law. Hence, it was a zoning ordinance
too intertwined with a permit scheme that conflicted with state law.
If the zoning ordinances had just been traditional exercises of
zoning authority, though, it appears that Justice O’Donnell would have
upheld them. Justice O’Donnell suggested that local jurisdictions use
measures “that address only the traditional concerns of zoning laws, such
as ensuring compatibility with local neighborhoods, preserving property
values, or effectuating a municipality’s long term plan for development,
by limiting oil and gas wells to certain zoning districts.”202 He wrote that
these types of ordinances were not before the court for decision in this
case, and that they would present a different issue altogether.203
Further, Justice O’Donnell wrote that the Ohio legislature could
have included traditional zoning in the description of powers it intended
197 Id. at 139–40 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in judgment only).
198 Id. at 138–39.
199 Morrison,37 N.E.3d at 138.
200 Id. (explaining that “[b]ecause [Munroe Falls’] zoning code incorporates the parallel
municipal permitting scheme that is applicable only to oil and gas wells before allowing




203 Id. at 138–39, 141 (stating that “. . . in my view, it remains to be decided whether the
General Assembly intended to wholly supplant all local zoning ordinances limiting land
uses to certain zoning districts without regulating the details of oil and gas drilling
expressly addressed by R.C. Chapter 1509 . . . [and] whether a municipality has authority
to enact zoning ordinances that affect oil and gas wells within its territory is a question
yet to be decided, and for that reason, I concur in the resolution of this case.”).
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to preempt, but it did not.204 According to Justice O’Donnell, local zoning
ordinances that limit specific land uses to certain zoning districts, such
as residential, commercial, or industrial, without regulating the details
of oil and gas drilling that were expressly addressed in the Ohio oil and gas
law would present an entirely different case than that addressed by the
court here. Either Justice O’Donnell is making a legitimate suggestion to
local jurisdictions, the ordinances conflicted with a general law, or he is
signaling to the legislature that they need to finish the job of tightening
the legislation even further, to preempt even traditional zoning powers.
It appears that the three justices in the dissent would agree with
Justice O’Donnell—that traditional zoning ordinances unrelated to oil
and gas permitting schemes should be upheld, if they were to come before
the court.205 Justice Lanziger here refers to zoning ordinances geared
towards preserving property values and ensuring compatibility with local
neighborhoods, assuming they are only applied in a non-discriminatory
manner to an oil and gas drilling operation.206
In that scenario, which is not the one this court considered,
Justice O’Donnell likely would join the three justices in the current
minority, thus forming a new majority in support of non-discriminatorily
created and enforced traditional zoning. Even the existing majority in
the Munroe Falls decision was clear that its opinion applies only to the
ordinances that were before it207—and that they were not the traditional
zoning ordinances about which Justice O’Donnell wrote.
Cities, towns, and villages in Ohio likely will move forward using
their traditional zoning authority and enforcing it in a non-discriminatory
manner. This way, they exercise only their police power, in a manner that
does not conflict with a general law. For example, a city, if merely enforcing
residential use in a residentially zoned area, might withstand a preemp-
tion argument. Similarly, public safety rules, also applied universally, may
stand as well. In some instances, non-discriminatorily enforced zoning
204 Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 141 (explaining that the General Assembly could also have
created a statutory scheme that addresses local land use and planning issues, yet it did
not do so).
205 Id. at 141–47 (Pfeifer, Lanzinger, & O’Neill, JJ., dissenting).
206 Id. at 143 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 137 (explaining that “the issue before us is not whether the law should generally
allow municipalities to have concurrent regulatory authority, but whether R.C. 1509.02
and the home rule Amendment do allow for the kind of double licensing at issue here.
They do not. We make no judgment as to whether other ordinances could coexist with the
General Assembly’s comprehensive regulatory scheme. Rather, our holding is limited to
the five municipal ordinances at issue in this case.”).
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could affect drilling. When state-permitted drillers challenge those ordi-
nances, a new majority may emerge around Justice O’Donnell.208
5) Beck Energy Sues Again
In State ex rel. Morrison, the Supreme Court of Ohio struck down
several of Munroe Falls’ ordinances for conflict with a general law, but it
did not address Munroe Falls’ zoning code broadly as applied to drilling.
The decision likely left local jurisdictions wondering what, if anything,
they could do to control or influence drilling that might take place within
their boundaries. Justice O’Donnell suggested that rather than use ordi-
nances that duplicate, contradict, or add to the requirements of the state
oil and gas law (because those surely will be rejected for conflicting with
the state statute)209 local jurisdictions should focus on their traditional
zoning authority.210 He suggested that they use traditional zoning, non-
discriminatorily created and applied to oil and gas development.211
Local jurisdictions would have to have wondered what that means
with respect to their existing zoning schemes. Beck Energy wondered,
too, and asked the Court to issue an order stating that the Ohio constitu-
tion’s home rule provision does not allow Munroe Falls to enforce a zoning
code that Beck Energy says discriminates against, unfairly impedes, and
obstructs oil and gas activities and production operations, that the state
of Ohio expressly permits those activities and regulates them under R.C.
Chapter 1509.212
208 Beck Energy sued the City of Munroe Falls for its enforcement of the City’s traditional
zoning ordinances, see Ohio ex rel. Beck Energy Corp. v. Munroe Falls, 40 N.E.3d 1178
(Table) (Ohio 2015), see also Complaint in Mandamus, Ohio ex rel. Beck Energy Corp. v.
Munroe Falls, 40 N.E.3d 1178 (Table) (Ohio 2015) (No. 2015-1019), http://supremecourt
.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=769427.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9BG-9BNB].
That case, however, was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Ohio without explanation
of the merits, see Merit Decisions without Opinions, Case No. 2015-1019. State ex rel.
Beck Energy Corp. v. Munroe, https://supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2015/2015
-ohio-4633.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAF7-PH5J] (stating “[o]n amended answer of respondents.
On S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04 determination, cause dismissed.”).
209 Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 138. (O’Donnell, J., concurring in judgment only) (acknowl-
edging that OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.02 preempts local ordinances which seek to impose
permitting schemes with respect to construction and operation of oil and gas wells).
210 Id. (stating that “this appeal does not present the question whether R.C. 1509.02 conflicts
with local land use ordinances that address only the traditional concerns of zoning laws”).
211 Id. at 141.
212 Complaint in Mandamus, supra note 208, at ¶ 4(a); see also Heidi G. Robertson, We
Still Don’t Know if a Drill Permit Trumps a Zoning Law in Ohio, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND
BUS. (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20151204/BLOGS05/15120
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Like many jurisdictions, Munroe Falls has a zoning code, dividing
the city into areas—or zones—residential, commercial, industrial, as the
city’s government deems appropriate. Munroe Falls last enacted zoning
rules in 1995, so no part of it was enacted in reaction to the more recent
shale development activity in Ohio.213 Beck Energy took issue with
Munroe Fall’s 1995 zoning ordinances, arguing that the zones effectively
prohibit drilling for oil and gas in 99.06% of the city’s territory, and
would allow oil and gas wells only as a conditionally permitted use—for
which special permission would be required—in the remainder of the
city’s jurisdiction.214 Munroe Falls disputed Beck’s calculation of these
percentages, but agreed with the basic premise that most of the residen-
tial city is inappropriate for drilling—or any other industrial use.215
Munroe Falls is the smallest city in Ohio and it comprises almost en-
tirely residential and park land.216
Because Beck Energy had obtained the state-issued drilling permit
and began work in an area not zoned for such activity, Munroe Falls
issued a “stop-work” order.217 Beck Energy would like the Ohio Supreme
Court to vacate that order.218
Following the Court’s State ex rel. Morrison decision, Beck Energy
asked the Court for a Writ of Mandamus against Munroe Falls. In a man-
damus action, the party bringing the action (Beck Energy) is asking the
court (the Supreme Court of Ohio) to require a public body (the City of
Munroe Falls) to do something it is required by law to do (allow Beck
Energy to drill in a specific location despite the zoning constraints). Beck
Energy’s basic argument was that the Court’s State ex rel. Morrison deci-
sion required Munroe Falls to withdraw its zoning scheme to the extent
that that zoning scheme prevented Beck Energy from drilling a specific well
within Munroe Falls.219 Although Munroe Falls repealed the specific ordi-




213 See Memorandum in Response to Relator’s Memorandum Supporting Mandamus at
4, 16, Ohio ex rel. Beck Energy Corp. v. Munroe Falls, 40 N.E.3d 1178 (Table) (Ohio 2015)
(No. 2015-1019).
214 See Complaint in Mandamus, supra note 208, at ¶ 4(b).
215 See Memorandum in Response, supra note 213, at 15–16.
216 Id. at 16.
217 Id. at 8.
218 See Complaint in Mandamus, supra note 208, at ¶ 4(c).
219 Id. ¶ 24–37.
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the rest of the city’s zoning code to the extent it prevented Beck Energy
from drilling a specific well.220
The well in question—the one Beck Energy hoped to drill within
Munroe Falls, would be located in a T-C zone—a town center area.221
This is a type of commercial zone in which industrial activities are not
allowed.222 Beck Energy argued that because Munroe Falls’ zoning code
does not allow drilling in any of the residential or commercial zones which
make up most of the city, and the land available in industrial zones is
not sufficient to allow drilling, the zoning code discriminates against oil
and gas production in violation of state law.223
This request for a mandamus order called into question the ability
of Ohio cities and towns actually to do what the Supreme Court of Ohio
seemed to say they could do—use their traditional zoning authority in a
non-discriminatory manner. Munroe Falls’ zoning ordinances designate
most of the mostly residential city as a residential zone.224 Much of the
area that is not residential is park land or golf courses.225 According to
the city, “it is a bona fide zoning code which, in 1995, considered existing
uses, population densities, congruous uses, potential nuisances, the charac-
ter of the community, and the health and safety of its population.”226
The three justices in the “minority” in the Court’s ex rel. Morrison
opinion, along with a fourth Justice, Justice O’Donnell, recognized the
difference between the activities the legislature intends to be controlled
by state statute and regulation—things like the location and spacing of
wells—and things that a home rule state like Ohio leaves to the local
jurisdiction—like traditional zoning.227 The creation of industrial, com-
mercial, and residential zones is just basic zoning.
Cities and towns were likely hoping to learn whether their tradi-
tional zoning schemes would hold up against efforts to install state-
permitted oil and gas wells contrary to their zoning schemes. Would the
220 Id. ¶¶ 11–17.
221 Id. ¶¶ 14(a)–(b).
222 Id. ¶ 14(b).
223 Complaint in Mandamus, supra note 208, at ¶ 36(d).
224 Id. ¶¶ 18–23 (arguing that the effect of Munroe Falls’ zoning ordinance scheme is that
only 16.30 acres, or 0.94% of the City’s total acreage is rendered suitable for oil and gas
drilling).
225 See Memorandum in Response, supra note 213, at 4.
226 Id. at 2, 16.
227 See Morrison, 37 N.E. 3d at 128, 138. (O’Donnell, J., concurring) (explaining that the legis-
lature’s intent to regulate the “spacing” and “location” of wells does not mean that the statute
preempts all local regulation of oil and gas as being irreconcilable with local zoning laws).
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Supreme Court of Ohio find zoning codes incompatible with the state oil
and gas statute—and strike them down as applied to oil and gas wells?
Or would the Court uphold the right of cities to enforce their zoning
codes, even as they apply to the drilling of oil and gas wells?
If the Court had struck down Munroe Falls’ zoning code, this
would have been the result dreaded by local jurisdictions. It would have
told them that their zoning codes—no matter when and how they were
created—would be invalid as applied to oil and gas wells. On November 10,
2015, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Beck Energy’s man-
damus request saying nothing whatsoever about its merits.228 By dismiss-
ing the request for mandamus, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided not to
decide.229 The Court neither discarded Munroe Falls’ zoning scheme, even
as applied to the oil and gas well Beck Energy hoped to drill, nor gave the
zoning scheme its blessing. The Court’s nondecision maintains the status
quo. Munroe Falls’ zoning code stands and Beck Energy cannot drill in
Munroe Falls’ Town Center zone. Beck Energy’s state-issued drilling
permit expired in April 2016, so it appears that the Court’s dismissal of
Beck’s mandamus request was a win, this round, for local jurisdictions.230
2. Drilling Bans by Voter Initiative
Ohio jurisdictions, other than Munroe Falls and Warren, have tried
to influence drilling locally231 without the kind of push back Munroe Falls
228 See Order Dismissing Relator’s Complaint in Mandamus, State ex rel. Beck Energy
Corp. v. Munroe Falls, No. 2015-1019 (Ohio, Nov. 10, 2015).
229 Id. See also Robertson, supra note 212.
230 An update: although Beck Energy’s Ohio DNR-issued drilling permit expired in April
2016, the company has applied for and will likely be granted an extension. But the re-
quested well would still be located in a land use zone for which it would require a conditional
use certificate from Munroe Falls. According to its complaint, filed in Summit Country
Court of Common Pleas, the City suggested Beck Energy apply for one, but instead of
complying, Beck Energy insisted Munroe Falls’ zoning ordinances do not apply to oil and
gas activities, and, assuming the Ohio DNR reissues Beck Energy’s permit, the company
is ready to drill. Munroe Falls has sued, in Summit County Court of Common Pleas, asking
the court to order Beck Energy to comply with the zoning ordinances. Beck Energy, of
course, would like the courts to say that Munroe Falls’ ordinances do not apply because
they are preempted by the state law—even beyond those that were disallowed by the
Ohio Supreme Court in the ex. rel. Morrison case. Munroe Falls, which brought the law
suit, would like the courts to say that the zoning ordinances do apply, even to oil and gas
activities, because traditional zoning is within the authority of local jurisdictions. See
Complaint for Declaratory Judgement, Request for Stay, State, ex. rel. Kostoff and Cnty.
of Munroe Falls v. Beck Energy Corp. (Ct. Com. Pl. Summit Cty., Ohio, May 27, 2016).
231 See Robert D. Cheren, Fracking Bans, Taxation, and Environmental Policy, 64 CASE W.
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received from Beck Energy or Warren received from Everflow East.232
This may be because in many jurisdictions that have taken legislative
action against or regarding drilling, the drilling industry has shown little
interest in exploring for oil and gas.233 In these jurisdictions, attempts to
pass outright bans on hydraulic fracturing or related activities have been
contested hotly amongst the citizenry,234 and have had varying success.235
Some cities and towns have purported to establish complete bans on
drilling, including, for example, Yellow Springs,236 or heavy regulations,
including, for example, Oberlin.237 Others have attempted narrower types
of regulations, or non-binding resolutions, with more success, for exam-
ple, in Cincinnati.238 Whether a particular method of control or influence
will be affected by the State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp. decision
may depend on which legal mechanism the locality chose in its attempt
to regulate or influence drilling, and the extent to which the imposed
considerations fall inside or outside of the limited scope of the home rule.
a. Local Ban on Injection Wells for Waste Disposal Leads to
Drilling Ban: Mansfield, Ohio
In 2011, the Ohio DNR approved Preferred Fluids Management,
Inc.’s plan to construct two injection wells on 4.9 acres within the City of
Mansfield for the purposes of disposing waste from oil and gas operations.239
RES. L. REV. 1483, 1506 (2014) (setting forth local drilling bans and moratoria in Maryland,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia).
232 See, e.g., CITY OF ATHENS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. §§ 47.01.04–.08 (2013); see also CITY
OF YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 878.07; see also CITY OF OBERLIN, OHIO
CODIFIED ORD. § 521.13 (2013); CITY OF WARREN, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 731.05; see also
CINCINNATI RES. 29-2012, Cincinnati City Council (Apr. 18, 2012).
233 See Cheren, supra note 231; see also Heidi G. Robertson, Support for Fracking Ban Seems
to be Fueled by Gas, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Nov. 15, 2013) http://www.crainscleveland
.com/article/20131115/BLOGS05/131119907/-1/blogs05 [https://perma.cc/8DRK-83UJ].
234 See, e.g., Arenschield, Athens Votes to Ban Fracking, supra note 2; Arenschield, Ohio
Counties Can’t Vote to Ban Fracking, supra note 2; Youngstown Voters Turn Down Anti-
fracking Proposal—Again, supra note 2. See also Robertson, supra note 232.
235 For a comprehensive listing of actions taken by Ohio jurisdictions, see Cheren, supra
note 231. See also Robertson, supra note 233.
236 CITY OF YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 878.07, supra note 232.
237 CITY OF OBERLIN, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 521.13, supra note 232. CITY OF OBERLIN
COMMUNITY BILL OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ORDINANCE (2013), http://web.archive.org
/web/20140626173423/http://celdf.org/downloads/Oberlin_CBOR_and_Obligations_Ordi
nance_112014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QE2-7FV3].
238 CINCINNATI RES. 29-2012, supra note 232.
239 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief at 3,
96 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:55
Mansfield citizens objected to Preferred Fluids’ planned creation of the
injection wells.240 Attempting to block the construction of these wells,
Mansfield attempted to enforce local ordinances that required a driller
of such wells to comply with zoning requirements that amounted to a
local ban on injection wells, and to obtain certain permits.241
Preferred Fluids Management sued Mansfield in federal court,
arguing that the local regulations were preempted by the Ohio oil and
gas law, O.R.C. section 1509.02.242 As in Natale, the question the court
faced was whether the state law preempted Mansfield’s local ordinances.
Before litigation could proceed, however, Mansfield citizens passed
a ballot initiative amending the Mansfield charter to include a Community
Bill of Rights243 which contained a drilling ban.244 Subsequently, Preferred
Fluids Management withdrew its plans for Mansfield-based waste fluid
wells and dropped its federal lawsuit in October of 2012.245 In this instance,
Preferred Fluids Mgmt. LLC v. City of Mansfield, No. 1:2012CV 01804 (N.D. Ohio 2012);
see also Marshall, supra note 173.
240 See Marshall, supra note 173.
241 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra note
239, at 5.
242 Id. See also Marshall, supra note 173.
243 See CTY. OF MANSFIELD COMMUNITY BILL OF RIGHTS § 1.03 (2013), http://web.archive
.org/web/20140626173423/http://celdf.org/downloads/Oberlin_CBOR_and_Obligations
_Ordinance_112014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU4N-MQRT].
244 Id. (stating “(B) Right to Clean Air. All residents, natural communities and ecosystems
in the City of Mansfield possess a fundamental and inalienable right to breathe air
untainted by toxins, carcinogens, particulates and other substances known to cause harm
to death; . . . (H) Securing and Protecting Rights. To further secure and protect rights
enumerated by the aforementioned Bill of Rights: (1) It shall be unlawful for any person
or corporation . . . to use a corporation or state government or entity to inject, deposit, store
or transport waste water, ‘produced water’, ‘frack’ water, brine or other materials, chemicals
or by-products from the development of natural gas from shale formations, within, upon
or through the land, air or waters of the City of Mansfield, without the written legislative
consent of the City of Mansfield. (2) No permit, license, privilege or charter issued by any
State or state government agency, Commission or Board to any person or any corporation
or state government or any entity operating under State laws, or any director, officer,
owner, or manager of a corporation or state government or any entity operating under
State laws, which would violate the prohibitions of this Charter provision or deprive any
City resident(s), of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by this Charter, the Ohio
Constitution, the United States Constitution, or other laws, shall be deemed valid within
the City of Mansfield, without the written legislative consent of the City of Mansfield”).
245 See Linda Martz, Plan for Fracking Waste Wells Withdrawn, MANSFIELD NEWS J.
(June 26, 2012, 4:02PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20120703221006/http://www.mans
fieldnewsjournal.com/article/20120626/NEWS01/120626008/Plan-fracking-waste-wells
-withdrawn [https://perma.cc/784W-Z9N2].
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no judicial decision was reached on the validity of the local ordinances
and of the drilling ban, located within the charter-based Community Bill
of Rights, was not challenged.
b. Community Bills of Rights: Drilling Bans Through Local
Charter Amendment
Unlike Munroe Falls and Warren, both of which sought to control
drilling in their jurisdictions through local ordinances that imposed controls
on drillers beyond the state requirements, several Ohio jurisdictions, like
Mansfield, have opted to attempt outright bans on drilling.246 A Pittsburgh-
based nonprofit, the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund [here-
inafter CELDF], drafted model legislation it calls a “Community Bill of
Rights,” and has lobbied for and supported efforts in the region and across
the nation to encourage local jurisdictions to adopt versions of it.247
A Community Bill of Rights [hereinafter CBR], as its name sug-
gests, is a rights-based approach to citizen control. It does not create spe-
cific rules, like those in a city ordinance, such as a requirement that wells
be limited to certain specified locations. Rather, it asserts residents’ rights
to an undefined clean environment, including the right to breathe air “un-
tainted by toxins, carcinogens, particulates” and other similar pronounce-
ments regarding areas regulated largely preemptively by both state and
federal law. For example, the CBRs assert residents’ right to clean water.
But water quality regulation generally is also not a matter of local control.
The Federal Safe Drinking Water Act248 and the Federal Clean Water
Act249 set forth the parameters, some of which are implemented locally.250
In addition to asserting rights for human citizens, the CBRs pur-
port to grant rights to ‘natural communities’ to exist and flourish within
246 See, e.g., CITY OF ATHENS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. §§ 47.01.04–.08 (2015); see also CITY
OF YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 878.07 (2012); see also CITY OF OBERLIN, OHIO
CODIFIED ORD. § 521.13 (2013).
247 See generally Gas Drilling and Fracking, COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL DEFENSE
FUND (CELDF), http://web.archive.org/web/20130617110648/http://www.celdf.org/-1-95
[https://perma.cc/SDN5-U979]. The CELDF-drafted Community Bill of Rights template
can be found at http://web.archive.org/web/20150813070142/http://celdf.org/downloads
/Ordinance%20-%20Pittsburgh%20Protection%20from%20Gas%20Drilling.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8R3N-2QP9].
248 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f–300j (West 2016).
249 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251–1387 (West 2016).
250 The directives and programs of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act
are implemented through state-level and regional EPA offices, and in conjunction with
other state agencies, e.g., the Ohio EPA Division of Drinking and Ground Waters.
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the adopting municipality.251 In particular, CBRs grant these rights to
woodlands, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and other water systems.252
Much has been written about who (or what) may have the right, or
the responsibility, to protect natural communities. Professor Christopher
D. Stone first wrote about it in his 1972 Southern California Law Review
article Should Trees Have Standing?253 Generally, the answer to the ques-
tion near to Stone’s question—that is, whether trees do have standing—
has been no. Natural entities do not have standing to sue on their own
behalf, and a CBR adopted by a local jurisdiction does not change that.
Moreover, the sweeping assertions of legal rights and causes of action
that a CBR purports to bestow, could preempt, or at least jeopardize, many
existing local laws, creating unintended consequences. The CBR petitions
that CELDF proposes would amend a village charter, which is effectively
a local constitution. Because constitutions are superior to legislation, local
ordinances that conflicted with the CBR-amended local charter, would be
at risk. The issue came up in the Village of Gates Mills, Ohio.
1) A Community Bill of Rights Defeated in Favor of a Study
Commission: Gates Mills, Ohio
A group of Village of Gates Mills, Ohio, citizens campaigned for
Issue 51, a CELDF CBR that would have altered the village’s charter.
The citizens’ proposal declared it “unlawful within Gates Mills for any
corporation or government to engage in the extraction of hydrocarbons.”254
Aside from the fact that the prohibition seemed not to apply to persons,
which in this context does not include corporations or governments, this
prohibition posed a problem because Ohio law allows drilling, regulates
it, and purports by statute to preempt its local regulation.255 Even Munroe
Falls did not attempt an outright ban on drilling.256
251 See Gas Drilling and Fracking, supra note 247; see also Heidi G. Robertson, Commu-
nity Bill of Rights Attempts to Use Rights-based Charter Amendment to Ban Drilling,
CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20141
010/BLOGS05/141019983/community-bill-of-rights-attempts-to-use-rights-based-charter
[https://perma.cc/WB6E-PZA9].
252 Id.; see also Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New
Mexico, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255 (2014) (discussion the history, policy, rationale for, and
limitations of Community Bills of Rights).
253 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
254 Proposed for the November Election—Community Bill of Rights, VILL. OF GATES MILLS
(Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.gatesmillsvillage.com/homepage/news/proposed-november-elec
tion-community-bill-rights [https://perma.cc/3HFR-D5MR].
255 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013).
256 See Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 85.
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The CBR presented several problems. For example, Gates Mills cur-
rently regulates solar panel placement on structures.257 The proposed CBR
charter amendment would have bestowed on residents a different right
that runs contrary to that village ordinance—the absolute right to develop
renewable energy on their property.258 If adopted, that new right may
well have negated the existing village limitations on placement of solar
panels because a charter (which, again, is like the village constitution)
trumps the ordinance (which is essentially village legislation). The type of
overreaching language in this and other CBRs could have had substan-
tial unintended consequences.
Gates Mills voters ultimately rejected the proposed CBR charter
amendment. More than 68% of Gates Mills citizens struck down the
would-be charter amendment, after months of local debate.259
In addition to its efforts in Gates Mills, CEDLF has fueled rights-
based charter amendment efforts in Youngstown,260 and in Broadview
Heights,261 where a CBR was adopted in November 2010 and altered the
city’s charter. Athens,262 Cincinnati,263 Mansfield,264 Niles265 and Yellow
257 VILL. OF GATES MILLS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 1157.07 (2014).
258 See Proposed for the November Election—Community Bill of Rights, supra note 254.
259 Sara Dorn, Gates Mills Voters Deny Anti-fracking Bill of Rights, Unofficial Election Re-
sults Show, THE PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:43 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/hillcrest
/index.ssf/2014/11/gates_mills_voters_deny_anti-f.html [https://perma.cc/7WXL-7A3D].
260 Jackie Stewart, Youngstown Mayor: CELDF Anti-Fracking Community Bill of Rights “Out
of State Folks Pushing an Agenda,” ENERGY IN DEPTH OHIO (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:05 PM),
http://energyindepth.org/ohio/youngstown-mayor-celdf-anti-fracking-community-bill-of
-rights-out-of-state-folks-pushing-an-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/3LP5-5BXM] (noting that
the city of Youngstown has already rejected Community Bill of Rights measures on four
separate occasions.)
261 See Chris Ventura, Community Bill of Rights is an Attempt to Suppress Economic
Growth, THE PLAIN DEALER (July 9, 2015, 7:01 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index
.ssf/2015/07/community_bill_of_rights_is_at.html [https://perma.cc/TL3Z-2JKD] (citing
CELDF’s support and backing of charter initiatives in Broadview Heights and through-
out the State, which promote the enactment of a Community Bill of Rights).
262 CITY OF ATHENS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. §§ 47.01.04–.08.
263 CINCINNATI RES. 29-2012, Cincinnati City Council (Apr. 18, 2012).
264 See CITY OF MANSFIELD COMMUNITY BILL OF RIGHTS § 1.03.
265 See, e.g., Erika Thomas & Jim Wyko, 27 Investigates: 85% of Niles Ordinances Passed
as Emergencies in 2013, WKBN FIRST NEWS 27 (May 6, 2014), http://wkbn.com/2014/05/06
/27-investigates-declaring-an-emergency/ [https://perma.cc/A7GA-QJCE]; City of Niles
Community Bill of Rights, MEDIATRACKERS.ORG, http://mediatrackers.org/assets/uploads
/2013/09/20130821_NILES_ORDINANCE_COMMUNITYBILLOFRIGHTS_54-13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/58BP-5ACF] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (stating that the initiative in
Niles was not put to the voters, rather, it was passed by the Niles City Council as an
emergency measure).
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Springs266 also have adopted versions of CEDLF’s model bill.267 Bowling
Green, Randolph Township, and Kent have had CBRs on the ballots, but
to date have declined to adopt them.268
2) Challenges to Rights-Based Drilling Bans: Broadview
Heights, Ohio
CBRs have sparked litigation for some Ohio localities that adopted
them, thus undermining their goal of helping the local jurisdiction control
drilling within its boundaries. For example, Broadview Heights’ version
of the CBR, which is similar to the version Gates Mills voters rejected, has
sparked legal action in at least two ways since its 2012 adoption. When
Bass Energy attempted to drill in Broadview Heights, in possession of an
Ohio DNR drilling permit, the City of Broadview Heights ordered Bass
Energy not to drill, citing the CBR drilling prohibition voters had ap-
proved.269 Bass Energy sued Broadview Heights arguing that the new
charter-based drilling prohibition violated Ohio law.270
In March 2015, almost immediately after the Ohio Supreme Court
released its opinion in State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., Judge
Michael Astrab of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas released
266 CITY OF YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 878.07.
267 See generally Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, What’s in a Community
Bill of Rights (Aug. 31, 2015) http://celdf.org/2015/08/whats-in-a-community-bill-of-rights
-cbor/ [https://perma.cc/B6TQ-JP78] (providing information regarding the “anatomy” of
a Community Bill of Rights).
268 See, e.g., Ken Paulman, Three Out of Four Ohio Towns Reject Anti-fracking Measures,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/2014/11/04/three
-out-of-four-ohio-towns-reject-anti-fracking-measures/ [https://perma.cc/HP4Q-8UVF]
(explaining the Youngstown, Kent, and Gates Mills measures); B.G. Residents Vote Against
So-called Citizen’s Bill of Rights, THE TOLEDO BLADE (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.toledo
blade.com/Politics/2013/11/05/B-G-residents-vote-against-so-called-citizen-s-bill-of
-rights.html [https://perma.cc/DS5P-B6PB] (explaining Bowling Green measures); see Bob
Downing, Judge Strikes Down Broadview Heights’ Community Bill of Rights that Banned
Additional Drilling, AKRON BEACON J. (March 13, 2015, 11:26 PM), http://www.ohio
.com/news/local/judge-strikes-down-broadview-heights-community-bill-of-rights-that
-banned-additional-drilling-1.574801 [https://perma.cc/BJ7E-SVHR] (explaining the impli-
cations of Broadview Heights’ community bill of rights being struck down on other munic-
ipalities who have approved similar initiatives).
269 Bass Energy, Inc., v. Broadview Heights, No. CV-14-828074 (Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga
Cty., Ohio, Mar. 10, 2015); see also Bob Sandrick, Judge Shoots Down Broadview Heights
Ban on Future Oil and Gas Wells, THE PLAIN DEALER (May 8, 2015, 10:34 AM), http://
www.cleveland.com/broadview-heights/index.ssf/2015/03/judge_shoots_down_broadview
_he.html [https://perma.cc/A6KD-RWY6].
270 Bass Energy, Inc., No. CV-14-828074 (2015).
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his decision in Bass Energy, Inc., et al. v. City of Broadview Heights. Citing
the Ohio Supreme Court’s ex rel. Morrison decision, Judge Astrab found
the Broadview Heights CBR or “Charter Amendment Article XV,” to be
preempted by the Ohio oil and gas statute, section 1509.02.271
To be clear, the legal natures of the two cases were quite different.
Munroe Falls had attempted to enforce pre-existing local ordinances that
would effect permitting or location of oil or gas wells. Broadview Heights,
on the other hand, amended its city charter, which is effectively its local
constitution, to ban all drilling within its boundaries. Still, Judge Astrab
felt that the Munroe Falls case, State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp.,
spoke clearly enough on the preemptive power of section 1509.02—and
he voided the Broadview Heights charter-based drilling ban.
In a separate lawsuit involving Broadview Heights’ CBR-induced
charter amendment prohibiting drilling, Kempen v. Bass Energy is cur-
rently pending before Judge Gaul in the Cuyahoga Court of Common
Pleas.272 Here, individual Broadview Heights residents sued Bass Energy
for violating deed restrictions prohibiting drilling, but also for violating
the drilling prohibition now in the city’s charter via the CBR.273 A class
action suit at Common Pleas surrounding the same matter is pending
before Judge McCormack.274 In this suit, the non-profit Mothers Against
Drilling In Our Neighborhoods joined Bass Energy and the Governor and
State of Ohio, alleging that the drilling activities and the statutory
preemption both violate the Ohio Constitution.275
The Ohio legislature worked hard to be clear about its intention
to prohibit local regulation of shale oil and gas development.276 It is possible
that the Ohio Supreme Court will allow localities still to issue some limited
271 Id.
272 Paul Kempen v. Bass Energy, Inc., No. CV-13-807931 (Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty.,
May 23, 2013) (stating that it appears that this case is still pending. As of October 20,
2015, the docket indicates that the latest activity was on September 14, 2015. The reply
brief was filed by plaintiff(s) Paul Kempen, Agina Kempen, and Sean S. Kelly, titled
Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Updated Motion for Partial Summary Judge-
ment and Motion for a Hearing on Attorneys’ Fees and Cost).
273 Complaint, Paul Kempen v. Bass Energy, Inc., No. CV-13-807931 (Ct. Com. Pl.
Cuyahoga Cty., May 23, 2013).
274 Mothers Against Drilling in our Neighborhood v. Bass Energy, Inc., No. CV-14-836889
(Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty., Dec. 4, 2014).
275 Complaint at 19, Mothers Against Drilling in our Neighborhood v. Bass Energy, Inc.,
No. CV-14-836889 (Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty., Dec. 4, 2014); see also Bob Sandrick, Two
Drilling Companies Sue Broadview Heights Over Ban on Oil and Gas Wells, THE PLAIN
DEALER (May 8, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/broadview-heights/index.ssf
/2014/07/two_drilling_companies_sue_bro.html [https://perma.cc/J9DZ-VKT3].
276 See Robertson, supra note 21.
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zoning rules, as Justice O’Donnell explained in State ex rel. Morrison v.
Beck Energy Corp.277 It is hard to imagine, however, any locality succeeding
with an outright ban, like those included in the various iterations of the
CBR, given the language of the Ohio statute and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp.
3) Community Bill of Rights in Other Ohio Jurisdictions
Ohio localities that have enacted a CBR, in addition to Mansfield,278
Warren,279 and Broadview Heights,280 include Yellow Springs,281 Oberlin,282
Athens,283 and Niles.284 With the exception of the lawsuits facing Broadview
Heights,285 the consequences that Gates Mills foresaw have yet to play
out in these cities, but neither, so far, have the expected benefits.
The small college town of Oberlin passed a town-wide outright
ban on hydraulic fracturing in 2013, in the form of a CBR.286 The ban
includes several activities related to drilling, including the actual activity
of drilling, the handling of its waste, the extraction of water to use for it,
and the building of infrastructure to support it.287 The town of Oberlin
passed the ballot measure by a vote of seventy-one percent to thirty-nine
percent. Broadview Heights had passed its drilling ban in a similar way
in 2012, after a lengthy drilling moratorium.288 In the 2014 midterm elec-
tions, voters in the Ohio University town of Athens passed a ban by
seventy-eight percent of the votes—the only city in Ohio to do so during
277 See Morrison, 143 Ohio St.3d at 271, 284–85 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in judgment only)
(explaining that “if the legislature had intended to override all local zoning ordinances that
affect oil and gas drilling, it could have declared that intent, such as it did in the case of
hazardous waste facilities, R.C. 3734.05(E), public utilities, R.C. 519.211(A), casinos, R.C.
3772.26(A), and licensed residential facilities, R.C. 5123.19(P). It could also have created a
statutory scheme that addresses local land use and planning issues. Yet it did not do so.”).
278 CITY OF MANSFIELD CMTY. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1.03(H)(1).
279 CITY OF WARREN, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. § 731.05.
280 CITY OF BROADVIEW HEIGHTS, OHIO ORDINANCE NO. 115-12 (2012).
281 CITY OF YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO ORDINANCE NO. 2011-25 (2011).
282 CITY OF OBERLIN, OHIO ORDINANCE NO. 13-41 (2013).
283 CITY OF ATHENS, OHIO CODIFIED ORD. §§ 47.01.04–.08.
284 Thomas & Wyko, supra note 265.
285 See Sandrick, supra note 269.
286 Valerie Richardson, Fracking Foes Pump Out Votes in Colorado and Ohio Where Wells
Are Dry, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/11
/fracking-foes-pump-out-votes-in-colorado-and-ohio-/?page=all [https://perma.cc/2RCK
-S6PP].
287 OBERLIN ORDINANCE NO. 13-41; see AC CMS, supra note 237, at § 4–6.
288 Gas & Oil Well Information, BROADVIEWHEIGHTS.ORG (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www
.broadview-heights.org/315/Gas-Oil-Well-Information [https://perma.cc/MZJ5-74WY].
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that election cycle.289 Critics of the “victory for local rule” view of drilling
have pointed out that towns like Oberlin tend to be non-industrial, with
little economic interest in natural gas.290
Similar attempts to ban drilling in larger, or more industry-driven
Ohio towns have failed. The same “community bill of rights” that Oberlin
passed was rejected in 2013 by the cities of Bowling Green and Youngs-
town.291 In Bowling Green, nearly three-quarters of voters defeated the
ban.292 In Youngstown, voters rejected the proposal twice within the first
six months after its introduction, first by fifty-five percent against the ban
and then by fifty-seven percent.293 Youngstown voters rejected the ban
again in the November 2014 election294 and most recently, in November
2015.295 In November 2015, Youngstown residents voted for the fifth time
on a CEDLF-based CBR, and once again, voters rejected the measure fifty-
one percent to forty-nine percent.296 The city of Kent also voted down the
“community bill of rights” in the November 2014 election,297 as did the
Village of Gates Mills.298
289 Conor Morris, Athens the Only Ohio City to Pass a Fracking Ban This Election, THE
ATHENS NEWS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.athensnews.com/ohio/election/athens-the-only
-ohio-city-to-pass-a-fracking-ban/article_feda6903-Oaf2-5609-b16d-8s660f555d00.html
[https://perma.cc/ZH5Y-ZZL6].
290 See Robertson, supra note 233.
291 Barclay Nicholson, Fracking Bans in Colo. And Ohio May be Unenforceable, LAW360




294 Daniel Moore, Disagreement on Legal Authority Complicates Local Fracking Bans,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 11, 2014, 12:15 AM), http://powersource.post-gazette
.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2014/11/11/Law-remains-ambiguous-on-local
-authority-to-ban-fracking/stories/201411110011 [https://perma.cc/24LV-6K99].
295 Stewart, supra note 260; see also Dave Sess, Frackfree Group to Put Fracking Ban on
Youngstown Ballot Again, WKBN FIRST NEWS (June 27, 2016), http://wkbn.com/2016/06
/27/frackfree-group-to-put-fracking-ban-on-youngstown-ballot-again/ [https://perma.cc/NA53
-J6H2]; see also Youngstown Voters Turn Down Anti-fracking Proposal—Again, supra note 3.
296 Bob Downing, Youngstown Group to Submit Community Bill of Rights Petition, AKRON
BEACON J. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.ohio.com/blogs/drilling/ohio-utica-shale-1.291290
/youngstown-group-to-submit-community-bill-of-rights-petition-1.693173 [https://perma
.cc/6XS7-GHRN].
297 Christina Bucciere, Kent’s Community Bill of Rights’ Fails to Pass, KENTWIRED.COM
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.kentwired.com/election_2014/article_2d3293e2-6480-11e4-ae0a
-001a4bcf6878.html [https://perma.cc/HEL4-EFPK].
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3. More Methods Ohio Local Jurisdictions Use to Attempt to
Influence Drilling
As discussed above, local jurisdictions have attempted to control
or influence oil and gas development activities through local regulatory
ordinance, local zoning, and charter-based drilling bans. To date, in Ohio,
these efforts have been largely unsuccessful. This section discusses some
other methods that local jurisdictions have found to exert some control
over oil and gas related activities.
a. Influencing Drilling by Regulating Related Activities
While Ohio local jurisdictions have had varied success in passing
the legally questionable outright drilling bans,299 some cities and towns
have tried to influence drilling in a more targeted, though less direct
way. For example, in 2012, the City of Cincinnati passed Local Ordinance
No. 314, which altered the City’s municipal code to prohibit disposal of
hydraulic fracturing waste within the city.300 This measure represents an
attempt to avoid conflict with state law by focusing on an activity other
than the siting or drilling of wells. In addition to prohibiting disposal of
waste from hydraulic fracturing, it called upon the state to reform many
drilling regulations301 and requested the Governor and the Legislature to
ban the construction of new wells throughout the state.302 Although it is un-
clear whether Ohio courts would uphold this ban against the Ohio oil and
gas law as interpreted in the State ex rel. Morrison decision because there
have been no permit requests filed with the Ohio DNR for waste disposal
wells in southwestern Ohio, Cincinnati’s ban has not been challenged.303
Like Cincinnati, the Village of Burton sought a targeted ordinance
that would have some influence on local oil and gas development without
running afoul of the state statute. It passed a research moratorium, by reso-
lution of the city council, in 2011, purporting to temporarily ban hydrau-
lic fracturing.304 In the same resolution, the Village of Burton asked the
299 See Cheran, supra note 231, at 1492, 1516–17.
300 Andy Brownfield & German Lopez, Council Approves Ban on Injection Wells, CITYBEAT




303 Ohio Supreme Court Decision Makes Future of Local Fracking Regulations, Unclear,
FROST BROWN TODD LAW FIRM (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/resources
-1780.html [https://perma.cc/QDE5-8WV3].
304 VILL. OF BURTON CODIFIED ORD. § 725.01 (1964), http://whdrane.conwaygreene.com
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state legislature to use its preemptive power to pass a statewide ban.305
To date, the Ohio legislature has not acted on Burton’s request.
b. Controlling Drilling by Using the Administrative Process
Even when localities cannot regulate in their own right they have
some very limited recourse through the administrative process. In North
Royalton, Ohio, Cutter Oil sought to package sufficient contiguous land
parcels to satisfy the state’s spacing and acreage requirements for oil and
gas drilling.306 In Ohio, for wells predicted to be between 2,000 and 4,000
feet deep, the drilling unit must include at least twenty acres.307 For
wells predicted to be deeper than 4,000 feet, a forty-acre drilling unit is
required.308 Cutter Oil predicted that this particular well would be 3,999
feet, just one single, miraculous foot shy of the state requirement that it
double the average size of the drilling area.309
To reach even the required twenty-acre regulatory threshold,
Cutter Oil sought to have two acres of North Royalton’s municipal streets
included in its drilling area via a request to Ohio DNR’s Division of Oil
and Gas Resources Management for a mandatory pooling order.310 The
order, if granted, would add those two acres of North Royalton’s city streets
to Cutter’s drilling unit, making it a unit of sufficient size and shape for
drilling.311 North Royalton, not wishing its streets to be included in the dril-
ling area, or ‘pool’, objected to Cutter Oil’s request for a mandatory pooling
order, complaining that, in addition to other reasons, Cutter Oil had been




306 OHIO OIL & GAS COMM’N, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & ORDER OF THE COMMISSION
(Appeal No. 856), at 5, findings 3–5 (Dec. 13, 2014); see also Heidi G. Robertson, Ohio
Cities May Have a New Way to Control Oil and Gas Drilling Within Their Borders,
CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/201509
11/BLOGS05/150919963/ohio-cities-may-have-a-new-way-to-control-oil-and-gas-drilling
[https://perma.cc/4ZPN-NXLN].
307 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-04 (2010).
308 Id.
309 OHIO OIL & GAS COMM’N, supra note 306, at 5, fn. 3 (stating that the mandatory
pooling order [issued to Cutter] set forth a total depth of 3,999 feet and explaining the
“critical importance” of that one additional foot).
310 Id. at 5, 10, findings 4, 17.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 12, findings 33–34. There had been three spills or accidents at the seventeen conven-
tional oil and gas wells Cutter Oil operates within North Royalton, see id. at finding 11.
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Despite North Royalton’s safety concerns, Ohio DNR’s Division of
Oil and Gas Resources Management issued Cutter Oil’s requested man-
datory pooling order and North Royalton quickly took advantage of its
statutory right to appeal the Division’s decision to the Ohio Oil and Gas
Commission.313
At the Commission’s hearing on this matter, it considered
whether Cutter Oil had met certain statutory requirements for obtaining
a mandatory pooling order—in particular, whether the proposed unit was
“compact,” as the statute requires, whether North Royalton’s streets
count as tracts of land which could be subject to a mandatory pooling
order, whether Cutter Oil’s mandatory pooling application was in order
in light of some potentially important changes it made in its affidavit
supporting the application, and whether Cutter Oil’s negotiation efforts re-
garding the required but unleased land were “just and equitable” in light
of the historical relationship between North Royalton and Cutter Oil.314
The first issue was simple. The statute does not provide a defini-
tion, so the Commission used a dictionary and noted “compact” to mean
close, solid, or packed together.315 The Commission looked at a map and
determined the proposed drilling unit to be “compact” because it was
shaped basically like a rectangle without outlying parts.316
The next issue was touchier. Are municipal streets “tracts” that
can be subject to mandatory pooling?317 The Commission wrestled with
several definitions of the word “tract”, but ultimately relied on that word’s
use in the oil and gas law and also on testimony of oil and gas commis-
sion geologists indicating that public roads had been mandatorily pooled
into drilling units in the past.318
Next, the Commission discussed whether Cutter Oil’s application
was proper given that the company made many alterations to it.319 The
Commission appeared irritated by some discrepancies between the applica-
tion and its supporting documents, but it let those go.320
313 Id. at 13–14, findings 36–38.
314 OHIO OIL & GAS COMM’N, supra note 306, at 16.
315 Id. at 16–17.
316 Id. at 17.
317 Id. at 18.
318 Id. at 18–19.
319 OHIO OIL & GAS COMM’N, supra note 306, at 21.
320 Id. at 24 (“[T]estimony revealed that, in the Division’s view, the ‘just and equitable’
standard has been distilled down to only a consideration of the financial aspects of lease
negotiations.”).
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Ultimately, the Commission revoked the drilling company’s manda-
tory pooling order on the grounds that the Division had not considered
adequately North Royalton’s documented and legitimate safety concerns.321
The Commission decided that the Division’s failure to consider North
Royalton’s safety concerns rendered the Division’s effort not “just and equi-
table.”322 The Chief conceded that when issuing the order, the Division
had only considered economics, not North Royalton’s safety concerns.323
The Commission revoked Cutter Oil’s Ohio DNR-issued manda-
tory pooling order in December 2014.324 The order, had it stood, would
have allowed Cutter Oil to include portions of North Royalton’s city
streets in a drilling unit despite North Royalton’s objections on grounds
that Cutter Oil has a poor safety record with its existing wells in North
Royalton.325 On March 23, 2015, the Chief of Ohio DNR’s Division of Oil
and Gas Resources Management—the agency that issued the original
order—appealed the Commission’s decision to void it to the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas, hoping the court would overturn the Com-
mission decision and reinstate the mandatory pooling order.326
On August 27, 2015, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
upheld the Oil and Gas Commission’s decision to void the mandatory
pooling order.327 By upholding the Commission’s voiding of the order, the
Franklin County court has given hope to local jurisdictions that would
like a voice in drilling decisions that effect health, safety, and welfare
within their borders—traditional home rule controls.328
Cities and other localities in Ohio have long been attempting to find
some measure of influence over drilling activity within their borders.329
The Commission’s North Royalton decision, and the Franklin County Com-
mon Pleas Court’s recent support of that decision, might provide some
321 Id. at 27.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 25 (“Division Chief Simmers testified that safety issues are not considered
during the evaluation of a mandatory pooling application.”).
324 See OHIO OIL & GAS COMM’N, supra note 306, at 1, 27.
325 Id.
326 See Simmers v. City of North Royalton, No. 15 CV-000042 (Franklin Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.
Aug. 27, 2015).
327 See id.
328 Mary Kilpatrick, Court Upholds Decision to Revoke Drilling Permit for North Royalton
Well, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 31, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/north-royalton
/index.ssf/2015/08/court_upholds_decision_to_revo.html [https://perma.cc/9ML8-GVFU].
329 See Arenschield, Athens Votes to Ban Fracking, supra note 2; see also Arenschield,
Ohio Counties Can’t Vote to Ban Fracking, supra note 2.
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fodder. It suggests that a community’s concerns—at least well-documented
safety concerns—might have some influence over administrative decisions.
c. Next Steps for Local Jurisdictions: Thoughts from the
Regional Commission to Study and Address Shale Oil and
Gas Development
In light of the legal circumstances in Ohio, where the state legis-
lature has placed a stricture on the power of local governments to regu-
late drilling and related activities, communities have struggled with how
best to act in the interests of their residents. The Ohio Constitution’s
home rule provision does not protect them from the preemptive power of
the state oil and gas law. The Ohio Supreme Court has made that clear.
Communities certainly vary in their desires regarding oil and gas
development—some communities want it to come to their jurisdiction for
its economic development potential, others want to block its arrival for
fear of environmental, social, and other concerns, some likely just want
to have a say in how it effects the community. In an effort to respond to
citizen concerns with their eyes open, one Ohio community reached out
to citizens and experts for analysis and advice.
Although voters in Gates Mills, Ohio, overwhelmingly defeated a
proposed CBR in 2014, the heated community-wide debates that pre-
ceded the election sent a strong message to the village council. Even
residents who understood the weaknesses of using a charter-altering
CBR to try to control drilling were concerned about the possibility of deep
well drilling and hydraulic fracturing in their village. In response to the
citizens’ concerns, the Gates Mills council “approved the concept of pre-
venting, controlling or limiting the further extraction of hydrocarbons.”330
The council then announced that it would form a commission to study
drilling and to recommend actions the council could take and efforts the
council could support. The new commission would include “residents,
land conservancy representatives, experts in science and in law, govern-
ment representatives and others to consider legal, political, sociological,
and legislative approaches to identify the current and future status of
Gates Mills Village within the Marcellus, Utica, and other possible geo-
logical formations . . . .”331 Gates Mills’ mayor soon appointed Commis-
sioners answering the above descriptions to the newly created Regional
330 Gates Mills Village Press Release, on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. REV.
331 Id.
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Commission to Study and Address Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Explo-
ration (“the Commission”).332 The Commission was to be a forum for edu-
cation and discussion leading to the development of a regional response to
oil and gas development that will address the concerns of communities.333
The Commission by-laws tasked the legal and legislative action
committee with evaluating communities’ options within Ohio’s legal
environment.334 Populated with volunteers, the committee tackled this
daunting task and came up with some recommendations for future
Commission actions. First, in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis
in State ex rel. Morrison, the committee recommended that local jurisdic-
tions look closely at their zoning codes to ensure that those codes, using
only their traditional zoning authority, protect their zoned areas as in-
tended. Further, the committee recommended that local jurisdictions
evaluate their ordinances that focus on health, safety and the environ-
ment. These areas of local control may well fall into the category of local
power that Justice O’Donnell, in his concurring opinion, intended to protect.
The committee recommended that the Commission, when appointed for
2016, focus on drafting model ordinances that local communities could
adapt to their preferences.
The committee understood that law may well not be on the side
of communities here. It therefore recommended taking a close look at
voluntary agreements amongst landowners. The committee suggested
that the Commission and local communities consider drafting model
documents that could be used by private citizens to agree amongst them-
selves, but perhaps under the encouragement or leadership of the juris-
diction or conservation groups, not to lease their land for drilling. This
could not be made mandatory under law, but if it is the will of a commu-
nity to banish drilling, presumably, there would be sufficient will to enter
into individual agreements towards that end. In so agreeing, it is possible
that citizens could create at least a patchwork of properties for which land-
owners would agree not to consent to drilling. For deep wells, without
332 The author is a commissioner and co-chair of the legal and legislative action committee.
For more information about the Regional Commission, see Purpose of the Regional Com-
mission, http://www.rcogw.com [https://perma.cc/N5J9-9FA9].
333 Report and Recommendations, REGIONAL COMMISSION TO STUDY AND ADDRESS OIL &
GAS WELL DRILLING AND EXPLORATION, at 1 (Dec. 2015), http://www.rcogw.com/sites
/default/files/files/Regional%20Commission%20on%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Drilling%20
Report%20and%20%20Recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W8V-46R6].
334 See Welcome to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Committee, REGIONAL COMMISSION
TO STUDY AND ADDRESS OIL & GAS WELL DRILLING AND EXPLORATION, http://www.rcogw
.com/legal [https://perma.cc/KHC7-2WUV].
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sixty-five percent of the mineral rights owners in a 650 acre area consenting
to drilling, developers would be unable to petition the state to mandatorily
include the dissenting landowners in a drilling unit. For shallower wells,
Ohio prefers to have more than ninety percent landowner agreement in
a forty acre area. If unable to create a drilling unit of sufficient size and
shape for the depth of well to be drilled, developers would be unable to
earn a drilling permit. The committee will delve into the possibilities
here in the coming year, presumably, the documents will take the form
of conservation easements or deed restrictions.
II. LOCAL CONTROL IN OHIO’S MARCELLUS AND UTICA
REGION NEIGHBORS
When trying to determine how courts might rule on important
matters, one often looks for insight from neighboring states. Two of Ohio’s
neighbors, Pennsylvania and New York, faced similar tensions concerning
the intersection of state oil and gas laws and local efforts to control shale
oil and gas activities within their local boundaries. Like Ohio, large areas
of Pennsylvania and New York sit atop the Marcellus and Utica shale
plays.335 This means that the three states share the majority of natural gas
development potential out of the entire Eastern and Midwestern regions.336
But because of the particulars of each state’s constitutional language re-
lated to home rule, and to environmental conservation, despite the simi-
larity in geography and resources, the three similarly situated states have
met local oil and gas drilling control efforts with very different responses.
This section will evaluate the legal environments in Pennsylvania
and New York. It will consider the oil and gas statutes in those states,
as well as the language of the state constitutions. Finally, it will compare
the relative interpretation of those state courts to Ohio.
A. Pennsylvania
Shale plays do not respect state lines. Because the Utica and
Marcellus shale formations run deep beneath Pennsylvania,337 as well as




337 See Chris Amico et al., Shale Play, NPR STATE IMPACT, http://stateimpact.npr.org/penn
sylvania/drilling/ [https://perma.cc/SP78-7TKB].
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beneath Ohio (and New York, West Virginia, and others),338 Pennsylvania
has faced issues similar to Ohio’s on the subject of local control bumping up
against a state statute and the state Constitution. This section illustrates
Pennsylvania’s approach to the problem by exploring that state’s oil and
gas legislation, its applicable Constitutional provisions, and the decisions
of its highest court.
1. Legislation: Pennsylvania’s Act 13
Like the Ohio legislature, Pennsylvania’s legislature was clear
about its intent to preempt local regulation of oil and gas operations.
Pennsylvania’s legislature enacted Act 13 in an effort to revamp its oil
and gas laws. The Pennsylvania law was old, originally enacted in 1961 as
the Oil & Gas Conservation Law.339 The original iteration did not address
the new technologies, like horizontal drilling or hydraulic fracturing, that
were quickly arriving in the state due to the developing shale oil and gas
industry surrounding the Marcellus shale play.340 Because of this omission,
Pennsylvania regulated the new technologies through a “patchwork of
regulatory responses by the state as well as local governments.”341
Act 13 substantially revised Pennsylvania’s old Oil and Gas Act
with a codified statutory framework regulating oil and gas operations.342
It included a system for collecting impact fees from drilling companies
using hydraulic fracturing to tap the enormous natural-gas supplies in the
Marcellus Shale region.343 It provided that significant revenue from those
fees be returned to effected municipalities and the state agencies running
the regulatory system.344 Pennsylvania had been “the only major gas-
producing state that did not tax natural-gas production, and it was pro-
jected to collect $175 million” in 2012.345 The new law regulated the
338 See Lower 48 States Shale Plays, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://
www.eia.gov/oil_gas/rpd/shale_gas.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK6D-CF3K].
339 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 419 (West 1961); Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 1961 PA. LAWS,
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/oilgas/bogm/bogmportalfiles/LawsRegsGuidelines/Act359uc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HGX-P78W].
340 John Dernbach et al., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Exami-
nations and Implications, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2015).
341 Id. at 1171–72.





345 Bill Reed, Controversy Abounds Over New Pennsylvania Drilling Law, THE PHILA.
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location of wells, specifically allowing drilling within 500 feet of buildings
and water wells; within 300 feet of springs, rivers, and wetlands larger
than an acre; and within 1,000 feet of sources of public drinking water.346
Act 13 also regulated the shale oil and gas permitting process by
providing new and modified requirements to be carried out by the Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Protection.347 It prevents doctors
from gaining information pertinent to their patients’ care, concerning the
risks of exposure to chemicals used in the production process unless they
sign a confidentiality agreement—ostensibly to protect drilling companies’
proprietary information.348 If a doctor releases obtained information re-
garding the risks of chemical exposure, in violation of the confidentiality
agreement, he or she will be subject to civil and criminal liability.349
Significantly, and at issue here, Act 13 attempted to preclude local
regulation of oil and gas drilling.350 Act 13’s section 3303 provides:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, environ-
mental acts are of Statewide concern and, to the extent
they regulate oil and gas operations, occupy the entire field
of regulation, to the exclusion of all local ordinances. The
Commonwealth, by this section, preempts and supersedes
the local regulation of oil and gas operations regulated by
the environmental acts, as provided in this chapter (em-
phasis added).351
This represents a clear statement of the legislature’s intent to
occupy the field of the regulation of shale oil and gas production. The Act
also includes a specifically stated expression of preemption of local regu-
lation. In section 3304, entitled ‘Uniformity of Local Ordinances’, the Act
states that “[A]ll local ordinances regulating oil and gas operations shall
allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources.”352 The Act
INQUIRER (Apr. 17, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-04-17/news/31355843_1_drilling
-law-unconventional-drilling-natural-gas-drilling [https://perma.cc/FKM6-8PE3].
346 Id.
347 Id.; see also Pa. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., supra note 342.
348 See Scott Detrow, What You Need to Know About Act 13’s Confidentiality Requirements,




350 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3303 (2012), abrogated by Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83
A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
351 Id.
352 Id. § 3304(a).
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then proceeds, in the specific, to explain that localities must allow “well
and pipeline location assessment operations,”353 are prohibited from impos-
ing requirements more stringent than the state with respect to drilling
construction and operations,354 and must complete any local review of dril-
ling proposals quickly—within time limits specified by statute.355 This Act
was superior to the Ohio oil and gas law, in terms of clarity and specificity
to preempt local regulation.
2. The Pennsylvania Constitution
The Pennsylvania Constitution includes a home rule provision,356
similar to that in Ohio’s Constitution357 and to those of many other states.358
It also includes an Environmental Rights amendment359 which provides
an additional tool for local jurisdictions in their quest to exercise some
control or influence over drilling within their boundaries. This section
will address these two provisions as they have been applied in the Penn-
sylvania courts to issues of local control of shale oil and gas development.
a. The Home Rule Provision
Like Ohio, the Pennsylvania Constitution includes a home rule
provision in Article IX, § 2.360 It says that “municipalities shall have the
right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters,” and that “a
municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power to
perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule
charter or by the General Assembly at any time.”361 The interesting point
here, though, is not the similarity of Ohio’s and Pennsylvania’s home rule
provisions, but, as discussed below, the fact that Pennsylvania’s highest
court did not rely on the home rule provision in the dispositive case on this
issue. Instead, it relied on the environmental rights amendment.362
353 Id. § 3304(b)(1)–(2).
354 Id. § 3304(b)(2)–(3).
355 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3303, at § 3304(b)(4).
356 PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
357 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
358 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2; see also COLO. CONST. art. XX § 6; ILL. CONST. art.
VII, § 6(a).
359 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
360 PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
361 Id.
362 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 985 (Pa. 2013).
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b. The Environmental Rights Amendment
The Pennsylvania Constitution includes a provision for which
there is no comparable language in the Ohio Constitution. Pennsylvania’s
Constitution boasts an “environmental rights amendment” stating:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthe-
tic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natu-
ral resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these re-
sources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.363
This provision was adopted in 1971, by referendum, during a period where
public awareness of environmental dangers had led to the adoption of
many of the federal environmental laws.364 Pennsylvania, in particular,
had been suffering pollution from industrialization, mining activities,
and other damaging industries.365
3. Judicial Interpretation: Robinson Township v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania
Like local jurisdictions in other states, Pennsylvania cities and
towns sought to impose their zoning rules and other ordinances on oil
and gas activities , but found themselves in potential conflict with Act 13,
which had purported to preempt their authority.366 They hoped the state
Constitution would help.367 In 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
applied the state’s Constitutional provisions to a group of Pennsylvania
townships’ efforts to enforce their zoning ordinances against oil and gas
activities in the face of Act 13.368
363 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
364 During the 1970s, Pennsylvania adopted state regulatory mechanisms under cooperative
federalism structures of the Federal Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. See, e.g., 25 PA.
CODE § 127.81-83 (adopting regulatory mechanisms of the Federal Clean Air Act).
365 See Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1170.
366 Id. at 1173.
367 Id.
368 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 902.
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a. Background
In 2012, Robinson Township, along with six other townships and
individuals, as well as an environmental group, sued Pennsylvania, argu-
ing that Act 13’s preemptive provisions were inconsistent with the envi-
ronmental rights amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution, among
other challenges.369 Plaintiffs alleged that among the seven complaining
townships—all sitting atop the Marcellus Shale—oil and gas drillers had
set up at least 150 wells within township limits.370 These townships argued
that Act 13 had unconstitutionally negated their traditional police powers
to control, among other things, where in their jurisdictions the wells could
be safely located. As written, the Act would force them to change their
zoning and traffic laws, and it would usurp their home rule powers.371
b. Robinson Township in the Commonwealth Court
In July 2012, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, an inter-
mediate court acting here as the trial court,372 upheld most of Act 13, but
struck down sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304 as unconstitutional.373 The
Commonwealth Court held that these sections failed on substantive due
process grounds. The reason was that Pennsylvania courts had previ-
ously required that land use decisions be directed at the whole commu-
nity and justified by a balancing of costs and benefits in order to satisfy
substantive due process.374 Instead, section 3304 fails to protect “the
interests of neighboring property owners from harm, alters the character
of neighborhoods, and makes irrational classifications” because it allows
incompatible uses to persist within zoning districts.375
369 See Christopher Lewis, Case Study: Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pa.,




372 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is an appellate level court that hears ap-
peals of final orders from state agencies and handles matters concerning state and local
governments. It serves as the trial court for cases brought against the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. See Learn About the Pennsylvania Judicial System, http://www.pacourts
.us/learn [https://perma.cc/V3J8-3ZR4] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
373 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.2d 463, 485, 493 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012),
overruled by Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 901.
374 See Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1173–74.
375 Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 482; see also id. at 1174.
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The Commonwealth Court considered section 3303, but upheld it
over the parties’ environmental rights amendment challenges.376 Earlier
Pennsylvania court decisions had laid the groundwork for this result in
two ways. First, Pennsylvania courts had held that the environmental
rights amendment only applies when specifically invoked by the legisla-
ture within the legislation itself,377 and then setting forth a three-part
balancing test for analyzing its applicability.378 The three parts are:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes
and regulations relevant to the protection of the
Commonwealth’s public natural resources?
(2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to
reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum?
(3) Does the environmental harm which will result from
the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh
the benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed
further would be an abuse of discretion?379
In Act 13, the legislature did not invoke specifically the environmental
rights amendment. And because, according to the Commonwealth Court,
Act 13 freed municipalities “of their responsibilities to strike a balance be-
tween oil and gas development and environmental concerns,” as required
in the three-part test, section 3303 survived the constitutional challenge.380
Because the Commonwealth Court found for Robinson Township
when it struck down sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304, but ruled for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania when it upheld section 3303, both sides
appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.381
376 Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 485.
377 Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1174.
378 Id. For more on Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, see John C. Dernbach,
Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When it Protects the Environment: Part I—
An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693 (1999); see
also John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When it Protects
the Environment: Part II—Environmental Rights and the Public Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV.
97 (1999).
379 Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1189 (citing Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa.
Cmmw. 1973), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. 1976)).
380 Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 489.
381 Id. at 485, 493.
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c. Robinson Township in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
As was widely predicted, the Robinson Township decision was
appealed immediately to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Pennsylvania
Governor Tom Corbett even requested expedited review.382 In December
2013, approximately 18 months after the appeal, Pennsylvania’s highest
court issued an opinion.383 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that,
“few could seriously dispute how remarkable a revolution is worked by
[Act 13] upon the existing zoning regimen in Pennsylvania.”384 In saying
this, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to be marveling at the
attempt by the state legislature to control local zoning decisions through
the preemption provisions of Act 13. The Court then returned to Pennsyl-
vania’s local governments the authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing
as an industrial use under their land use and zoning ordinances. In par-
ticular, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Commonwealth Court
regarding the two provisions that court had found unconstitutional—
sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304.385 It added to the townships’ victory by also
finding section 3303 unconstitutional under the environmental rights
amendment of the state’s constitution.386
1) The Environmental Rights Amendment
The essential question in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
whether the environmental rights amendment confers any rights upon
citizens or responsibilities upon municipalities. The state argued that it
does not.387 Instead, the state argued, the environmental rights amend-
ment is merely a guide to the legislature as it does its job to decide what
is best for the citizens, the natural resources, and the environment of
Pennsylvania.388 The municipalities argued that the environmental rights
amendment does confer rights upon Pennsylvania’s citizens and respon-
sibilities upon its municipalities, and is a foundational piece of the state’s
382 Brief of Appellants, Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (No. 63
MAP 2012), 2012 WL 3875605.
383 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 902.
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 For an in-depth analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 162-page plurality
opinion, see Dernbach, supra note 340.
387 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 933–34.
388 Id.
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constitution, imbued with meaning of its own.389 The question was crucial.
If the Amendment gave the citizens rights and the municipalities respon-
sibilities, they would have to be able to exercise these rights and respon-
sibilities by creating rules or standards in their communities.
On this point, the Supreme Court’s plurality sided with the munic-
ipalities, in part because the environmental rights amendment, like the
constitution’s language on freedom of speech, is located in the state consti-
tution’s equivalent of the Bill of Rights.390 The proper place and interpre-
tation of the environmental rights amendment was a new issue for the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and to address it, the Court began with
the plain language of the amendment.391 The amendment says “[t]he
people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.” This
appeared, to the Court, to confer a right on the people of the state—as
stated, the right to clean air, pure water, and the preservation of certain
environmental values. The Court, though, found a second right inherent
in this sentence. It found a “limitation on the state’s power to act contrary
to this right.”392
The amendment goes on to say, “Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall con-
serve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”393 The Court
found these later sentences to refer to a public trust that the state holds
on behalf of the people—both current citizens and future generations.394 As
a trustee of the resources of Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth has a duty
to, as the environmental rights amendment states, conserve and maintain
them. The court says, “[t]he plain meaning of the terms conserve and
maintain implicates a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation,
diminution, or depletion of our public natural resources.”395 In addition,
the Court found an additional duty, the duty “to act affirmatively to pro-
tect the environment, via legislative action.”396 So, rather than merely
providing guidance for the legislature, the Court imposed a duty upon it.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 962; see Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1178.
391 Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1170.
392 Id. at 1179 (citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 951).
393 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948–49; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
394 Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1179 (citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 954–55).
395 Id.
396 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 958.
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Following the Court’s analysis of the text of the environmental
rights amendment, it rejected the idea that the balancing test, relied upon
by the Commonwealth, was an appropriate substitute for the language
of the Amendment itself.
2) Act 13’s Section 3303
Section 3303 preempted local regulation of oil and gas operations.397
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that this provision violated
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s environmental rights amendment “because
‘the General Assembly has no authority to remove a political subdivision’s
implicitly necessary authority to carrying into effect its constitutional
duties.’ ”398 Presumably, this means that the legislature cannot take away
the municipality’s duty, under the Constitution, to regulate as it deems
necessary to protect the environment.
3) Act 13’s Section 3304
Section 3304 attempted to control local land use ordinances.399 In
particular, it required that “all local ordinances . . . allow for the reasonable
development of oil and gas resources” and puts in place a uniform system
of oil and gas regulation.400 The Court found this section to violate the
Pennsylvania Constitution because “a new regulatory regime permitting
industrial uses as a matter of right in every type of pre-existing zoning
district is incapable of conserving or maintaining the constitutionally-
protected aspects of the public environment and a certain quality of
life.”401 Even though the language of Section 3304 calls for municipalities
to “allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources,”402
Section 3304 would impose its regulatory system on all land use zones,
already determined by municipalities, thus effectively depriving the
municipality from enforcing its own land use zones.403 The section would
even impose itself on already existing residential zones.404
397 58 PA. CONS. STAT § 3303 (2012).
398 Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1180 (citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977).
399 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304 (2016).
400 Id.
401 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979.
402 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304.
403 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 971–72.
404 Id. at 972.
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In addition, the Court felt that enforcement of section 3304 would
lead to inequitable burdens of environmental damage across the Common-
wealth and that this was a violation of the Commonwealth’s duty under
the environmental rights amendment, to serve as trustee for all of the
Commonwealth’s people.405 The Court said “some properties and communi-
ties will carry much heavier environmental and habitability burdens than
others,” and it found this violates the environmental rights amendment.406
4) Conclusion re: the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision
The Act 13 preemption of all local regulation of hydraulic fractur-
ing was dead. Despite strong support from Pennsylvania’s governor, and
the best efforts of the Pennsylvania legislature to vest the state with com-
plete control of oil and gas decision-making, the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion preserved the locality’s ability to regulate.407 The ruling was a blow
to Pennsylvania’s Governor Corbett, who was counting on the preemp-
tion provision of Act 13 to help attract gas drilling and associated jobs to
Pennsylvania.408 According to Nancy Alessi, a supervisor in Nockamixon
Township, Bucks County, one of the plaintiffs in the suit, “[e]very citizen
in the state should be pleased that the concept of local zoning has been
upheld. . . . This was a huge portion of the act, and the court ruled defini-
tively, overturning it.”409
4. Pennsylvania Conclusion: Environmental Rights Amendment
Serves Pennsylvania Communities
Act 13 was a clear expression of legislative intent to occupy the
field and thereby to preempt local regulation of oil and gas, and it was
overturned under the Pennsylvania Constitution’s environmental rights
amendment, in favor of local regulation. The plurality of the Pennsylvania
court wrote about the environmental rights amendment as if it has foun-
dational value similar to free speech and freedom of the press.410 This
was new in Pennsylvania. In addition to having foundational value, the
405 Id. at 975.
406 Id. at 980.
407 Id.
408 Bill Reed, Major Parts of Pa.’s Natural-Gas Law Ruled Unconstitutional, THE PHILA.
INQUIRER (July 28, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-07-28/news/32890243_1_major
-gas-producing-state-natural-gas-law-marcellus-shale [https://perma.cc/6C27-JKUG].
409 Id.
410 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 934.
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environmental rights amendment was used to strike down a statute as
unconstitutional. This, too, was new. The Court set forth two specific
rights derived from the environmental rights amendment. First, it noted
the citizens’ rights to clean air, pure water, and the preservation of
natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic values of the environment.411 Sec-
ond, it noted a public trust in public natural resources through which the
Commonwealth has the duty to conserve and maintain for the citizens of
Pennsylvania, both present and future.412 In highlighting these two rights,
grounded in the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Court rejected the Com-
monwealth’s preference for applying a balancing test, as set forth in Payne
v. Kassab, except in certain limited cases.413 Instead, the Court stated a
preference for a constitutional, text-based analysis.414
Ohio’s constitution does not include an environmental rights provi-
sion like the one in Pennsylvania. Perhaps it should, but it does not. Ohio’s
constitution does include several provisions in its Bill of Rights protecting
property rights as they pertain to the environment,415 but they differ sub-
stantially from the environmental protection provided in Pennsylvania’s
constitution. In Ohio, then, only the Ohio Constitution’s home rule pro-
vision remains as a constitutional means to protect local action effecting
oil and gas activities. Although not a statewide provision, Mansfield, Ohio,
has passed an “environmental bill of rights” to add to its city charter,416
but so far, no such effort has added environmental rights to the Ohio
constitution.
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court might well have relied on its own
home rule provision to decide this case. The fact that it did not might tell
us that it did not believe it could strike down the relevant Act 13 provisions
on home rule grounds. Or, it might just mean that the environmental
rights argument was stronger. Regardless, Ohio’s constitution does not




414 Dernbach, supra note 340, at 1179–80.
415 See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. I, §§ 1.19–1.20.
416 See Section I.C.2.a, supra. Preferred Fluids Mgmt., LLC v. City of Mansfield, No. 1:12-cv-
01804 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2012) (Plaintiff, Preferred Fluids, filed a Complaint for Declar-
atory Judgment and Permanent Injunction in which Plaintiff sought: (1) declaration that
the City of Mansfield has no authority to require permits or licenses of Preferred Fluids
in order to construct and operate injection wells within the City of Mansfield, and (2) to
enjoin the City of Mansfield from requiring any permits [of Preferred Fluids] to operate
the wells and/or regulate the location, construction, or operation of the wells); see also
Marshall, supra note 173.
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until an appropriate test case goes to Ohio’s Supreme Court before they
know whether Ohio’s oil and gas statute, Ohio Rev. Code sec. 1509.02,
which preempts local regulation, runs afoul of the Ohio constitution.417
According to Professor Dernbach’s work on environmental consti-
tutionalism,418 Pennsylvania is not alone in finding strength in its consti-
tution for supporting environmental rights.419 The Supreme Court in
Alaska relied on its state constitution’s public interest standard for re-
source development to hold that the courts in that state must consider
whether, in their decision-making, state agencies adequately valued the
cumulative environmental impacts of oil and gas leases.420 Dernbach has
also noted that the Supreme Court of Montana has “subjected state de-
cisions that implicate environmental rights provisions in its constitution
to strict scrutiny.”421 Still, Dernbach and Professor Barton Thomson have
found that most of the environmental rights provisions in state constitu-
tions have been made comparatively obscure due to the decisions of the
relevant state courts.422
B. New York
1. New York’s Constitution and Legislative Background
Like the constitutions of Ohio and Pennsylvania, New York’s con-
stitution has a home rule provision. Article IX of the New York Constitution
says: “every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local
laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any
general law . . . except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the
adoption of such a local law.”423 The New York legislature enacted the
Municipal Home Rule Law to implement the Constitutional provision.
417 See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Pennsylvania’s environmental rights might snag drillers,
CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS.(Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20140131
/SHALEBLOGS/301319996 [https://perma.cc/8W8C-256U].
418 See, e.g., Dernbach et al., supra note 340; JOHN DERNBACH, ACTING AS IF TOMORROW
MATTERS: ACCELERATING THE TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY (2012); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INSTITUTE, AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA (John Dernbach ed., 2009); ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY (John Dernbach ed., 2002).
419 Id.
420 Dernbach et al., supra note 340, at 1195 (citing Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl. Destruction
on Indigenous Lands, 311 P.3d 625 (Alaska 2013)).
421 Id.
422 Id. (citing Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History
of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 158 (2003)).
423 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii).
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The Municipal Home Rule Law empowers local governments to pass laws
both for the “protection and enhancement of [their] physical and visual
environment”424 and for the “government, protection, order, conduct,
safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein.”425
In addition to the Municipal Home Rule Law, the New York legisla-
ture enacted the Town Law which authorized towns to enact zoning laws
to foster “the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the commu-
nity,”426 and the Statute of Local Governments, which granted towns the
power to “adopt, amend, and repeal zoning regulations.”427
2. New York’s Oil and Gas Statutes
New York also has a statute stating that New York state rules
supersede local ordinances regulating oil and gas. Commonly referred to
as “Article 23”, New York’s entire oil and gas law resides in the Environ-
mental Conservation section of the Laws of New York, titled “Mineral
Resources.”428 The policy statement in Article 23 §2703 says “this title
shall supersede all other state and local laws relating to the extractive
mining industry.”429 But the clause includes caveats, wiggle room that
states like Ohio do not have. For example, the statute does not prohibit
local governments from “enacting or enforcing local laws or ordinances
of general applicability” unless they regulate mining that the state has
already regulated.430 The statute contains similar subsections allowing
for local zoning regulations, and allowing localities to regulate in areas
the state does not require permitting.431 Moreover, Article 23 also con-
tains what is known as the Supersession Clause, providing the state law
“shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of
the oil, gas and solution mining industries.”432 As a whole, these laws are
known as New York’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law (“OGSML”)433
and the regulatory agency responsible for enforcement is the Department
of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”).434 The tension in New York home
424 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW, § 10(1)(ii)(a)(11) (McKinney 2014).
425 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW, § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12) (McKinney 2014).
426 N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 2014).
427 N.Y. STAT. LOC. GOVS § 10(6) (McKinney 2014).
428 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, § 23 (McKinney 2014).
429 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, § 23-2703 (McKinney 2014).
430 Id. at 2(a).
431 Id. at 2(b)(c).
432 Id.
433 See Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014).
434 Id.
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rule lawsuits is the degree to which the Policy and Supersession Clauses
conflict with home rule language elsewhere in New York’s legal and polit-
ical traditions.
3. New York Law as Compared with Pennsylvania and Ohio
In comparison to Ohio and Pennsylvania—and indeed, to most
states in the country—New York localities have attempted to regulate
and even ban drilling in huge numbers.435 The Town of Dryden enacted a
drilling ban by amending its zoning rules to prohibit the practice.436 The
Town of Middlefield also enacted a ban.437 Both were sued; Dryden by an
energy company that had acquired oil and case leases prior to the zoning
amendment, and Middlefield by a dairy farm that had leased its land to
a drilling company.438 In both circumstances, the argument was that the
towns had no right to enact drilling bans because New York state law
preempted those actions.439 On June 30, 2014, the New York Court of
Appeals upheld a lower court decision supporting the local ordinances.440
The lower court found, and the high court agreed, that the state statute
did not eliminate the towns’ authority to ban hydraulic fracturing within
their borders using their local zoning authority.441 The Court’s rationale
for allowing the local drilling bans to stand was that New York’s Oil, Gas,
and Solution Mining Law cannot preempt the New York Constitution’s
home rule provision, despite the statute’s intent to suppress local regula-
tion of land use.442 The state legislature’s attempt to emasculate that
provision, by including suppression language in the oil and gas law, was
not effective. The state statute cannot trump the state constitution.
According to the New York Court of Appeals in Dryden, “the Legis-
lature has recognized that the local regulation of land use is ‘[a]mong the
most significant powers and duties granted . . . to a town government.’ ”443
The Court also noted that, in addition to the legislature having recognized
435 See Chris Dolmetsch & Daniel Sanzone, N.Y.’s Local Fracking Bans Spur Debate
Before Top Court, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 4, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2014-06-03/cuomo-ponders-drilling-as-fracking-bans-reach-top-court
[https://perma.cc/6EUG-C82U]; see also Cheren, supra note 231.
436 See Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d at 1193.
437 Id.
438 Id. at 1188, 1193.
439 Id.
440 Id. at 1203–04.
441 Id. at 1204.
442 Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d at 1204.
443 Id. at 1188, 1194 (citing N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (1)(b)).
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that local zoning authority should be vested in local government, the Court
has also found, itself, that local control of zoning is “one of the core powers
of local governance.”444
The Court fully understood the implications of a statutory/legislative
conflict. It understood the concept of preemption, too. The Court said “a
town may not enact ordinances that conflict with the State Constitution or
any general law.”445 It noted that “[u]nder the preemption doctrine, a local
law promulgated under a municipality’s home rule authority must yield to
an inconsistent state law as a consequence of ‘the untrammeled primacy
of the Legislature to act with respect to matters of State concern.’ ”446 But,
the Court found the suppression of local zoning control to be sufficiently
important that it would only allow it in cases of a “clear expression of leg-
islative intent to preempt local control over land use.”447
The Court, therefore, focused on whether the New York legislature
evidenced sufficiently clear intent to preempt local control over land use
decisions. It started by looking at the statutory language: “The provisions
of this article [the OGSML] shall supersede all local laws or ordinances
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries; but
shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over local roads or the
rights of local governments under the real property tax law.”448
Unsurprisingly, the towns’ opponents argued that the legislature’s
suppression language should “be interpreted broadly to reach zoning
laws that restrict, or as presented here, prohibit oil and gas activities,
including hydrofracking, within municipal boundaries.”449 Like the Ohio
courts, New York has a three part test for determining whether a sup-
pression (preemption) clause in a state statute is sufficiently clear to
preempt a local ordinance. The New York test looks to: “(1) the plain
language of the supersession clause; (2) the statutory scheme as a whole;
and (3) the relevant legislative history.”450
In Matter of Frew Run, the town had attempted to create a zoning
district that would prohibit sand and gravel production.451 The disappointed
sand and gravel company which had sought permission to operate within
the town pointed to language in New York’s Mined Land Reclamation
444 Id. (citing DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 91, 96 (2001)).
445 Id. at 1195 (citing N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)–(ii)).
446 Id. (citing Albany Area Bldrs. Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 377 (1989)).
447 Id. (citing Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 87 N.Y.2d 668, 682 (1996)).
448 Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d at 1188, 1195 (citing N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-303(2)).
449 Id.
450 Id. (citing Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods. v. Town of Carroll, 71 N.Y.2d 126 (1987)).
451 Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d at 126.
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Law (“MLRL”) and argued that that state law superseded the town’s zon-
ing ordinance.452 The MLRL said, “[T]his title shall supersede all other
state and local laws relating to the extractive mining industry; provided,
however, that nothing in this title shall be construed to prevent any local
government from enacting local zoning ordinances or other local laws
which impose stricter mined land reclamation standards or requirements
than those found herein.”453
The Court found that the words “local laws relating to the extrac-
tive mining industry” did not include the town’s zoning provisions.454 It
held that zoning laws do not relate to the extractive mining industry.455
Instead, they related to land use decisions within the town.456 The Court
found this to be “an entirely different subject matter and purpose.”457 The
Court distinguished between local rules that attempt to control opera-
tions and processes concerning mining, which would be superseded by
the state law, and those that pertain to land use questions within the
town’s borders, which instead, are a matter for local discretion.458
The Court found the circumstances for the towns of Dryden and
Middlesex to be substantially similar to those in Matter of Frew. Still, it
dutifully applied the aforementioned three part test. First, it looked at
the plain language of the statute. The NY oil and gas law preempts local
laws “relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining indus-
tries” whereas the state statute in Matter of Frew purported to preempt
local laws “relating to the extractive mining industry.”459 As it did in
Matter of Frew, the Court found that local zoning ordinances are not local
laws relating a specific industry, here the regulation of the oil, gas, and
solution mining industries.460 Instead, as in Matter of Frew, the Dryden
court held that local zoning ordinances relate to how land may be used
within the town borders—an issue of local concern.
4. Other Local Ordinances Enacted in New York
Despite the New York legislature’s effort at statutory preemption
of local oil and gas activities, many New York jurisdictions enacted local
452 Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d at 1188, 1196.




457 Id. at 1196 (citing Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d at 126, 131).
458 Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d at 1188.
459 Id. at 1197.
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2016] WHEN STATES’ LEGISLATION & CONSTITUTIONS COLLIDE 127
ordinances, some including outright drilling bans.461 More than 150 juris-
dictions, mostly in upstate New York, enacted local bans on shale oil and
gas drilling, or on the use of the hydraulic fracturing technology.462 They
enacted these drilling bans, in various forms, including zoning regulations
and charter amendments, in anticipation of New York Department of
Environmental Conservation (New York “DEC”) completing an environ-
mental review and ultimately lifting a state moratorium on the use of the
hydraulic fracturing technology that had been in effect since 2008.463
Even before the now-famous actions from Dryden and Middlefield,
New York has experienced more localities issuing drilling regulations than
any other state. Food and Water Watch, a policy-monitoring organization
that has audited New York localities for years, documented local action
on drilling regulations.464 The organization splits local actions into three
categories: 1) outright bans; 2) moratoria or other regulations; and 3) places
where local authorities seem to be moving towards action, though none
has yet occurred. The Food and Water Watch list included 266 localities
in New York as of 2014. Eighty had outright bans, 99 more have morato-
ria or other regulations, and 86 more were expected to follow. Another
often-cited tracker of New York regulations is John Hoff of Perinton, NY,
the chairperson of Keuka Citizens Against Hydrofracking. His research
from January 2, 2014, put the number of localities with some type of mora-
torium or ban at 213, and identified another 90 with draft legislation.465
Whatever the exact number, it is large.
Local jurisdictions regulating drilling in New York arise at sev-
eral levels of government (towns, cities, and counties) and regulate using
461 See Cheren, supra note 231; see also Interactive Map of High Volume Hydrofracking
Bans, Moratoria, and Movements for Prohibitions in New York State, FRAC TRACKER
ALLIANCE (Dec. 30, 2014), http://maps.fractracker.org/latest/?appid=68f3de3fc2a1462aaf
700fff5ec0ab47 [https://perma.cc/AL87-L7UY].
462 Id.
463 In June 2015, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) finished
its review and concluded that high volume hydraulic fracturing should be prohibited due
to its significant adverse impacts to land, air, water, natural resources and potential
public health impacts that could not be adequately mitigated. See Glenn Coin, New York
State Officially Bans Fracking, SYRACUSE.COM (June 29, 2015, 12:15 PM) http://www
.syracuse.com/new/index.ssf/2015/new_york_officially_bans_hydrofracking.html [https://
perma.cc/KCB2-BHAG].
464 Local Actions Against Fracking: Passed Measures, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Mar. 10,
2015), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-center/local-ac
tion-documents/#newyork [https://perma.cc/7Z86-EUHV].
465 New York Localities Act to Reign in Fracking, SIERRA CLUB NEW YORK CITY GROUP
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://nyc.sierraclub.org/new-york-localities-act-to-reign-in-fracking/ [https://
perma.cc/SEM3-97UH].
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various mechanisms (zoning regulations, mandated research moratoria
and city council votes on general legislation are examples). Since the Court
issued the Dryden/Middlefield decision, and even while those cases were
progressing through appeals courts, New York state experienced a surge of
jurisdictions following suit.466 For example, in June 2014, the Canandaigua
city council voted unanimously to ban drilling within city limits.467 The
local law “permanently bans natural gas exploration and the storage,
treatment or disposal of drilling wastewater disposal within city limits.”468
The city’s ban followed two previous actions: a temporary drilling mora-
torium within the city, and an earlier prohibition on the city wastewater
treatment plant from accepting water from drillers.469 A regional newspa-
per observed, “in New York, even if the statewide moratorium is lifted,
such a patchwork of (local) regulation may deter companies from invest-
ing in the small areas that remain available for fracking in fears that
similar bans . . . could require the companies to pull out.”470
The story from Canandaigua notes that the city ban may be
symbolic, because companies were unlikely to seek to drill inside city
limits, but still influential because of its contribution to a larger trend.
Indeed, it appears that local drilling regulations are clustered regionally
in New York State.471 In certain counties, especially Ostego, Ulster, and
Onondaga, well over half of the towns, cities and villages have banned
drilling altogether. In other counties, Oswego, Steuben, and Cattaragus,
466 See Steven Mufson, How Two Small New York Towns Have Shaken up the National
Fight Over Fracking, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 2, 2014,  http://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/economy/how-two-small-new-york-towns-have-shaken-up-the-national
-fight-over-fracking/2014/07/02/fe9c728a-012b-11e4-8fd0-3a663dfa68ac_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5RBV-V8T8]. See Town of Kirkland bans hydrofracking, THE UTICA
OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Jan. 7, 2014, 12:57 PM), http://www.uticaod.com/article/20140107
/NEWS/140109610#ixzz2po3yKWTG [https://perma.cc/SE4S-CQGN]. See Claudia M.
Barrett, 2014 Should Be Pivotal For Fracking Regulation, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2014, 5:58
PM), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/BarrettFrackingRegulation
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE3A-C4BY]. See Jay Rey, Amherst Town Board agrees to draft a
local law banning “fracking,” THE BUFF. NEWS (April 29, 2014, 11:34 AM), http://www
.buffalonews.com/feed/amherst-town-board-agrees-to-draft-a-local-law-banning-fracking
-20140429 [https://perma.cc/SZ3A-RRUF].
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(Feb. 10, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Barrett
FrackingRegulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJP3-NG5L].
471 Orr, supra note 467.
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for example, there has been little action, though the Utica Shale lies
beneath each of them.
It is not only small symbolic gestures that accumulated in New
York. Large cities, including Buffalo and Syracuse, have passed total
bans on hydraulic fracturing through charter amendments or zoning
ordinances. The legislation from the City of Syracuse, for example, clari-
fies the definition of “fracking,” and involves three prohibitions dealing
with exploration, waste, and pollution associated with drilling.472
Like action in New York, the move towards local action on shale
oil and gas drilling has grown. A national policy watch program, Keep
Tap Water Safe, counts the number of local actions in the United States
(drilling bans or related actions) at 418.473 Still, with research indicating
between 179 and 266 town or county actions, that puts well over a third
of national local action in New York State.474
5. A Critical Wrinkle in New York: The Statewide Drilling Ban
In December 2014, New York took a step that no neighboring
state has seen, and one that mooted much of the home rule debate there:
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo ratified a binding statewide drilling ban.475
The ban followed a lengthy moratorium, and some have argued that its
enactment was the result of the many local bans wounding the state like
a thousand paper cuts.476
On July 23, 2008, then-Governor Paterson first marshalled a mora-
torium on high volume hydraulic fracturing (“HVHF”) through the New
York legislature.477 The moratorium mandated the state environmental
agency, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to produce
472 SYRACUSE GENERAL ORD. 38 (Oct. 24, 2011).
473 KEEP TAPWATER SAFE, http://keeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/ [https://
perma.cc/932H-L5SB].
474 Id.
475 See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, New York will ban hydraulic fracturing through a review
requirement Ohio lacks, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Jan. 16, 2015, 9:11 AM), http://www
.crainscleveland.com/article/20150116/BLOGS05/150119883 [https://perma.cc/3UZN-FGNN].
476 See, e.g., Wendy Koch, Could New York’s Fracking Ban Have Domino Effect?, NAT.
GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 18, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/12/14
1218-fracking-ban-new-york-states-oil-gas-drilling-energy-news/ [https://perma.cc/R62W
-ACHH].
477 Shannon Ayala, The Story of NYS’s Fracking Moratorium, THE EXAMINER (Nov. 29,
2011, 11:33 PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/the-story-of-nys-s-fracking-moratorium
[https://perma.cc/WZN4-VS42].
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a new Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (“SGEIS”)
about statewide hydraulic fracturing, and prohibited companies from
drilling before its results unless they produced their own satisfactory im-
pact study.478 Because it required this expensive and arduous analysis,
the moratorium effectively banned drilling in the state. The statewide
moratorium was reinforced in many areas of the state by local moratoria;
even drilling projects that predated the moratorium were effected.479 For
example, “John Holko, president of Lenape Resources, sent a letter . . . to
[NY] State DEC Commissioner Joe Martens saying a [local] moratorium
prohibiting natural gas development in the Livingston County town of
Avon forced his company to shut down its wells there.”480
When the Governor’s original order expired in 2010, the New York
legislature proposed a bill to limit drilling.481 Governor Paterson vetoed
the bill, and issued an executive order establishing another six-month
statewide drilling moratorium. It required the New York DEC to com-
plete the impacts study before the moratorium would lift. The following
Governor, Andrew M. Cuomo, continued this executive moratorium,
which unlike a legislative measure, did not have to go up for renewal at
a designated time—in other words, it did not have to expire.
Between 2008 and 2014, the New York DEC drafted two sets of
environmental impact reviews, and corresponding rules, but published
none.482 In 2012, the New York DEC brought in the New York Department
of Health (New York “DOH”) to its study to analyze the impacts of the
New York’s DEC’s findings on public health and safety.483 To do this, the
New York DEC requested an extension of time to complete its review from
the New York State Department.484 The notice-and-comment process for
this review closed in January of 2013, and for quite some time no signifi-
cant progress followed. Nirav Shah, the Health Commissioner, resigned in
478 Id.
479 Mary Esch, New York Drilling Moratorium: Gas Company Threatens to Sue State Over
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482 See N.Y. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERV., 6 ENVTL. CONSERV.52, 290, 550–56, 560, 750.
483 N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. Health, A Public Health Review of High Volume Hydraulic Frac-
turing for Shale Gas Development (Dec. 2014), http://www.health.ny.gov/press/reports
/docs/high_volume_hydraulic_fracturing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NG5-PEF6].
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2014 and was replaced by an interim director, which slowed the study.485
In early 2014 the New York General Assembly ratified the review to con-
tinue through 2015.486
Finally, in December of 2014, the New York Department of Health
published its 184-page study, “A Public Health Review of High Volume
Hydraulic Fracturing for Shale Gas Development.”487 Based on the
findings of that study, Governor Cuomo initiated the statewide ban.488
The legal mechanism through which the ban took effect is unique
among states enmeshed in drilling regulation debates. Most often—as
was the case in Ohio—drilling laws have taken the form of local ordi-
nances, passed through city councils, or statewide laws, passed through
the legislative body. But New York took a different approach.
Cuomo’s administration, specifically the New York DEC, issued
an official finding supported by the recent recommendation of New
York’s health commissioner prohibiting the use of the technology.489 The
prohibition is legally binding. The section below will describe how New
York’s laws made this possible, where Ohio’s laws do not.
6. New York Conclusion: “Little NEPA” Sets New York Apart
New York state has unique environmental laws, which contextu-
alize the hydraulic fracturing ban’s development. New York is one of at
least 15 states (along with New York City, Washington, D.C., and Puerto
Rico) that have what are affectionately known as “little NEPA” laws.490
Little NEPAs are state laws modeled after the federal law, the National
Environmental Policy Act (the “Big NEPA”).
These laws require that agencies study the environmental conse-
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vironmental review of fracking, THE AUBURN CITIZEN (May 14, 2015), http://auburnpub.com
/news/local/state-and-regional/new-york-releases-final-environmental-review-of-fracking
/article_42bcccdc-f9ef-11e4-9d6e-6b231511973f.html [https://perma.cc/F6XN-E442]; N.Y.
Dep’t Envtl. Conserv., Final SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Pro-
gram (May 2015), http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/75370.html [https://perma.cc/ZW88-2H8X].
490 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with NEPA-like Environmental Planning Requirements
(2015), http://energy.gov/nepa/downloads/states-nepa-environmental-planning-require
ments [https://perma.cc/8K46-2RMP].
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adverse environmental effects. New York DEC’s major study was spurred
by a proposed set of New York regulations called “Well Permit Issuance for
Horizontal Drilling and High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing to Develop the
Marcellus Shale and Other Low-Permeability Gas Reservoirs.”491
The Big NEPA is largely procedural. It requires that the decision-
making agency conduct an environmental review prior to taking the action,
but it does not require that the agency make decisions based on the findings
of that review.492 New York’s version of the law is different in an important
way. It requires more than the procedural obligation that the decision-
making agency do an environmental study. The New York law directs
agencies to make their decisions while actually considering the environ-
mental effects that were revealed through the environmental study.493 It
even requires agencies to choose alternative actions that would minimize
or avoid identified negative environmental effects.494 That goes well beyond
the procedural requirements of the Big NEPA.495
So, before taking an action that could have significant adverse envi-
ronmental impact, such as here issuing a regulation concerning hydraulic
fracturing, New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (New
York’s “little NEPA” or “NYSEQRA”) requires agencies to consider envi-
ronmental factors, consistent with social and economic factors, when they
make decisions, such as promulgating a set of regulations governing the
permitting of shale oil and gas wells using hydraulic fracturing technology.
In the Big NEPA, the general idea is that the agency taking an action (like
proposing a regulation or issuing a permit) should understand the envi-
ronmental impact of the action before taking it.496 Under NYSEQRA, New
York agencies actually have to consider what they have learned and try
to avoid adverse environmental consequences.497
To study the environmental consequences of its proposed oil and
gas permitting program, the New York DEC prepared a study, here a
Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (or “Draft
SGEIS”) and asked the New York Department of Health to review and
491 N.Y. Dep’t Envtl. Conserv., Well Permit Issuance for Horizontal Drilling and High-
Volume Hydraulic Fracturing to Develop the Marcellus Shale and Other Low-Perme-
ability Gas Reservoirs (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf
/rdsgeisexecsum0911.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SAY-LEVN].
492 42 U.S.C. § 4333–4334 (2014).
493 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 2015).
494 Id.
495 Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4347, with ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney
2015); see also 38 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 547 (1996).
496 38 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 547 (1996).
497 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 2015).
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comment on it.498 The final version of the SGEIS was released in May
2015.499
The report of the New York health department was done to satisfy
New York DEC’s review request and it concluded that, due to “the ques-
tions and risks to public health which as of yet are unanswered,”500 hy-
draulic fracturing should not take place in New York State.
In addition to requesting that the New York DOH (and several
other agencies) review the Draft SGEIS, an important part of environ-
mental review is allowing the public to comment at various stages of the
process. The New York DEC reported that over 260,000 public comments
were submitted regarding the various versions of the SGEIS501 and that
the comments ran heavily against the use of hydraulic fracturing tech-
nology in New York State.502
So, supported by the health department’s report reviewing New
York DEC’s draft SGEIS, and bolstered by the flood of public comments
opposing the use of hydraulic fracturing in New York State, New York
DEC issued a findings statement that bans hydraulic fracturing in New
York State.503 This becomes binding law.
Unlike New York, Ohio does not have a “little NEPA” law that
would require state agencies to conduct an environmental review before
taking action that might adversely effect the environment. In Ohio, state
legislation not only allows the use of the hydraulic fracturing technology,
but encourages its use by creating a uniform statewide system of regula-
tion through the Ohio Department of Natural Resources.504
498 N.Y. Dep’t Envtl. Conserv., supra note 491 (This one was “supplemental” because the
agency had already studied shale oil and gas permitting in 1992 and issued a GEIS on
it. The new combination of horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing
technology was not considered in the earlier study and thus a supplemental study was
needed prior to issuing new regulations.).
499 N.Y. Dep’t Envtl. Conserv., Regulatory Program for Horizontal Drilling and High-
Volume Hydraulic Fracturing to Develop the Marcellus Shale and Other Low-Permea-
bility Gas Reservoirs (May 2015), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf
/findingstatehvhf62015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP5B-V2PV].
500 N.Y. Dep’t Envtl. Conserv., New York State Department of Health Completes Review
of High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/1000
55.html [https://perma.cc/K2DL-M6WN].
501 N.Y. Dep’t Envtl. Conserv., supra note 491.
502 Id.
503 N.Y. Dep’t Envtl. Conserv., New York State Officially Prohibits High-Volume Hydrau-
lic Fracturing (June 29,205), http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/102337.html [https://perma.cc
/QF87-US2E].
504 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02.
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The fact that Ohio lacks a “little NEPA” does not mean that Ohio’s
agencies do not consider the environmental consequences of their actions.
It means that Ohio has no law similar to the NEPA that requires them to
study the environmental consequences of the proposed actions or to con-
sider those consequences in their decisions.
III. A QUICK LOOK AT LOCAL CONTROL ELSEWHERE
Clearly, the Utica and Marcellus regions are not the only areas
struggling with the legal tension between local desire to control and in-
fluence drilling and state efforts to preempt local control. This section
takes a brief look at two other regions, Colorado and Texas, because, like
Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania, they have seen active engagement
on this issue by their legislatures, courts, and local communities.
A. Colorado
This section provides a brief, fundamental overview of the ten-
sions among Colorado’s oil and gas statute, its constitutional home rule
provisions, and its courts. Like many other areas of the country, Colorado
has experienced a shale oil and gas drilling boom. Its constitution provides
for local home rule and several home rule jurisdictions have attempted
to regulate under that perceived authority. Like Ohio, Colorado’s oil and
gas law has conferred exclusive regulatory authority for oil and gas
activities on a state agency. Naturally, the question of whether and the
extent to which local jurisdictions can act has reached Colorado’s courts.
1. Constitutional Home Rule Authority
Colorado’s constitution has two different home rule provisions—
one governing the home rule authority of cities and towns and the other
governing the home rule authority of counties. Article XX, Section 6 of
Colorado’s constitution governs home rule authority for cities and towns.
It provides that people of each city or town within Colorado, with a popu-
lation of at least 2,000 inhabitants, have the power “to make, amend, add
to, or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic
law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.”505
Article XIV, Section 16 of Colorado’s constitution gives counties
the authority to adopt home rule charters as well; however, “home rule
505 COLO. CONST. ART. XX, § 6 (amended 1913).
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counties” are much more limited in terms of their authority to regulate.506
For instance, a home rule county may establish the organization and
structure of county government, but it must continue to provide all manda-
tory county functions, services, and facilities in a consistent manner with
Article XIV and other state statutes enacted pursuant to it.507 To the
contrary, when a city or town adopts a home rule charter, the charter
and any ordinances enacted pursuant to it that seek to address local and
municipal matters will “supersede any law of the state in conflict there-
with.”508 The rationale for the differential in regulatory authority is that
home rule municipalities derive their authority directly from the state
constitution, whereas home rule counties are considered subdivisions of
the state.509 Thus, the preemption analysis differs for home rule munici-
palities versus home rule counties when either adopts a local regulation
that conflicts with state law.510
2. The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act and Commission
(“COGCC”)
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act511 created the Colo-
rado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC”) and vested the
Commission with exclusive authority to promulgate statewide rules and
regulations with respect to oil and gas drilling activities.512 Thus, the
COGCC promotes the exploration, development, and conservation of
Colorado’s oil/gas resources, and has the exclusive authority to create
regulations governing permitting of oil/gas wells and ensuring industry
compliance with statewide oil and gas statutes and regulations.513
506 See COLO. CONST. ART. XIV, Sec. 16; see also Debra Kalish et al., The Doctrine of Pre-
emption and Regulating Oil and Gas Development, 38 COLO. LAW. 47, 48 (Oct. 2009).
507 Id.
508 COLO. CONST. ART. XX, § 6.
509 Debra Kalish et al., The Doctrine of Preemption and Regulating Oil and Gas Develop-
ment, 38 COLO. LAW. 47 (Oct. 2009).
510 Kalish et al., supra note 506, at 48.
511 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-100.
512 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-105(1); see also Intermountain Oil and Gas BMP Research,
Colorado Laws, http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/laws/colorado_law.php [https://perma.cc
/5MLD-CCG5]; Ralph A. Cantafio, Overview of Permitting of Oil and Gas Wells in
Colorado: Understanding the Doctrine of Preemption and the Authority of “Home Rule
Municipalities,” at 7, http://www.cantafiolaw.com/A-Discussion-of-Permitting-of-Oil-and
-Gas-Wells-in-Colorado-Understanding-the-Doctrine-of-Preemption-and-the-Authority-of
-Home-Rule-Municipalities.pdf [https://perma.cc/57X2-VQDZ].
513 See Intermountain Oil and Gas BMP Research, supra note 512.
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3. Colorado Oil & Gas Preemption in the Courts
With respect to home rule municipalities, Colorado courts have
tailored the preemption analysis depending under which of three “catego-
ries” the regulated matter falls: (1) Matters of Local Concern (such as land
use regulation and zoning), (2) Matters of State Concern, and (3) Matters
of Mixed State-Local Concern.514 When regulations fall under the first
category the local concern generally controls, when regulations fall under
the second category local governments may not legislate unless authorized
by state statute, and when regulations fall under the third category the
local regulation may co-exist with the state statute as long as there is no
conflict.515 To determine under which of the three categories a local regula-
tion falls, the Colorado Supreme Court announced a four-part test:516
(1) Whether there is a need for statewide uniformity
in regulation;
(2) Whether the municipal regulation has an extrater-
ritorial effect;
(3) Whether the subject matter is one traditionally
governed by state or local government; and
(4) Whether the Colorado constitution specifically com-
mits the particular matter to state or local regula-
tion.
Note that no single criterion is determinative and the purpose of
the multi-factor test is to weigh the respective state and local interests
on a case-by-case basis.517 However, for purposes of this Article, the
Colorado Supreme Court has already determined that “the exercise of
zoning authority for the purposes of controlling land use within a home
rule city’s municipal borders is a matter of local concern.”518
Voss v. Lundvall Bros. is a landmark case addressing the question
whether Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act preempts a home rule
municipality’s ordinance which seeks to ban oil and gas drilling activities
514 Id.
515 Id. (it should be noted that when a local regulation is on a matter of mixed state-local
concern and the local regulation conflicts with the state statute, the state statute super-
sedes the conflicting local regulation).
516 See Colorado Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Summit County, 199 P.3d 718,
723 (Colo. 2009); see also Voss v. Lundvall Bros. Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo. 1992).
517 See City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 155 (Colo. 2003).
518 Voss, 830 P.2d at 1061, 1064.
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within the municipality’s borders.519 In Voss, the city council in Greeley,
Colorado, enacted an ordinance prohibiting the drilling of any well for
the purpose of exploration or production of any oil or gas or other hydro-
carbons within the corporate limits of Greeley. Although the ordinance
would not become effective until approved by local voters, Lundvall Broth-
ers, an oil and gas operator, sued and obtained a Declaratory Judgment
from the District Court of Weld County granting Summary Judgment
and declaring the ordinance void because “the entire area of oil and gas
exploration regulation, including sites within municipalities had been
preempted by the State of Colorado and such regulation delegated to the
COGCC such that there existed no area of regulation of oil and gas
exploration to be left to Greeley.”520
The case eventually reached the Colorado Supreme Court which
found that, while the exercise of zoning authority is a matter of local
concern, the ordinance at issue created a matter of mixed state and local
concern.521 The Court struck down the ordinance despite finding that
“nothing in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act manifests a legislative intent
to expressly or impliedly preempt all aspects of a local government’s
land-use authority over land that might be subject to oil and gas develop-
ment and operations within the boundaries of a local government.”522 The
Court ultimately held that Colorado’s statewide interest in the efficient
development of oil and gas was “sufficiently dominant” to override the
home rule municipality’s outright ban on all oil and gas drilling within
the city limits.523
Unlike Greeley’s attempt at a total drilling ban, La Plata County,
Colorado attempted to exert control in a different way. La Plata County
issued land use regulations that categorized oil and gas facilities into
major facilities and minor facilities and required mitigation processes
according to their land use impacts. This was a much more nuanced
effort at regulation than that of an outright ban.524 Oil and gas operator
Bowen/Edwards Associates challenged the regulations arguing that they
were preempted by Colorado’s oil and gas statute.525 La Plata defended
its regulations in the Colorado Supreme Court, arguing that the Act did
519 Cantafio, supra note 512, at 7.
520 Voss, 830 P.2d at 1061, 1063.
521 Id. at 1066.
522 Id.
523 Id. at 1068.
524 Cantafio, supra note 512, at 7.
525 Board of County Commissions, La Plata County v. Bowen/Edward Associates, Inc., 830
P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1992).
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not preempt all local land use regulation and that these specific land use
regulations were enacted within the county’s legislative authority.526 The
Colorado Supreme Court agreed with La Plata.527 In rejecting the drillers’
argument that the county regulations were preempted by state law, the
Court said it found “no such clear and unequivocal statement of legisla-
tive intent in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act.”528
Although there have been intervening cases in Colorado since
Voss and Bowen/Edwards, the current state of affairs resides in the
Longmont case. In 2011, the City of Longmont imposed a 120-day mora-
torium on accepting applications for oil and gas well permits due to resi-
dents’ concerns regarding the safety, health, and environmental effects
of hydraulic fracturing.529 During a period in which the moratorium was
extended, the City issued a draft of oil and gas regulations it intended to
impose.530 The Director of the COGCC expressed concern that the draft
regulations would be preempted by the Oil and Gas Conservation Act,
infringing on COGCC authority.531 Longmont issued several successive
iterations of draft regulations, and then conditionally approved them.532
Following another expression of concern from the COGCC, Longmont
delayed imposition of its regulations, but extended the permit morato-
rium.533 Over the objections of the COGCC, Longmont City Council ap-
proved its oil and gas drilling regulations on July 17, 2012.534
On behalf of the COGCC, the Colorado Attorney General filed a
Complaint for Declaratory Relief, asking the District Court of Boulder
County to declare Longmont’s regulations preempted by the state statute.535
In addition, Longmont voters approved a charter amendment
banning both the use of hydraulic fracturing and the storage or disposal
of solid or liquid wastes associated with drilling.536 COGCC filed its own
526 Id.
527 Id.
528 Id. at 1057.






535 See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, COGCC v. City of Longmont, Col. (D. Colo. 2012).
536 In the fall of 2012, the residents of Longmont, a home rule municipality, voted to add
Article XVI to Longmont’s home rule charter.
Article XVI provides: It shall hereby be the policy of the City of Long-
mont that it is prohibited to use hydraulic fracturing to extract oil, gas,
or other hydrocarbons within the City of Longmont. In addition, within
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lawsuit, in Weld County District Court (later removed to Boulder County),
seeking a Declaratory Judgment that the voter approved charter amend-
ment is preempted by state law.
Longmont was originally the subject of two actions, one challeng-
ing its oil and gas regulations—though this case was ultimately dismissed,
and the other challenging its charter amendment banning hydraulic frac-
turing and the storage and disposal of liquid drilling wastes. In May 2016,
the Colorado Supreme Court struck down Longmont’s voter-approved
ban on hydraulic fracturing—the charter amendment case,537 and, at the
same time, it struck down Fort Collins’ drilling moratorium.538 Both cases,
especially Longmont’s, are expected to have a longstanding effect on the
ability of local jurisdictions to influence hydraulic fracturing in the state.
Focusing on the need for statewide uniformity, the Court struck down
the Longmont regulations on the grounds that the ban interfered with
the state’s interest in oil and gas development and with state regulations.539
In effect, it was preempted by state law and on public policy grounds.540
Interestingly, although the Longmont decision struck down that
city’s charter-based ban on hydraulic fracturing, the opinion, written by
Justice Greeley, noted that Longmont retains its ability to use its home
rule based power of traditional zoning.541 Justice Greeley recognized
“Longmont’s traditional authority to exercise its zoning authority over
land where oil and gas development occurs.”542 As discussed above,
Longmont enacted regulations, based on its zoning authority to, among
other things, prohibit drilling in a residential zone but allow drillers to
seek exceptions to that prohibition if it would obviate their access to their
mineral rights. Although the Colorado Oil and Gas Association had sued
Longmont over those regulations, it dropped the lawsuit as part of a
compromise brokered by the Colorado governor.543
the City of Longmont, it is prohibited to store in open pits or dispose of
solid or liquid wastes created in connection with the hydraulic fracturing
process, including but not limited to flowback or produced wastewater
and brine.
See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Association, 369 P.3d 573, 577 (Colo. 2016).
537 Id.
538 See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil and Gas Assn., No. 15SC668, at 5 (Colo. May 2, 2016).
539 See City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 577.
540 Karen Antonacci, Colorado Supreme Court Strikes Down Longmont’s Voter-Approved
Fracking Ban, http://www.timescall.com/longmont-local-news/ci_29839751/colo-supreme
-court-strikes-down-longmont-fracking-ban [https://perma.cc/QZZ4-7J2D].
541 City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 579.
542 Id.
543 Antonacci, supra note 540.
140 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:55
How Colorado jurisdictions will respond to the Colorado Supreme
Court’s Longmont decision remains to be seen. But, like Ohio’s State ex
rel. Morrison decision, it appears that the Colorado Supreme Court has left
an opening for local jurisdictions to use their traditional zoning powers in
historically customary ways—presumably, non-discriminatorily created
and non-discriminatorily applied.
B. Texas
1. Texas’s Constitutional Home Rule Authority
Texas’s constitution grants [some] local governments total author-
ity to regulate, but the legislature can withdraw or limit the municipal-
ity’s home rule authority via statute.544 Article 11, Section 5, of Texas’s
Constitution governs home rule authority for cities with a population of
at least 5,000 inhabitants.545 Section 5 provides that such cities may, by
a majority vote of qualified voters, adopt or amend their city charter.546
However, Texas’s home rule provision immediately limits this authority
by providing that:
the adoption or amendment of charters is subject to such
limitations as may be prescribed by the Legislature, and
no charter or any ordinance passed under said charter
shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the
Legislature of the State.547
So, in Texas, home rule municipalities must look to the state constitution
and statutes to determine what they may not do, rather than what they
544 Chester James Antieau, Antieau on Local Government Law § 21.021 (Sandra M.
Stevenson ed., 2d ed. 2011).
545 TEX. CONST. art. 11, § 5 (amended 2011); see also TEX. CONST. art. 11, § 4 (providing
that cities with less than 5,000 residents may only be chartered by general law); see also
Texas Municipal League, Local Government in Texas, http://www.tml.org/pdftexts/HRH
Chapter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN6D-LBDY] (explaining that general law cities have
limited powers and operate according to specific state statutes that define their powers
and duties. Thus, they are only permitted to do what the state directs or permits them
to do and, without an express or implied grant of power by the state to perform a par-
ticular action, none may be taken).
546 TEX. CONST. art. 11, § 5.
547 Id.
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are permitted to do.548 If the city’s proposed action has not been prohib-
ited (or preempted) by the state, the city generally can regulate.549
2. Erosion of Home Rule in Texas
Historically, Texas courts had a strong track record of upholding
a municipality’s authority to regulate oil and gas development based on
the municipality’s broad authority to protect its citizens and property
under the municipality’s police powers.550 In fact, the Texas Supreme
Court has held, on numerous occasions, that for the legislature to pre-
empt a subject matter that is within the purview of the home rule city’s
broad powers, it must do so with “unmistakable clarity.”551 However,
after Denton, a home rule city, voted in November 2014 to ban hydraulic
fracturing within its borders,552 the political and legal landscape rapidly
changed with respect to home rule municipalities’ ability to regulate oil
and gas drilling. The Texas legislature quickly enacted House Bill 40
which “relates to the exclusive jurisdiction of [Texas] to regulate oil and
gas operations in this state and the express preemption of local regula-
tion of those operations.”553 H.B. 40 was filed in March 2015, approved by
the Texas House in April 2015, approved by the Texas Senate in May
2015, and became law in May 2015, a little over two months after the bill
was introduced.554 Among other things, H.B. 40 provides that:
The legislature recognizes that in order to continue this
prosperity and the efficient management of a key industry
548 See also Texas Municipal League, supra note 545.
549 Id.
550 See, e.g., Tysco Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 12 F. Supp. 195, 200–01 (S.D. 1935)
(establishing, for the first time, that Texas’s municipalities have authority to regulate oil
and gas development within their corporate limits); see also Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City
of Houston, 957 S.W.2d 625, 628, 635 (Tex. App. 1997) (upholding a city ordinance which
prohibited oil and gas drilling within its watershed on the grounds that the ordinance
was a valid exercise of the city’s police power which was reasonably related to the legiti-
mate goal of protecting the water supply from pollution).
551 See Dallas Merch.’s & Concessionaitre’s Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 490–91
(Tex. 1993); see also City of Streetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. 1964).
552 Clifford Krauss, Split Decision by Voters on Fracking Bans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/business/energy-environment/split-decision-by
-voters-on-local-fracking-bans-.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A9JK-U6T3].
553 Texas Legislative Guide, House Bill 40, https://txlege.texastribune.org/84/bills/HB40/
[https://perma.cc/D267-FC94].
554 Id.
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in this state, it is in the interest of this state to explicitly
confirm the authority to regulate oil and gas operations in
this state. The legislature intends that this Act expressly
preempt the regulation of oil and gas operations by munic-
ipalities and other political subdivisions, which is impliedly
preempted by the statutes already in effect.555
This bill, now law, now known as “the ban on bans” or the “Denton
Fracking Bill” has drawn the ire of home rule advocating Texans across
the state.556 Governor Greg Abbott justified the bill as a measure to pre-
vent “a patchwork of local regulations that threaten oil and gas produc-
tion” and to protect private property rights.557 Supporters of the bill agree
with the governor and believe that the bill strikes an appropriate balance
between private property and local control, whereas critics of the bill have
described it as a fundamentally flawed attempt to invalidate all local
drilling ordinances across Texas and “a gold mine for lawyers” due to the
uncertainty regarding what municipalities can and cannot regulate.558
Indeed, moving forward, the only certainty in Texas is that cities and
municipalities are now significantly more limited (if not prevented al-
together) in their ability to regulate oil and gas drilling activities.
Soon after Texas passed the ban on bans, Oklahoma followed suit.
Governor Mary Fallin signed into law a bill specifically prohibiting towns,
cities and counties from banning hydraulic fracturing and other oil and gas
activities.559 The Oklahoma legislature had considered several similar bills
555 H.B. 40, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015), http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/bill
text/pdf/HB00040F.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/9DA2-53PH].
556 Mose Buchele, After HB 40, What’s Next for Local Drilling Rules in Texas?, STATE
IMPACT: TEXAS (July 2, 2015, 8:58 a.m.), https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2015/07/02
/after-hb-40-whats-next-for-local-drilling-bans-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/8TQ6-C9WG];
see also Mark W. McCord, The Most Blatant Assault on Home Rule Authority in Texas’
History, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 28, 2015, 01:20 p.m.), http://www.dallasnews.com
/opinion/latest-columns/20150522-marc-w.-mccord-the-the-most-blatant-assault-on
-home-rule-authority-in-texas-history.ece [https://perma.cc/CC44-EVZH]; see also Jim
Malewitz, Abbott Signs “Denton Fracking Bill,” TEXAS TRIBUNE (May 18, 2015), http://
www.texastribune.org/2015/05/18/abbott-signs-denton-fracking-bill/ [https://perma.cc/4ADZ
-NYRK].
557 Malewitz, supra note 556.
558 Id.; see also 52 Okl. St. Ann. § 137.1 (2016).
559 Joe Hurtz, Gov. Fallin Signs Bill to Prevent Towns, Cities and Counties from Banning
Fracking, STATE IMPACT OKLAHOMA (June 1, 2015, 10:14 AM), https://stateimpact.npr.org
/oklahoma/2015/06/01/gov-fallin-signs-bill-to-prevent-towns-cities-and-counties-from
-banning-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/6TRL-36RD].
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during the 2015 legislative year, reportedly due to the actions of Denton,
Texas, and of the Oklahoma cities of Norman and Stillwater, which had
sought to enact local regulations governing oil and gas activities.560 The
new law allows local governments to enact local rules regulating oil and
gas-related nuisances, such as noise, traffic and odors, only when those
rules are “reasonable.”561 The law was opposed by the Oklahoma Municipal
League and supported by the energy industry and mineral owners, and
the Oklahoma Chamber.562 The Oklahoma action reflects the goal of many
state officials around the country of adopting reliable statewide uniform
regulatory systems by excluding local participation in the oil and gas regu-
latory process.
CONCLUSIONS
Local jurisdictions want a voice in the decisions that affect oil and
gas activities within their borders. This is evident throughout the country.
Some jurisdictions would like to encourage these activities, while others
want to ban, control, or influence them. As with many other activities
affecting local jurisdictions, the state in which jurisdictions are located
is vital. For example, New York’s and Pennsylvania’s lower and appellate
courts have supported their jurisdictions’ ability to regulate oil and gas
activities; for New York, via the state constitution’s home rule provision,
and for Pennsylvania, via the state constitution’s Environmental Rights
Amendment. Despite legislative efforts in both New York and Pennsylvania
to the contrary, courts have interpreted the law to value local control over
legislative efforts towards unified state control.
As evidenced by the ex rel Morrison case, Ohio has been different.
Like Pennsylvania and New York, the Ohio oil and gas statute explicitly
preempts local regulation. Unlike the courts in Pennsylvania and New
York, though, the Supreme Court of Ohio supported the state legislature’s
efforts to bestow on the Ohio DNR sole power to regulate all aspects of
oil and gas operations rather than to preserve local regulatory authority.
So, what is left for local jurisdictions in Ohio and in states with
similar legal circumstances? The answer is not yet known, but the follow-
ing section will explain some possibilities that are nothing short of fan-
tasy, and others that may present a workable reality if attempted by a
motivated community.
560 Id.
561 Id.; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 137.1.
562 Hurtz, supra note 559.
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A. The Fantasy World
This portion of the conclusion describes methods some states have
used to secure the ability of local jurisdictions to act on oil and gas
activities, but which, in Ohio and likely many other states, would be a
fantasy in the current political climate.
1. An Environmental Rights Amendment
Because of the environmental rights amendment to the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution, local jurisdictions there can use their local regulatory
authority to protect their citizens and communities by keeping oil and gas
development in places they deem appropriate. Ohio’s constitution lacks
a comparable provision. Still, many communities across Ohio have at-
tempted to insert the idea of environmental rights into city and village
charters using the so-called Community Bills of Rights.563 So far, the CBRs
have not protected any community from an impending oil or gas well, or
helped in winning for any community the ability to regulate in light of
Ohio’s (or any other state’s) oil and gas statute. They have also led to
litigation against the very cities whose citizens enacted them. The Com-
munity Bills of Rights may have misplaced the rights and responsibilities.
Rather than placing a blanket of ill-defined rights on citizens and hoping
that jurisdictions will be able to enforce them locally, it might be prefera-
ble to hear the valid cries of those seeking a rights-based approach, but
to implement it differently—in an amendment to the state constitution.
Pennsylvania’s environmental rights amendment places environ-
mental responsibility on the Commonwealth. Recall that the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court held this in the Robinson Township case, in particular,
finding that responsibility was not vested singularly in the state legisla-
tive body, the General Assembly, but instead that responsibility filtered
down through all levels of government, including the General Assembly,
but also including local governments.564 Local governments thus were
invested in, not only the power to exercise their environmental responsi-
bility through local zoning, but also the Constitutional responsibility to
do so.
It would benefit Ohio communities enormously to have a similar
environmental rights amendment to the Ohio Constitution. Admittedly,
563 See Robertson, supra note 251.
564 See Dernbach, supra note 340.
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if one is not seeking to vest private parties with casino authority, or the
right to grow medicinal marijuana, it is not easy to change Ohio’s Consti-
tution. But with the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission565
charged with studying the Constitution and proposing changes to the
Ohio General Assembly, perhaps an Environmental Rights Amendment
can at least earn consideration.
2. Statutory and/or Judicial Clarity Regarding Local
Regulatory Authority
Despite the New York legislature’s attempt to preempt local
control of oil and gas activities, that state’s highest court interpreted the
state oil and gas law not to preempt local land use controls, including
local ordinances that would ban or negatively impact oil and gas develop-
ment. The New York court found that the legislature’s intent to preempt
such activities was not sufficiently clear in the statute. Unlike the Ohio
statute, however, the New York statute was not written and expanded
many times to increasingly exclude local control. Local jurisdictions in
New York gained the right to make their own decisions regarding the
desirability or undesirability of drilling in their communities because
New York’s highest court ruled in their favor. They were able, if they
chose, to enact total bans on drilling or on hydraulic fracturing within
their boundaries and many did.
In State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp, the Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the Ohio legislature intended to preempt conflicting
local regulation of oil and gas activities.566 But in declining to act on Beck
Energy’s request for a mandamus order invalidating Munroe Falls’ entire
zoning scheme, that Court sent no message regarding the validity of tra-
ditional local zoning ordinances, even as applied to oil and gas activities.
Local jurisdictions need to know, either through statutory clarity or ju-
dicial decision that their traditional zoning authority is secure. Justice
O’Donnell indicated that local jurisdictions ought to be able to use their
traditional zoning authority, non-discriminatorily created and non-
discriminatorily applied to the oil and gas industry.567 Jurisdictions
would take comfort, though, in an affirmative message on this authority.
This message could come from the legislature, by clarifying the statute.
565 For information about the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission, see http://
www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/home [https://perma.cc/L47N-ENPZ].
566 See Morrison, 143 Ohio St.3d.
567 Id.
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Clearly, though, this is a dangerous request because the legislature could,
instead, clarify that such authority does not exist. Of course, this clarity
could also come from the courts.
Ohio state Representative Debbie Phillips’ bill, H.B. 522, repre-
sents another foray into legislative action that would reverse the current
tide running against local efforts to regulate oil and gas activities.568 It
would remove the language from the oil and gas law that granted exclu-
sive regulatory authority to the state agency, remove language barring
local action, and add language requiring local approval prior to permit
issuance. Though many local jurisdictions will appreciate Representative
Phillips’ efforts, this bill is presented to the same body that created the
language it seeks to reverse. It will likely die where sits, in the Ohio
House Committee on Environment and Natural Resources.
3. Environmental Review
New York state was able to ban, administratively, the use of the hy-
draulic fracturing technology. This was achieved because New York’s state
version of the National Environmental Quality Act, the New York State
Environmental Quality Review Act, requires that agencies complete a
comprehensive environmental review prior to making decisions that would
adversely effect the environment. The New York law goes beyond the
largely procedural national act by requiring that state agencies consider
and act on the findings of the required environmental review. Because
the administrative review indicated health and environmental dangers
associated with hydraulic fracturing, the state agency was able to recom-
mend a ban on the use of the technology.
Ohio has no environmental quality review act. For that matter,
Ohio has no law requiring that state agencies study the environmental con-
sequences of their decisions. Of course, this does not mean that agencies
do not study or consider environmental consequences. Sometimes they do.
It means they are not required to do so by a statute similar to the National
Environmental Policy Act. The welcome adoption of an Ohio environmen-
tal quality review act unfortunately resides in the fantasy section.
B. Reality in an ex rel. Morrison Environment
This portion of the conclusion describes methods to secure some
local control or influence over oil and gas activities which might move
beyond fantasy and into the realm of possibility.
568 See H.B. 522, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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1. Traditional Zoning
Ohio Supreme Court Justice O’Donnell indicated in his ex rel.
Morrison concurrence that local jurisdictions, although preempted from
regulating in conflict with the state oil and gas law, could use their tra-
ditional zoning authority to protect the interests of their communities.569
He was clear to say that such zoning must be non-discriminatorily created
as to the oil and gas industry—that is, it must not target the industry’s
activities—and it must also be non-discriminatorily applied to the oil and
gas industry.
Zoning is something local jurisdictions know how to do. Still,
Justice O’Donnell provided little information about what zoning efforts
would be allowed as they pertain to the oil and gas industry, except to
say that zoning ordinances must be non-discriminatory. Driller Beck
Energy was sufficiently concerned about local jurisdictions using tradi-
tional zoning and applying it to oil and gas activities that it sought,
unsuccessfully, to have the Ohio Supreme Court invalidate the City of
Munroe Falls’ entire zoning code as applied to drilling.570 The fact that
the Court dismissed Beck Energy’s mandamus petition indicates that the
Court was not ready to address an entire zoning code as it pertains to
drilling. By taking no action, the Court found Munroe Falls’ zoning code,
as a whole, neither valid nor invalid. A decision on that question will
have to wait for another case.
Although uncertainty remains regarding zoning that would not
conflict with the state oil and gas law when applied to oil and gas
activities—there has been no statement of the Ohio Supreme Court
confirming its acceptability—Justice O’Donnell’s advice seems sound. In
light of ex rel. Morrison and Justice O’Donnell’s concurrence, now would
be a good time to review local zoning and ensure that zoning ordinances
are written to support the community’s goals.
In Colorado, too, the Supreme Court noted that in striking down
the city of Longmont’s charter-based ban on hydraulic fracturing, it was
leaving—for the present—the city’s traditional zoning authority.571
2. Health and Safety Ordinances
The Ohio Oil and Gas Commission’s decision in the North Royalton
case confirms that communities should be vigilant about their health and
569 See Morrison, 143 Ohio St.3d (O’Donnell, J. concurring in judgment only).
570 Id.
571 See City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 573.
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safety concerns. In throwing out the Ohio Department of Natural Re-
sources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management’s mandatory
pooling order against North Royalton, the Commission said that the Divi-
sion had not given sufficient consideration to North Royalton’s legitimate
safety concerns.572 The driller, Cutter Oil, had applied to the Division for
an order to have some of North Royalton’s city streets mandatorily in-
cluded in a drilling unit.573 The addition would make the drilling unit of
a sufficient size and shape to obtain a state drilling permit. But Cutter
Oil had several other wells within North Royalton and those wells had
presented numerous safety-related problems.
Local jurisdictions should clarify their safety goals and concerns,
and document them. Although the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission order
was quite specific in its application to a given case, it made clear that a
community’s legitimate health and safety concerns must be considered
by the decision-making agency.
3. Voluntary Agreements Amongst Neighbors
The Gates Mills–based Regional Commission has been working
to find solutions to the question of what actions local jurisdictions can
take in a legal environment where the state statute preempts local regu-
lation, a home rule provision is held by the state supreme court not to
apply, but where local residents want some input into local oil and gas
industry activities. The Commission has considered zoning and health
and safety ordinances, but hopes also to advise the communities in the
Utica and Marcellus region regarding some agreements that individual
landowners might enter into amongst themselves. For example, if a suf-
ficient number of landowners would like to prevent drilling, they might
consider using the requirements of Ohio’s mandatory pooling and unit-
ization statutes. To add land to a drilling unit under the unitization
provision, the applicant must show that 65% of the landowners have
already agreed to be included in the drilling unit.574 If a community
really wants to prevent drilling from occurring, it might, with the helpful
coordination and facilitation of local government or non-profits, encour-
age landowners to agree amongst themselves not to lease their land. In
this case, the driller would not be able to assemble the needed 65% of
landowners. Similarly, the Division usually requires that 90% of the land
572 See OHIO OIL & GAS COMM’N, supra note 306.
573 Id.
574 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.28 (West 2013).
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owners in a drilling unit agree to be included before it will force a hold-
out landowner to participate. In a community that seeks to block drilling,
the community would have to obtain agreement from only a small per-
centage of landowners to refuse inclusion in order to block the ability of
the driller to successfully force a dissenting landowner’s inclusion.
Similarly, some organizations are working on plans that would
involve community land trusts coordinating conservation easements in
which landowners would agree, for themselves and future owners of their
land, not to use the land for oil and gas production. There are some major
questions and unknowns that will apply to this solution, such as whether
land subject to a conservation easement can be included in a drilling unit
through unitization or mandatory pooling, but that is an issue for an-
other day.
4. What Local Jurisdictions Can Do Today
Today, local jurisdictions can focus on their traditional zoning codes,
revising them to ensure that they protect their residential, commercial and
industrial zones as is best for their communities. They should re-evaluate
their traffic, noise, light, and similar ordinances to preserve their com-
munities as their residents intend. They should also seek clarity regarding
their zoning ordinances’ applicability to oil and gas activities.
Local jurisdictions can work with their residents to help them
agree amongst themselves to refuse drilling leases. If residents are moti-
vated to regulate oil and gas activities, they should be willing to enter into
agreements regarding not leasing their land. As such, they could prevent
land from being unitized or mandatorily pooled under the requirements
of the state law.
Communities should document safety and health-related incidents
and concerns and make those known to regulators. It is now clear that,
at least in Ohio, the responsible state agency must take local safety con-
cerns into account when making decisions. Jurisdictions should be aware
that this is the case, and be prepared with documentation to make the
case on their own behalf.
Jurisdictions could stretch to the fantasy world, too. They could
push for the addition of an environmental rights amendment to the Ohio
Constitution, for Ohio to adopt a “little NEPA” law that would require
state agencies to consider the environmental implications of their deci-
sions, or for the Ohio legislature to amend the oil and gas law to eliminate
the local preemption provisions and require local approval prior to issuing
a drilling permit.
